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U.S. naval doctrine has been dominated by the Mahanian concept of massing 
large capital ships for over one hundred years. Yet, it was a Cyclone-class patrol craft, a 
USCG cutter, and an Australian frigate that pushed up the Khor-Abd-Allah waterway and 
opened up the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq, during the Second Gulf War. They continue to 
protect it and the surrounding oil infrastructure from insurgent and terrorist attacks today. 
With the navy’s current interest in transformation, the question arises, is the navy as 
presently configured well suited for today’s threats? This thesis explores the question of 
how should the navy meet threats to national interests. This is accomplished through 
historical analysis of an event that is similar to the situation today: The Philippine 
Insurrection (1899-1902). This episode showcases the shortcomings of the navy’s 
conventional approach to military operations other than war, and the need for change. In 
today’s asymmetric environment, the past provides insight into effective means for 
handling these types of threats. This thesis concludes that the navy needs to diversify 
itself to incorporate different ship platforms, platforms that incorporate the utility of old 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The old axiom that “those who will not learn from the past are bound to repeat its 
mistakes” is as valid today as ever. The United States and her military face a pivotal 
juncture. The Cold War has been over for a decade, but the American military has yet to 
transform itself into a fighting force ready for the threats of the 21st Century. Large army 
divisions, air force wings, and naval battle-groups, designed for large-scale conventional 
war on and over the plains of Europe and the high-seas, are finding it difficult to deal 
with the asymmetric threats presented by today’s insurgents and terrorist. While the U.S. 
military battles within itself over what courses of action to take in regards to 
transformation and asymmetric warfare, it is extremely useful to look at the Philippine 
Insurrection (1899-1902) for possible answers and lessons. Check alignment all the way 
The similarities between the Philippine Insurrection and today are numerous, but 
the majority are not the primary focus of this study, although their underlying themes are 
obvious throughout the paper. While there is clearly a need for such work, and it would 
most assuredly draw immense attention, the topic of this paper deals specifically with the 
navy in the Philippine Insurrection and concludes with the implications for the navy 
today. As demonstrated in the proceeding paragraphs, the parallels are there 
Even the most cursory analysis of the Philippine Insurrection and the events of 
today, most notably Operation Iraqi Freedom, demonstrate a host of similarities. While 
today’s leaders imply that “nation building” and “stability operations” are new concepts 
that the military is struggling to embrace, one only has to look to the Philippines one 
hundred years ago to see the U.S. military facing many of the same problems. On May 
21, 1898, President William McKinley issued his famous “Benevolent Assimilation” 
proclamation in which he claimed that the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila 
Harbor and the surrender of Spanish forces in Manila, “practically effected the conquest 
of the Philippine Islands”.1 Less then two months later, a violent insurrection erupted that 
                                                 
1 William McKinley, “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation” (Executive Mansion, Washington, 
D.C., Dec. 21, 1898), Available [Online] 
http://www.boondocksnet.com//centennial/sctexts/assimilation.html [Oct. 3, 2004]. 
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would take years to quell. While there are dissimilarities between the circumstances of 
this proclamation and that issued May 2, 2003 by President George W. Bush ending 
major combat operations in Iraq, there are also parallels. 
Iraq witnessed prisoner abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison while the Philippines saw 
atrocities such as the “water cure”, a method learned from the Spanish to extract 
information by filling a person’s stomach with water and then squeezing it out of him. 
The ethnic and religious rifts between Christian Americans, Iraqi Sunnis, Iraqi Shiites, 
and Iraqi Kurds present similar religious and ethnic problems as those encountered in the 
Philippines between Protestant Americans, Catholic Filipinos, Muslim Moros, and 
Tagolog Filipinos. Also strikingly similar is the support initially given to Filipino leader 
Emilio Aguinaldo by the United States and that of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Pentagon to Ahmed Chalabi. While the support of Aguinaldo backfired on America, 
it is yet to be seen what will happen with Chalabi, but his increasing distance from the 
United States does not bode well. 
Other similarities include the outside support of insurgents. Today arms and 
supplies are pouring in across porous borders from Iran, Syria, and Jordan, much the 
same way Filipino insurgents sought to be supplied by Germany and Japan. Three of the 
most important comparisons involve strategy, manning, and force structure.  The question 
one-hundred years ago was whether to adopt a policy of appeasement or provocation 
towards the Filipino population. While appeasement won out initially in the Philippines, 
it led to what many believed was a view by the Filipinos as American weakness, a theme 
echoed in Iraq today. The result was the eventual adoption of harsher methods, similar to 
those being adopted in the Sunni Triangle. Part of this problem was insufficient numbers 
of troops and the right composition of the occupying forces. The “stop-loss” or “back-
door draft” of today replicates the situation as when the United States Volunteers, state 
militias enlisted for the Spanish-American War, were retained past termination of their 
contracts in the Philippines at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War because of 
the burgeoning Philippine Insurrection. 
The insurrection became an issue in the 1900 election that pitted President 
McKinley, seen as an imperialist, against William J. Bryan, who advocated immediate 
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independence for the ceded territories. The legal problem of “unlawful combatants” is not 
new. In fact, it predates the Philippine Insurrection, as is seen when the army in the 
Philippines pushed for the adoption and full implementation of the Lieberman Code, a set 
of rules governing the conduct of the army in the field in regards to a hostile population 
that had been issued by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War in response to 
conditions in the border states. In dealing more harshly with the population, a policy of 
“concentration” was adopted by the army; a method that was used by the Spanish in Cuba 
and would later appear in South Africa, British Malaysia, and in Vietnam as the “strategic 
hamlet” program. 
At the turn of the 20th Century, America found itself as an emerging world power, 
seeking to protect her growing economic prowess throughout the world. The task at hand 
was transforming its military from one of territorial defense to one of global presence. Of 
course this is not to say that the American military had never exerted its influence abroad, 
but prior to the Spanish-American War and the following Philippine Insurrection, it had 
never embarked on such a large-scale permanent occupation abroad save for a rather 
short campaign in Mexico (1846-1848). To achieve this new mission, the navy adapted to 
the strategy espoused by prominent military theorist Alfred T. Mahan. But, while 
America concerned herself with building battleship fleets and deciding where to 
concentrate its mass, much like the current concern over the Expeditionary Strike Groups, 
it was not these large capital vessels that were crucial in the Philippine Insurrection. 
What can the navy of today learn from the navy of the past? Gunboats and littoral 
operations have always for the most part been relegated to minor roles within the navy. 
As Lieutenant Commander John E. Lewis, commanding officer of the gunboats Mindoro 
and Gardoqui during the Philippine Insurrection asserted, “gunboats were the stepchild of 
the Navy. The Navy did not want them and assumed charge only when the army 
indicated they intended to operate them if the navy did not.” 2 But it was “In the narrow, 
shallow waters of the archipelago, the ‘real war’ in the Philippines was fought by the 
gunboats. . . . they convoyed troops to isolated coastal villages, protected garrisons and 
                                                 
2 John E. Lewis to Dudley Knox, May 14, 1945; Operations of Large Groups of Vessels, Squadrons, 
Asiatic 1887-1902, Subject File OO (SF OO); Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records 
and Library, 1691-1945, Record Group 45 (RG 45); National Archives Building (NAB), Washington, D.C. 
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patrols, and ferried supplies and reinforcements.”, notes American historian of the 
Philippine Insurrection, Brian MacAllister Linn. 3 Is this pertinent to today’s navy? If you 
consider that in the major push into Iraq to open up the Khor Abd Allah water way and 
the port of Umm Qasr, it was a navy coastal patrol craft (PC), Australian frigate, and 
Coast Guard Cutter that accomplished the task while the naval fleet, too large and too 
valuable in near coastal areas, remained off shore. Also, the Iraqi oil terminals of Khawr 
al-Amaya and al-Basra are being protected by the Coast Guard and navy PC’s today. 
A. OUTLINE 
As stated previously, the purpose of this paper is to explore the role of the navy 
during the Philippine Insurrection. To accomplish this, a system of chronological analysis 
is used to present a clear and understandable portrayal of events as they happened. This 
paper has divided the period (1899-1902) into three sections: from the outbreak of 
hostilities and the first year of conventional warfare (1899), guerilla warfare in the second 
year (1900), and the unraveling and final defeat of the insurgency (1901-1902). Each 
chapter is further divided into specific operational missions that the navy fulfilled, to 
include cooperation with the army, blockading, and other operations.  At the same time, 
to understand fully the role that the navy played, naval operations must be placed within 
the context of the overall picture of operations, and for this, there is a large portion 
devoted to exploring the other half of the equation: the army. It concludes with the 
argument that there are several important lessons to take away from the Philippine 
Insurrection, examples that are hopefully not too late to learn. 
Chapter I is the introduction to this paper. The chapter explores the relevance of 
the Philippine Insurrection to events of today and presents the structure of the thesis. The 
methodology of studying a hundred years old subject requires both primary and 
secondary sources. The last part of the chapter explains the background to the conflict. 
Chapter II opens with the start of the insurrection on February 4, 1899. For the 
first year of hostilities, conventional warfare dominated the landscape, and the navy’s 
role was to support land operations. At the same time as the campaigns were being waged 
                                                 
3 Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 
207. 
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on land, the navy was also busy trying to enforce a blockade to prevent the importation of 
arms and other supplies from abroad and within the archipelago.  But, while the main 
focus tended to be on support and blockading, the navy also engaged in “other 
operations”. These included projecting American presence throughout the islands and 
acting as a force multiplier where the army could not divert enough strength away from 
its main campaigns on Luzon. At the end of the first year of hostilities, the army and navy 
had evolved dramatically to fight the insurgency with a large degree of success. 
Unfortunately, war is not static, and the insurgents, having learned that they could not 
defeat the Americans on a conventional battlefield, resorted to guerilla warfare. 
Chapter III deals with the change in strategy of the insurgents into one of guerilla 
warfare. In conventional operations, the support of the populace for the insurgents was 
not critical because American forces pummeled the Filipino army on the battlefield, 
destroying its ranks, arms, and supplies. But, under guerilla warfare, the insurgents drew 
their strength from the populace and it would take a year until Americans evolved a 
strategy for dealing with this. Counter-insurgency operations in a maritime environment 
required close army/navy cooperation. The navy was also forced to maintain a blockade 
over an expanded area. Meanwhile, the China Relief Expedition siphoned off troops and 
ships to deal with the Boxer Rebellion (May to August, 1900). At the close of 1900, the 
insurrection had maintained its momentum. The U.S. military finally realized that 
moderation would not prevent the insurgents from winning over or controlling the 
population. So, a harsher strategy was decided on for the next year. 
Chapter IV deals with the final phase of the insurrection. After the reelection of 
McKinley in 1900, the combination of the adoption of harsher methods, and the 
army/navy reaching their peak strength, caused the insurgency to fade. As the U.S. 
military began confiscating and destroying property of insurgent supporters, and arresting 
and deporting sympathizers, native support for the insurgency began to wane. By 1901 
insurgent generals began to capitulate, and with the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo on 
March 23, 1901, all but a few persistent insurgents remained after May. However, in the 
Province of Batangas, in Luzon, and on the Island of Samar, the insurgents remained 
active for almost another year. But, with the blockade cutting off supplies and the 
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constant pursuit by the army, the last of the insurgent generals was finally defeated. On 
July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the end to hostilities.  
In the aftermath of the Philippine Insurrection, it is clear that the navy’s role was 
to cooperate with the army and enforce a blockade. These two objectives were met with 
great success. The gunboat and not the battleship was the vessel that secured America’s 
interest in the Philippines. The utility of the gunboat was immeasurable: it allowed the 
army to conduct amphibious operations and extended its operational and tactical reach. 
The overarching problem for the Americans was to evolve an effective counter-
insurgency strategy that separated the combatant and combatant-supporter.  In 
conclusion, to combat an asymmetric threat, which any enemy will try to present, it is 
incumbent to meet it with a force appropriately tailored for the mission. Aircraft carriers, 
cruisers, and destroyers do not completely fulfill this requirement as battleships and 
cruisers did not during the Philippine Insurrection. The navy needs the flexibility allowed 
by a variety of platforms, and as learned 100 years ago, small-littoral gunboats provide 
such agility. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
When using the MERLN/WorldCat search engine, which has access to the OCLC 
Online Union Catalog to over 9,000 libraries, typing in the “Philippine Insurrection” 
results in 384 records found. Type in the “Boxer Rebellion” and the result is 1,394 
records for a conflict that erupted in May 1900, and ended in August with the lifting of 
the siege of Peking, barley three months. The “Spanish-American War”, which started on 
April 25, 1898 with the U.S. declaration of war, ceased hostilities on August 13, 1898, 
returns with 6,091 records found. It is only through the efforts of Brian MacAllister Linn 
that there seems to be a recent swell in interest on the subject of the Philippine 
Insurrection, and with the similarities with the situation in Iraq, this should only increase. 
This is the context of a thesis that seeks to discover the navy’s role in the Philippine 
Insurrection. 
The starting point for this project was to search through secondary sources and 
ascertain what primary sources were used by previous and much more enlightened 
scholars. The majority of the literature (99.9%) on the Philippine Insurrection can be 
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grouped into two areas: that concerning the army, and that concerning the political aspect 
of the war, neither of which are the major focus of this study. But, the majority of these 
writings did identify six military primary sources (groups). These sources provided the 
bulk of material for this research and included the annual reports of the Department of the 
Navy and the War Department; personal accounts by such individuals as Bradley A. Fisk, 
Frederick Sawyer, and General Frederick Funston respectively; the compilation of 
insurgent documents by John R. Taylor, the War Department’s correspondence relating 
to the insurrection; but most importantly, records within the National Archives.  
The constant obstacles encountered with the primary sources centered on several 
facets. During the first year of hostilities, gunboats were assigned to “parent ships” and 
thus made their reports to them. Unfortunately, it seems that these reports went no 
further. Another problem is that of the condition of primary documents. Many reports 
were hand written, and not to be critical of the officers of the time, were illegible, or at 
least to the point that, time being of the essence, not usable for this study. A great deal of 
the documents used carbon copy paper, which has over time, faded or disappeared to the 
point of illegibility. What is left is still a good deal of material, but it is sporadic and 
incomplete. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to present these accounts and deduce 
from them a coherent account of what actually transpired. In this effort, secondary 
sources proved most useful. 
Much of the secondary writing on the Philippine Insurrection deals with the 
political aspect of the conflict. The decision to annex the Philippines, how and why, is the 
subject of much discussion. On the same scale, much has been written on the army in the 
insurrection. Unfortunately, the volumes written about the army center solely on it, or 
often use the battles on Samar and Batangas, the most controversial, as a basis for 
describing the whole war. There are a number of texts by Filipinos that present a unique 
view into the occurrences of specific locations such as on Leyte or Cebu. But, while 
informative, they tend to be a bit limited in scope and view. The rest of the literature is 
usually composed of compilations that devote a small portion to the conflict and usually 
adhere to received views. Two books proved to be most valuable: Brian McAllister 
Linn’s, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 is an excellent, well researched, and neutral 
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presentation of the conflict.4 This one work was the “go to” book. While the main focus 
was the army, Linn paid due attention to the accomplishments of the navy and the other 
facets of the conflict. The other work was the doctoral dissertation of Vernon L. 
Williams, “The U.S. Navy in the Philippine Insurrection and Subsequent Native Unrest, 
1898-1906”.5 While this title may appear as overlapping, that is not the case. Williams’ 
focus is almost solely on the navy in the Philippines and its impact on the service. He 
does not present the navy’s role in the context of the larger picture - that is, the navy’s 
association with the army and its strategy. Furthermore, he extends his study out to 1906 
and studies the career trends of the young officers who served aboard the gunboats in the 
Philippines and naval base development.  
Rarely does the secondary literature present an overall account of the 
complexities of the conflict, including the navy, but usually repeats accepted 
interpretations. A case in point is the conduct of Brigadier General James F. Smith who 
has been vilified by most for his command on Samar. 6 While it is alleged that Smith 
ordered the interior of the island to be transformed into a “howling wilderness”, in fact he 
simply adopted the policies of his predecessor, Brigadier General Robert Hughes, who 
had been employing them for two years throughout the Visayan Island group. Another 
area lacking in current writing is in regard to the causal linkages between the policies 
adopted by the military and the background of these military leaders who were often 
Civil War veterans and Indian fighters. This study hopes to correct these lacunae. 
C. PRE-HOSTILITIES 
The focus of this paper is the navy’s role in the Philippine Insurrection, so the 
issues of the Spanish-American War, why the U.S. annexed the Philippines and why 
hostilities broke out, are dealt with only summarily. But, like so many other things, they 
do have an influence on the navy’s role inasmuch as they shaped the conflict. For this 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Vernon L. Williams, “The U.S. Navy in the Philippine Insurrection and Subsequent Native Unrest, 
1898-1906”, Ph.D. diss., Texas A&M University, 1985. 
6Richard E. Dupay and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars of the United States (New York: 
Hawthorn Books, Inc., 2003), 89-93. 
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reason, it is necessary briefly to discuss what was happening prior to the start of the 
Philippine Insurrection.  
The turn of the 20th century found America in a period of transition. The political 
ideology of the time was taking a new form. Social Darwinism was prevalent during the 
1890’s which helped feed the climate for expansionism. In 1890 the frontier was claimed 
to no longer exist (Frederick Jackson Turner) and this pronouncement was followed by a 
depression that lasted from 1893 to 1897. In 1890, Captain Alfred T. Mahan published 
his book on naval strategy, The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783.7 The 
rest of the world was scrambling for colonies, and America believed that it required 
outlets for its surplus goods and capital, so some leaders started looking beyond the 
nation’s borders. Senator Orville Platt advised, “It is to the oceans that our children must 
look as we once looked to the boundless west.”8  At the same time, the United States 
faced threats to the Monroe Doctrine in the Atlantic and the Open Door policy in the 
Pacific. While in Hong Kong preparing for war with Spain in November 1897, 
Commodore George Dewey recounted how there was uneasiness as foreign nations 
awaited the dismemberment of China which they foresaw as imminent.9  
In 1896, a young Lieutenant William W. Kimball, under direction of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, drafted plans for war against Spain. The war plans advocated the 
attacking of colonies, which when inadequately defended are in time of war a source of 
serious weakness for the mother country. The plans called for the destruction of Spanish 
power in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, which was seen as the best way to force 
Madrid to come to terms. But the retention of colonies once they were conquered was not 
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addressed. It was these war plans that the Naval War Board endorsed for the war with 
Spain, which commenced on April 24, 1898. 10  
On the morning of May 1, 1898, Rear Admiral George S. Dewey’s squadron 
(cruisers Olympia, Boston, Raleigh, Baltimore, and gunboats Concord, and Petrel) 
entered Manila Bay and after a brief battle, destroyed the Spanish squadron under 
Spanish Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo (the Spanish squadron included the antiquated 
cruisers Reina Cristina and Castilla, and gunboats Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio de 
Ullao, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, Velasco, Marques del Duero, Isla de Mindanao).11  
After the battle, the gunboat Petrel was sent into shore to clean up what was left of the 
Spanish squadron and bombard the Spanish arsenal at Cavite. After firing a few rounds of 
her main batteries, Montojo raised the white flag and officially surrendered. The next step 
of the navy was to cut off the enemy’s commerce in and around Manila as the first step in 
weakening enemy resistance.12 By May 12, 1898, Dewey and his ships were maintaining 
a strict blockade around the city.13 In May, the Spanish gunboats Callao and Manila were 
captured and put into service by the navy, and realizing the utility of such small shallow 
draft vessels, Dewey requested that the gunboats Bennington and Yorktown be sent 
instead of the cruiser Philadelphia.14 In detailing the instructions for the occupation of 
the Philippines by the military, President McKinley stated that “All ports and places in 
the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be 
opened, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral 
nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war.”15  
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After Dewey annihilated Spanish naval forces in Manila Bay, the army prepared 
to fight Spanish land forces. Major General Wesley Merritt, commanding the Philippine 
Expedition (Department of the Pacific, 8th Army Corps), requested 12,000 field soldiers 
plus support personnel. However, Major General Nelson A. Miles, Commanding General 
of the Army, recommended a force consisting of more volunteer troops and fewer 
regulars, and a lighter composition with infantry and cavalry.. Merritt responded that the 
force (recommended by Miles) would be unsuited and insufficient for the Philippines, 
some 7,000 miles from base, defended by 10,000-25,000 Spanish led forces, and 
inhabited by 14,000,000 people “the majority whom will regard us with the intense 
hatred born of race and religion”. Miles countered that it was not U.S. policy to conquer 
an extensive territory, but only take Manila and relieve the navy.16 By late May, with 
McKinley’s refusal to provide clear guidance and Miles’ efforts to restrict the size and 
composition of the 8th Corps, the Secretary of War came to a compromise and decided to 
send a force of 20,000 troops.17 
The blockade of Manila was entirely at the discretion of Dewey. Because of the 
lengthy time required to communicate, all matters of the management of affairs were left 
up to him.18 So, as Dewey besieged the Spanish from the sea, he sought the assistance of 
Filipinos on Land. Dewey recommended supplying the Filipino insurgents, American 
allies at the time, with arms and ammunition. From the captured Cavite Spanish Arsenal, 
Dewey provided the insurgents with rifles and cartridges. 19 In Hong Kong, Consul 
General Rounseville Wildman assisted insurgent attempts to purchase arms. But a 
shipment was stopped by the Chinese and British authorities. On June 23, 1898, 
Aguinaldo declared open revolution by the Filipinos against the Spanish, and on July 1, 
1898, he declared himself president of the Republic of the Philippines. In August he 
                                                 
16 Miles to SECWAR, May 18, 1898, Correspondence, 648-649. 
17 AGWAR to Merritt, May 29, 1898, ibid., 680; Wesley Merritt, to William McKinley, May 13, 
1898, idem, 643-644; Nelson A. Miles to SECWAR, May 16, 1898, idem, 647-648; Merritt to SECWAR, 
May 17, 1898, idem, 648. 
18 SECNAV to Henry W. Peabody & Co., Jun. 8, 1898; Area File 10 (AF 10) of the Naval Records 
Collection, 1775-1910 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M625); RG45; NAB. 
19 Alvey A. Adee, Second Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to SECWAR, May 21,1898, 
Correspondence, 665; SECNAV to SECWAR, May 27, 1898, idem. 
 12
declared independence.20 The insurgent Filipino army at this time was reported to field 
about 37,000 troops, but only possessed 6,600 rifles, taken from the Spanish.21 In a 
prophetic message, U.S. Army Brigadier General Anderson wrote that,  
These people [Filipinos] only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all 
difference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not 
ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and though 
insignificant in appearance are fierce fighters . . . .22   
Within in a year, these “fierce fighters” would launch an insurrection to oppose 
U.S. plans to colonize the Philippines. 
With the American squadron, supplemented by the arrivals of the cruiser 
Charleston, and monitors Monterey and Monadnock, under Dewey, and army forces 
under Merritt, the city of Manila fell on August 13, 1898, a day after peace protocols had 
been signed between Spain and the United States. Dewey immediately lifted the blockade 
and opened the port to trade.23 President McKinley called for U.S. forces to occupy and 
hold the city of Manila, the bay, and harbor pending the signing of a treaty and to 
commence trade and protect Spanish interests.24 General Merritt for his part, having 
captured Manila, recommended that no more troops be sent to the Philippines.25 
In the only report found from the Naval War Board, dated August 19, 1898, two 
threats in the Philippines were indentified.26 First, the insurgents might turn to overt acts 
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of disorderly conduct which the army and Dewey would be forced to repress. 
Alternatively, foreign powers, claiming that their interests were threatened, would assert 
their right to intervene. The recommendation of the board was to send a division of two 
battleships and an appropriate number of cruisers to reinforce Dewey. The intent was to 
demonstrate the power of the United States to repress internal disorder or oppose outside 
intervention in the region, both to insurgents and to foreign powers.27  
Major General Elwell Otis relieved Merritt on August 29, 1898. By this time it 
was reported that the insurgents entrenched around Manila numbered about 15,000, with 
11,000 armed, mostly with rifles taken from the Spanish or given by Dewey.28 Even 
though relations were somewhat strained between the Americans and Filipinos, 
originating from the exclusion of Filipinos from occupying Manila, they remained 
cordial, and free trade was granted to Filipino vessels in and around Manila.29 But by 
September, charged with protecting the Spanish and hearing that the insurgents were 
launching attacks on them throughout the archipelago, the American senior leadership in 
Manila became worried. Otis estimated that he faced about 30,000 Filipino troops in and 
around Manila, and that the insurgents might be seeking assistance from the Japanese; he 
thought war a possibility. 30 On September 23, 1898, the American steamer Abby was 
seized off the port of Batangas, Southern Luzon, by the navy. Unfortunately, she had 
already unloaded her cargo of arms and ammunition for the insurgents.31 Dewey also 
began to detain Filipino vessels in Manila Bay for flying the insurgent flag because he 
viewed them as a threat to U.S. authority.32 Meanwhile, on October 3, 1898, Otis pressed 
for the opening up of foreign trade in the Philippines’ major ports of entry: Manila, Iloilo 
on Panay, and Cebu on Cebu.33 Unbeknownst to the Americans, the insurgents were 
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already collecting a 5-15% duty on all trade within the islands in efforts to supplement 
the insurgent governments’ funds.34 
In November 1898, the situation continued to deteriorate. Aguinaldo was 
preaching independence. He claimed that the Americans must be driven out, and was 
seeking to obtain the protection of Japan.35  While Consul General Wildman was 
pressured to stop assisting the insurgents in importing arms, the insurgents tried to obtain 
arms using other means. Using money raised through a loan from banks, the insurgents 
purchased Mauser rifles, several tons of powder, small arms ammunition, and were 
looking into six 6-pounder (pdr.) field pieces. The supposed method of operation was to 
purchase the arms in Hong Kong, consigned to the Chinese government at Shanghai, 
which would decline to receive them. But on the return voyage, instead of going to Hong 
Kong, the vessel would sail to Luzon for Aparri or Lingayen Bay.36 Unfortunately for the 
Filipinos, the company that they entrusted, Sylveste and Company, welched on the deal, 
and took their money and arms. Since the trade was illegal to begin with, the Filipinos 
had no recourse.37 The increased insurgent activity forced the Spanish to consolidate and 
withdraw their forces to the city of Iloilo on the island of Panay.38 
As peace treaty negotiations began in Paris and the likelihood of Philippine 
annexation by the United States seemed likely, Otis recommended that seven main posts 
would be required with several detached garrisons to hold the islands. Though the 
locations were not mentioned in his correspondence, Otis stated that the total required 
strength would be 25,000 U.S. troops, and their dispersement would depend on the 
behavior of the inhabitants.39 At this same time, President McKinley ordered that no arms 
or munitions of war were to be landed in the Philippines.40  
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In a move that would greatly effect the composition and efficiency of the navy 
within the Philippines, Otis made arrangements for the transfer of the former Spanish 
gunboats Paragua, Samar, Albay, Calamianes, Mindoro, Mariveles, Pampanga, Panay, 
Manileno, Urdaneta, Gardoqui, and Basco in the southern Philippines to Manila.41 These 
would add to the navy’s arsenal of former Spanish gunboats such as the Callao and 
Manila that the navy was operating, and the Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, and Don Juan 
de Austria which were being repaired in Hong Kong. While the navy (Dewey) was not 
initially pleased to be assuming the burden of the gunboats, it is noted that those most 
familiar with the Philippines and the usefulness of gunboat, saw its need. In a note, Sir 
Andrew Clarke, former British Governor of the Straits Settlements (Malacca, Singapore, 
and Penang), wrote that, while seeing that the United States was sending more troops, he 
wished that they were sending more gunboats, as “they will be found more useful in 
every way”.42 
On December 4, 1898, McKinley finally acknowledges his intent to retain the 
Philippines.43 So, on December 8, 1898, Otis informed the Secretary of War of the 
necessity to occupy the ports of Iloilo and Cebu as soon as possible, and then the ports of 
Aparri, Vigan, Dagupan, and Zamboanga (seven points if included with Manila).44 On 
December 10, 1898, the Paris Peace Treaty was signed between the United States and 
Spain, and for the sum of 20 million dollars, the Philippines were ceded to America.  But, 
on December 14, 1898, as Otis received a petition for protection from the bankers and 
merchants at Iloilo, the Secretary of War and the President were out of town and 
instructed Otis to wait for a reply upon their return.45 On December 21, 1898, McKinley 
instructed Otis to send troops to preserve peace and protect life and property, but most 
importantly not to start a conflict with the insurgents. That same day the Spanish vacated 
Iloilo, and the insurgents occupied the town. The 21st also marked the day that McKinley 
gave his famous “Benevolent Assimilation” speech which included the statement: 
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All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of 
the land and naval forces of the Unite States will be opened to the 
commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares, not prohibited for 
military reasons by due announcement of the military authority, will be 
admitted . . . the mission of the United States is one of benevolent 
assimilation.46 
By the end of December, an advisor to the president, Professor Dean C. 
Worcester, of the University of Michigan, suggested that the War Department occupy all 
strategic points in the island before the insurgents did.47 With due restraint, Otis 
responded that he was well aware of the strategic points in the islands, but that all had 
been turned over by the Spanish to the insurgents, except Zamboanga, when the Spanish 
had secretly withdrawn their forces. The strategic points could have been taken earlier, 
but not now.48 The Secretary of War responded that it was not expected that the 
occupation be prosecuted too rapidly, but proceed with prudence, avoiding conflict if 
possible, and only resort to force as the last extremity, “Be kind and tactful, taking time if 
necessary to accomplish results desired by peaceful means”.49 
In McKinley’s “Benevolent Assimilation” speech, he claimed that “the 
destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval 
squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and 
the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically affected the conquest of the Philippine 
Islands”. In a chilling tell, Dewey asserted otherwise, “in return for . . . the islands, 
[Spain] was paid the sum of twenty million . . . [the United States] scarcely 
comprehended that a rebellion was included with the purchase. We were far from being 
in possession of the property which we had bought.”50 The Philippine Insurrection was 
only a matter of time. 
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II. THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND 
CONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Though there has been no declaration of war, though there has been no 
avowal of hostile intent, with two such armies confronting each other with 
such diverse intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to ignite the 
magazine which is to explode. (Senator Robert Bacon) 
On the night of February 4, 1899, as a small patrol of three Filipino soldiers 
approached the American line surrounding the city of Manila, the order of “halt” was 
issued by a small patrol of Nebraska Volunteers. Failing to heed the order, the Filipinos 
continued on, and a young-American private, William Grayson, opened fire. The 
Philippine Insurrection had started. 
The composition of American forces in and around Manila were prepared for the 
initial turn of events with the onset of hostilities. The land forces were assigned to 
Military Governor of the Philippines, Department of the Pacific, Major General Elwell S. 
Otis, and consisted of roughly 20,000 troops of the Eighth Army Corps. The vast 
majority of these troops were drawn from state militias and known as U.S. Volunteers; 
the rest being U.S. Army Regulars. Of his total troop strength, only 11,000 were front-
line troops arranged into two separate divisions (see Figure1). The 1st Division, 
commanded by Brigadier General Thomas N. Anderson, held the southern American line 
south from the Pasig River to Manila Bay. The 2nd Division, commanded by Brigadier 
General Arthur MacArthur, was holding the northern line from the Pasig River northward 
along the outskirts of Manila to Manila Bay. Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes was the 
Provost Marshall of Manila and was charged with the City of Manila proper.51  
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Figure 1.   Manila (From: Linn, The Philippine War, 43) 
 
 19
The U.S. naval forces on Asiatic Station were commanded by Rear Admiral 
George S. Dewey aboard the flagship Olympia. The squadron had grown since the Battle 
of Manila Bay the preceding year, but it still remained relatively small. Assigned an 
enormous area of responsibility, Dewey stationed only one vessel outside of the 
Philippine Islands, the gunboat Monocacy, at Shanghai, China. All other vessels of the 
Asiatic Station were assigned duties in the Philippine Islands. At the onset of hostilities, 
these ships included the cruisers Olympia, Boston, and Charleston, the monitors 
Monadnock and Monterey, and the gunboats Callao, Concord, Manila, and Petrel.52 The 
naval force by early February was arranged with the Charleston, Callao, and Concord 
anchored off Vitas protecting the Army’s northern flank. The Monadnock was anchored 
off of Fort San Antonio de Abad on the Army’s southern flank. The flagship Olympia 
took position off Manila proper in the middle, and the Boston and Petrel were anchored 
off the port of Iloilo on the Island of Panay.53 
The Filipino Army of Liberation held a loose line around Manila and the 
American positions. Commanded by President and General Emilio Aguinaldo, the 
insurgents mustered over 20,000 troops on their line.54 Using fortified fieldworks, 
emplaced artillery, strong points, and a number of captured Spanish blockhouses, the 
Army of Liberation held a semi-circle from Boca de Vita in the north to Fort San Antonio 
de Abad in the south, presenting a formable obstacle to American forces. A brief note 
must be made to Emilio Aguinaldo as to his importance in the Philippine Insurrection. 
Aguinaldo had been a key Figurein the Katipunan Revolution against the Spanish that 
started in 1896. Exiled to Hong Kong by the Spanish, Aguinaldo was brought back to 
Manila by the United States to assist in coordinating Filipino efforts during the Spanish-
American War, and assumed command of the Filipino Army. As hopes of independence 
for the Philippines diminished with the Treaty of Paris, Aguinaldo led the resistance to 
American occupation, and on January 1, 1899, he was elected President of the Philippine 
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Republic. Emilio Aguinaldo was twenty-nine years old when hostilities broke out; he 
embodied the hopes and aspirations of a nation that had endured 300 years of Spanish 
occupation, and he led the fight to prevent any further occupation. 
The initial strategy, after the Spanish-American War and the decision to annex the 
Philippines was made, was for the United States to take control of all the strategic points 
in the Philippine Islands. But after Spanish troops withdrew prematurely, in late 
December 1899, prior to American occupation, these points all fell into the hands of 
Filipino forces. Manila was the only exception. Otis desired to occupy the cities of Iloilo, 
Panay; Cebu, Cebu; Zamboanga, Mindanao; and Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago as soon as 
possible (see Figure2), but the main threat to American interests lay on the island of 
Luzon. Desiring to also occupy the strategic points of Dagupan, Aparri, and Legaspi on 
Luzon, and to secure Manila, Otis first had to contend with the main Filipino force 
surrounding Manila.  
The strategy of the navy, as stated by Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, was to 
“cooperate with the Army and to maintain a blockade of such extent as has been 
determined by the general policy of campaign laid down by the War Department”.55 At 
the commencement of hostilities, Otis defined the navy’s role as stopping arms shipments 
to the insurgents from China and Japan and cooperating with the Army.56 Unfortunately, 
American naval forces would suffer from a lack of manpower and vessels. Further adding 
to the difficulties of the blockade was an inconsistent policy by Otis and neglect of 
Dewey who tended to focus more on his social schedule more than anything.57  
The first year of hostilities was dominated by conventional warfare. Americans 
fought nine successful military campaigns against the Filipino Army of Liberation from 
February 4, 1899 to February 9, 1900. Of the named campaigns, only one, the Iloilo 
Campaign, occurred outside of the Island of Luzon. The greater emphasis on Luzon was 
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because it held the three greatest objectives for the military: the Army of Liberation, 




Figure 2.   Philippines Islands (From: 
http://www.nationmaster.com/images/enc/P/Ph_general_map.png) 
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In Clausewitzian fashion, these three objectives embodied the “centers of gravity” 
that American forces sought to destroy or capture. 
In each of the nine conventional military campaigns, except one (the Tarlac 
Campaign), naval vessels (both navy and army operated) played a crucial role. As 
attention was diverted or mandated to other parts of the archipelago during this time, the 
navy’s importance grew even more. And the blockade, as it became effectively 
employed, proved instrumental in its efforts in suppressing Filipino resistance. This 
chapter looks at the navy’s role during the first year of the Insurrection, in cooperating 
with the army’s campaigns, implementing a blockade, and acting in other operations 
throughout the archipelago. During this period many changes came about for the navy. 
The size of naval forces on the Asiatic Station grew exponentially, the station was 
reorganized and saw new leadership, and the navy was forced to rely on vessels that did 
not prescribe to its newly adopted Mahanian theory of concentration and mass of 
battleships. Instead, the navy had to rely on the lonely gunboat. 
A. THE CAMPAIGNS 
1. Manila (February 4, 1899 – March 17, 1899) 
After the initial exchange of volleys on the night of February 4, 1899, rifle fire 
subsided within several hours. On the morning of February 5, 1899, the American 
assault, a preplanned reaction should hostilities begin, began under the withering fire of 
U.S. artillery and the guns of the U.S. naval ships Callao, Charleston, Concord, and 
Monadnock. With the softening up of the Filipino front lines and flanks by the navy, the 
army began its advance that would steadily push back the Army of Liberation around 
Manila for over a month during the Manila Campaign (see Figure3).58  
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Figure 3.   Manila Region (After: Linn, The Philippine War, 28) 
  
McArthur’s 2nd Division advanced along the San Juan River towards the high 
ground of Santa Mesa Ridge held by the insurgents on February 5, 1899. With the 
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Charleston and Callao shelling enemy positions along the north, the 2nd Division broke 
through the Army of Liberation’s lines by nightfall and held the ridge. As the Filipinos 
were routed, they withdrew to the city of Caloocan. Caloocan was an important city due 
to its rail station and that it blocked the way to the insurgent capital at Malolos. After 
receiving troop reinforcements from the southern line and the Monadnock off Bitas River 
on February 9, 1899, General MacArthur launched his offensive against Caloocan on 
February 10, 1899. Receiving gunfire support from the vessels Charleston and 
Monadnock, the army was able to capture the city and the strategic Manila-Dagupan 
railroad terminus.59 As the Filipino Army launched a counterattack on Caloocan the 
following day, the Charleston opened fire upon the insurgents and helped repel the 
attack.60 After the fall of Caloocan, the Monadnock continued to render vital assistance to 
MacArthur’s forces as they battled around Caloocan and Malabon. While providing 
gunfire support, the vessel was also ordered to interdict waterborne supplies being taken 
to the insurgent army at neighboring Polo. In one such raid on the night of February 23, 
1899, the Monadnock captured thirty-five Filipinos and 15 small canoes and banca boats 
(an outrigger-equipped, manually constructed, canoe-shaped wooden boat commonly 
used in the Philippines).61 
Along the 1st Division line to the south,  Anderson’s advance on February 5, 1899 
proceeded successfully. The only exception was along the shore of Manila Bay. Brigadier 
General Ovenshire, pushing towards Pasay, met stiff resistance. Even with the assistance 
of the  monitor Monadnock, laying off Fort San Antonio, enfilading Filipino trenches and 
causing the first Filipino retreat with its four 10-inch guns and two 4-inch guns the 
progress was slow. Finally, the cruiser Charleston, with its main battery of two 8-inch 
guns and six 6-inch guns, was transferred from the north to assist.62 The combined 
gunfire of both the Monadnock and Charleston at last allowed Ovenshire’s troops to 
breakout and cleared the ground for their advance. By nightfall the Americans were in 
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control of the town of Pasay. 63 On February 11, 1899, an advance Army reconnoitering 
party pushed south of Pasay and met a large insurgent force at Parañaque. Outnumbered 
and overwhelmed, the small gunboat Barcelo was sent to assist the army in their retreat. 
The Barcelo’s efforts drove the insurgents back and enabled the army to safely 
withdraw.64 
In the east, Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton, of the 2nd Division, pushed along 
the Pasig River against insurgents under General Pio del Pilar. To assist Wheaton’s 
attack, Otis requested that the newly arrived cruiser,  Buffalo, create a diversion by firing 
on insurgent positions near Parañague while Anderson made a feint near Pasay. With 
direct assistance of the army’s gunboat, Laguna de Bay, flanking and firing on insurgent 
positions along the Pasig River, Wheaton’s forces captured the town of Pasig on February 
9, 1899.65 Ten days later on February 19, 1899, insurgents launched a counter attack on 
the town of Pasig, but aided by the Laguna de Bay and her Gatling guns, the attack was 
repulsed.66 To the west, on the Cavite peninsula, 1,500 U.S. Army troops were stationed 
to protect the Cavite Naval Station. Together with naval forces from Cavite, the 
Americans battled the insurgents. As the insurgents repeatedly attempted to entrench 
themselves, shelling by the gunboat Manila, kept them at bay. 67  
After the preliminary onslaught, the army had advanced its line to Caloocan in the 
north to Pasay in the south. With the advance in the south extending farther than expected 
after the initial thrust, Otis came to the conclusion that his front lines were overextended. 
On February 18, 1899 he reported that he could not extend his lines any further68. 
Realizing the importance of pushing north towards the insurgent capital at Malolos, Otis 
decided to shift more troops to the north, so a general withdrawal was conducted along 
                                                 
63 Monadnock to CINC Asiatic, Jun. 9, 1899; ibid.  
64 Dewey to SECNAV, Feb. 19, 1899; ibid. 
65 Otis to Dewey, Mar. 12, 1899; ibid. 
66 Linn, 55-56. 
67 Dewey to SECNAV, Feb. 19, 1899; ibid.  
68 Otis to AGWAR, Feb. 18, 1899, Correspondence, 906. 
 27
the southern from line.69 By February 28, 1899, Americans held a line from the city of 
Polo in the north, east to Marikina, southeast to Pasig, and south to Pasay.70 
Within the city of Manila itself, insurgents attempted a mass uprising on February 
23, 1899. The provost-guard, under Hughes, easily put down the uprising which had long 
been anticipated. As the provost-guard began mop-up operations of clearing the last 
remaining insurgents in Manila, the gunboat Callao assisted using its 6-pdr., 3-pdr., two 
1-pdrs., and Colt automatic to fire on the last insurgent positions in northern Manila along 
the Pasig River.71 
In the last effort of the Manila Campaign and prior to the launch of the next 
campaign against the insurgent capital of Malolos, Otis decided to launch an expedition 
up the Pasig River to the lake Laguna de Bay. The objective was to split the Filipino 
Army in two and quiet the harassment by insurgents on the eastern and southern fronts. 
Wheaton, commanding a flying column, set out on March 12, 1899 with the army 
gunboats Laguna de Bay, Oesta, and Napidan.72 With the assistance of the gunboat 
Laguna de Bay, firing its cannon and Gatling guns into the enemy flanks at Guadalupe 
Church, American forces advanced along the Pasig river, taking Pasig, Pateros, and 
Taguig.73 Advancing beyond their artillery, American forces relied on the Laguna de Bay 
and its batteries to drive off the insurgents. By March 17, 1899, Americans held a line 
from Manila across to the Laguna de Bay, and the Manila Campaign came to a close.74 
2. Iloilo (February 8 – 12, 1899)  
The city of Iloilo on the Island of Panay was the second largest port within the 
Philippine Archipelago (see Figure4). On December 27, 1898, an expedition to Iloilo 
departed Manila consisting of a battalion under command of Brigadier General Marcus P. 
Miller embarked on the transports Newport, Arizona, and Pennsylvania and escorted by 
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the cruiser Baltimore. The purpose of the campaign was to take Iloilo (strategic point) 
without provoking the natives. This was necessitated in mid-December by the notification 
by the Spanish garrison commander at Iloilo, General Diego de Los Rios, that he would 
be withdrawing due to increased insurgent hostilities, and a plea from the towns 
merchants for American occupation. Unfortunately, Spanish troops departed Iloilo on 
December 24, 1898; the same day permission was received from Washington to occupy 
the city.75  
 
Figure 4.   Island of Panay (From: Linn, The Philippine War, 242) 
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When Miller reached Iloilo, it was in insurgent hands. Since hostilities had not 
broken out, President William McKinley instructed that it was of the utmost importance 
that a conflict not be started by the United States.76 It was the War Department’s fear that 
if Miller took the city by force it would ignite a war throughout the islands. McKinley 
wrote to Otis stating that he was “most desirous that conflict be avoided”.77 During 
January, Miller held talks with the city’s leaders and insurgents to allow for a peaceful 
occupation, but nothing was reached. After the outbreak of hostilities in Manila, Otis 
made the decision to capture Iloilo as conditions and business interests demanded it.78  
On February 7, 1899, Secretary of War Russel A. Alger informed Otis and Dewey that 
the President would leave the occupation of Iloilo up to their judgment as conflict had 
already begun.79 This message was transmitted to Miller along with the news that 
hostilities has broken out and ordered him to occupy Iloilo upon the arrival of 
reinforcements and with the full cooperation of the navy under Captain Frank F. Wilde 
commanding the cruiser Boston, which had relieved the Baltimore, and had been joined 
by the gunboat  Petrel. 
General Miller’s expedition of 2,500 troops, which had been kept aboard transport 
ships off Iloilo for over a month, prepared to land the following day as he issued an 
ultimatum on February 10, 1899. In his demands, General Miller demanded that there be 
no defensive works erected by the Filipinos. So, on the morning of February 11, 1899, 
upon witnessing insurgents fortifying their trenches, the Petrel fired two warning shots in 
an attempt to discourage the insurgents. The insurgents in response filled the trenches 
with troops and began firing on the Petrel. The Petrel and Boston subsequently began 
shelling the earthworks and drove out the insurgents. Fearing for the safety of the town 
and that the insurgents may set it afire (which they did), a landing party of some fifty blue 
jackets was assembled from both ships and sent ashore, led by Lieutenant Albert P. 
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Niblack80. The city was thus occupied at 1150 and turned over to Miller upon his arrival 
an hour later.81 Captain Wilde of the Boston commended Lieutenant Commander Charles 
C. Cornwell of the Petrel for taking a necessary and dangerous position close to shore 
which enabled the gunboat to direct fire upon the inner slope of the landing beach and 
fire up many streets within Iloilo.82 
After the fall of Iloilo to American forces, the island would become the district 
headquarters for the Visayan Military District on March 1, 1899. The Visayan Military 
District was established comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and other islands 
as might be designated later. Miller was initially assigned this post and established his 
headquarters at Iloilo, but was relieved by Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes on May 
25, 1899.83 
3. Malolos (March 25 – August 16, 1899) 
After the fall of Caloocan, the army spent almost a month on preparations 
(hardening lines, establishing roads, and improving the railway) before it was ready to 
move against the city of Malolos. Malolos was the insurgent capital where the Filipino 
Government and Aguinaldo were, and it was defended by the bulk of the Army of 
Liberation. On March 25, 1899, the Malolos campaign began. Four Army brigades 
launched a pincer movement to envelop the insurgent army, but terrain conditions and 
well fortified enemy positions made the advance slow. General MacArthur proceeded up 
the rail line towards Malolos and was aided by the army’s gunboats operating on the 
Bulacan River and relieving pressure on his front.84 But, by the time Wheaton’s brigade 
circled around from the east and met up with MacArthur’s advance guard, the Army of 
Liberation was already in full retreat, and any hopes of entrapping it, Aguinaldo, or the 
insurgent government had evaporated. On March 31, 1899, American forces entered a 
burning Malolos, ignited by insurgents. The United States captured an empty capital. 
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After taking Malolos, the northern push (Malolos Campaign) by American forces 
stopped momentarily while attention was diverted south to the Laguna de Bay Campaign, 
described in the next sub-section. This allowed the northern offensive forces to 
recuperate and collect themselves for the march on the next major city on the rail-line, 
Calumpit. In an attempt to gain ground before the U.S. Volunteer forces departed, their 
enlistments having expired upon the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, Otis 
moved Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton to command a brigade under MacArthur and 
take the insurgent stronghold at Calumpit. Wheaton would again move in the east into a 
blocking position to prevent the Army of Liberation’s escape. On April 23, 1899, the 
northern offensive began. Insurgent forces under General Antonio Luna presented 
formable defenses around Calumpit, and again in conjunction with the terrain and 
weather, took a toll on the American Army. By April 27, 1899, American forces had 
defeated the fortifications at Calumpit and captured the city, but once again the Army of 
Liberation escaped.   
MacArthur’s next objective was San Fernando, ten miles up the railroad, and as 
the Filipino line gave way on May 5, 1899, San Fernando was taken. After extending the 
American lines forty miles to the north in eighteen major engagements, MacArthur’s 2nd 
Division stalled.85 MacArthur and his Division would remain at San Fernando for three 
months as focus shifted to Lawton’s first expedition in the San Isidro Campaign, 
described later. On August 8, 1899, a rested and reinforced 2nd Division set out towards 
the insurgent stronghold at Angeles. Four thousand troops under General MacArthur 
fought against an insurgent army of six thousand, and routed an estimated 2,500 Filipino 
troops entrenched around the outskirts of Angeles on August 16, 1899. With the capture 
of Angeles, also came the conclusion of the Malolos Campaign.86  
4. Laguna de Bay (April 8 – 17, 1899) 
The Army had been operating on Laguna de Bay since mid-March when 
Wheaton’s column had opened the Pasig River all the way from Manila Bay to Laguna 
de Bay. Employing the two improvised gunboats, the Oesta and Napidan, the Army 
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sought to capture insurgent property and harass insurgent troops.87 With the 2nd Division 
resting at Malolos and conditions deteriorating in the south, Otis’ attention turned 
towards Laguna de Bay and destroying insurgent supply centers and communications 
located on the lake. Fifteen hundred troops were assembled under Brigadier General 
Charles King and commanded by Lawton.88 
On April 8, 1899, the force set out under the escort of the gunboats Oesta and 
Napindan to capture the insurgent supply depot of Santa Cruz (see Figure5). On the 
following day, the force landed under the covering fire of the gunboats south of the city, 
and advancing on the city as the gunboats batteries pushed the insurgents back. Santa 
Cruz was captured on April 10, 1899. While occupying the town Lawton continued to 
pursue the retreating insurgents along the bay as well as capture all the larger trading 
vessels on the lake, destroying smaller vessels, and capturing a Spanish gunboat on April 
12, 1899.89 Running low on rations, Lawton requested permission to capture other towns 
along the bay, but on April 16th General Otis ordered the expedition to return.90 Lawton 
returned from Lake country on April 17, 1899 bringing with him an assortment of 
captured vessels.91 
In addition to the Laguna de Bay Campaign, the Army launched another 
expedition to the lake in late July 1899. In a similar raiding style, 1,000 troops, 
accompanied by the Army’s gunboats, defeated 300 entrenched insurgents and captured 
the strategic town of Calamba and Los Baños. Lawton’s Laguna de Bay Campaign 
originally had Calamba as an objective, but the low level of the lake during dry season 
created shoal water that prevented any amphibious operations in that locality.92 The 
monsoon season, which enabled operations on the lake with higher water levels, would 
not be as welcomed elsewhere. 
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5. San Isidro (April 21 – May 30, 1899, and October 15 – November 19, 
1899) 
The San Isidro Campaign involved two expeditions. The first was to capture the 
town when it became the insurgent capital after Malolos fell. The second expedition was 
to recapture the town and use it as a staging point for Lawton’s push northward in 
conjunction with the San Fabian and Tarlac Campaigns that will be discussed later. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Lake Laguna de Bay (From: May, Battle of Batangas, 81) 
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On April 22, 1899. Lawton led a provisional division from Manila into Central 
Luzon and the Bulacan Province. Facing logistical problems, bad weather, and indecision 
by Otis, Lawton was given little direction and was ordered to stop.93 On May 11, 1899, 
Lawton was finally allowed to proceed. His new plan was to march on San Isidro, the 
new capital of the insurgent government, and then down the Rio Grande River to flank 
Luna’s forces that opposed MacArthur (see Figure6).  
 
 
Figure 6.   Central Luzon Campaigns (After: Linn, The Philippine War, 141) 
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To aid in the campaign, the army’s gunboats were passed up to Calumpit for use 
on the Rio Grande River. Starting on May 16, 1899, the gunboats began to ferry a force, 
under Brigadier General William A. Kobbé Jr., up the Rio Grande from Calumpit 
towards San Isidro to assist Lawton.94 
On May 16, 1899, Lawton’s forces took San Isidro, but Aguinaldo and 13 
American prisoners had escaped. As Kobbé and his gunboats fought their way up the Rio 
Grande, Lawton abandoned San Isidro and moved down the Rio Grande. Instead of 
trapping the insurgent army between Lawton and MacArthur as planned, the insurgents 
once again escaped, this time to the new insurgent capital at Tarlac.95  When MacArthur 
and Lawton linked up, Lawton returned to Manila while MacArthur remained 
commanding the northern forces. With the conclusion of the first expedition of the San 
Isidro Campaign, the Spring Offensive period came to a close. Weather and force 
realignment would necessitate a lull in the fighting until the Fall Offensive could be 
started. During the summer of 1899, American forces sat in their trenches and traded 
sniping with insurgent forces while awaiting reinforcements and better weather. 
With the launch of the fall campaign season, Otis intended to capture Aguinaldo 
and destroy the Army of Liberation. The plan was to stagger the launch of a three prong 
offensive consisting of three different campaigns. Lawton’s 1st Division would be 
spearheaded by Brigadier General Samuel Young and take San Isidro. A logistics base 
would be established at San Isidro, and then forces would push on towards the Gulf of 
Lingayen; Lawton’s forces would cut off the insurgents escape route to the east. 
Meanwhile, MacArthur’s 2nd Division would thrust up the railroad to the new insurgent 
capital at Tarlac, pushing the insurgent army northward. Wheaton would then land by sea 
at San Fabian on the Gulf of Lingayen and trap the Army of Liberation96 Unfortunately, 
attacks along the southern front of Manila would again require a short delay. Lawton 
briefly joined American forces to the south under Brigadier General Theodore Schwan 
for a punitive expedition that resulted in the Zapote River Campaign that will be 
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discussed next. After this short diversion and with all quiet along the southern front, Otis 
returned his focus and Lawton to the north. 
The first phase of the three-prong offensive and the second expedition of the San 
Isidro Campaign was launched on October 15, 1899. Lawton was preceded by Young, 
who had set out on October 9, 1899, up the Rio Grande River towards San Isidro. After 
much difficulty, Young recaptured San Isidro on October 20, 1899.97 After establishing a 
permanent station and receiving supplies via the San Juan River, Lawton and Young 
continued their advance. With Young acting as an advance party, Lawton was supposed 
to move quickly with the main force, but logistics and weather hindered Lawton’s 
advance. To remedy the problem, Young advocated that his detachment advance without 
a logistical train and press north to the Gulf of Lingayan and meet up with Wheaton’s 
forces.98 
With intelligence indicating that Aguinaldo was seeking to escape through to 
northeastern Luzon, between Lawton’s and Wheaton’s forces, Young was given 
permission to proceed. In truly heroic fashion, Young led a 1,100 man column, marching 
fast and living off the land, in pursuit of Aguinaldo. One by one Young closed the 
mountain passes of escape. On November 13, 1899, an advance guard captured 
Aguinaldo’s mother and son. For days Young ran a continuing battle with Aguinaldo’s 
rear guard, all but destroying it. On November 17, 1899, realizing that Otis’ plan had 
failed, Aguinaldo had escaped, Young decided to continue his chase.99  Young raced to 
the coastal town of San Fernando on the Gulf of Lingayan where he received vital 
supplies from the gunboat Samar. After Wheaton, who had recently landed at San Fabian, 
refused Young’s request that he take the town of Vigan to slow Aguinaldo’s escape, 
Young turned to the navy to assist. On November 24, 1899, after a short bombardment, 
the battleship Oregon took the town of Vigan. That very same day Young departed San 
Fernando and began marching up the Ilocos coast. With barely 250 men, Young reached 
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Vigan on December 5, 1899. 100 On December 10, 1899, the navy landed a combined 
force of army soldiers and navy bluejackets and took the city of Laoag on the 
northwestern coast of Luzon. Young arrived the next day as his forces pursued the 
insurgent General Tinio who was reported in possession of American prisoners. By this 
time Aguinaldo had abandoned his troops and was hiding in the province of Benguet in 
central Northern Luzon.101 Exhausted and unable to continue the pursuit, Young assigned 
Colonels Hare and Howze to pursue the retreating enemy forces and rescue the American 
prisoners. The heroic tale of the march of Hare and Howze will be recanted later in a 
discussion on navy lieutenant James Gilmore and the failed Baler Expedition.102  
General Lawton during this time had left San Rafael and continued his march 
towards the Gulf of Lingayan as originally planned. With a supply line that stretched 
some 70 miles, the majority of Lawton’s men had been left behind to protect his lines of 
communication and operations. On November 18, 1899, Lawton and a collection of 
companies and battalions entered San Fabian on the Gulf of Lingayan. The San Isidro 
Campaign officially came to a close. 
6. Zapote River, June 13, 1899 
On June 9, 1899, preparations began for the army’s advance into southern Luzon 
against 6,000 revolutionary troops under Lieutenant General Mariano Trias. Lawton, 
returning from the north, was put in charge of two brigades, one under General Wheaton 
and one under General Ovenshire. The plan was for the Army to strike south through the 
isthmus between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay into the southern provinces and end the 
harassment that insurgent forces had been initiating (see Figure7). Army and navy 
gunboats would patrol the army’s lines along the two bays and shell enemy fortifications 
that appeared and protect the army’s flanks. On June 10, 1899, Lawton’s forces launched 
their attack103 
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The army in company with the navy off shore, advanced toward the south. 
Insurgent resistance was light, and the army captured the towns of Paranaque and Las 
Pinas on the shores of Manila Bay. Halting at Paranaque, Lawton boarded the  Helena for 
a reconnaissance of enemy positions along the bay to Cavite. Lawton asked the navy to 
harass the insurgents in the following days until another general advance could be 
launched and to deny the enemy sleep. But prior to the army launching another advance, 
heavy firing broke out on the morning of June 13, 1899, around the Cavite Arsenal and 
around Bacoor. Quickly the navy took up positions to assist. Insurgents attacking Cavite 
were met by the monitor Monterey, and gunboats Callao, Princeton and Helena. 
 
Figure 7.   Cavite Province(From: May, Battle for Batangas, 97) 
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While the battle along the Cavite peninsular raged, the army’s advance guard 
along the beach requested support. The gunboats Manila and Undaneta closed to shore 
and landed ninety men from the Helena and Monadnock to reinforce the Army and also 
provided crucial gunfire support. With reinforcements, supplies, and the ships shelling 
insurgents, the Army’s advance position was held under very heavy fire from insurgents 
until a general advance of the main army was ordered in what would be called the Zapote 
River Campaign. 
Just prior to darkness, Lawton signaled “Carried the bridge, crossed the river, 
enemy completely routed, I appreciate assistance of the navy”. In all, the vessels Helena, 
Monterey, Princeton, Manila, Monadnock, Callao, Basco, and Urdaneta had participated 
in the Zapolte River Campaign. The Asiatic Flagship,  Baltimore, anchored within 
Manila Bay a few miles away, proved of no service because of her deep draft and the 
proximity of shoal water. Rear Admiral Watson was forced to take a steam launch to the 
vicinity of the action and boarded a number of the participating vessels to ascertain the 
status of the battle.   
It was later learned that the Army’s advance guard ran into an unexpected large 
insurgent force, and with little food, water, and ammunition, it was the navy’s quick 
response that supported and reinforced the army. The navy’s actions enabled the army’s 
advance force to repel the large insurgent force and in doing so tie down 1,000 insurgents 
whose inability to join the main body of insurgents, around the Zapote River, in opposing 
the main body of the U.S. Army, ensured an overwhelming victory for the Americans. By 
the morning of June 14, 1899, the army had captured the town of Bacoor and ended the 
southern expedition. For their specific gallantry in landing as reinforcements in co-
operation with the army, Lawton expressed thanks and appreciation to the officers and 
men from the gunboat Helena and monitor Monadnock.104 A proud Captain Albert 
Barker, Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces on Asiatic Station, stated “that the navy 
will do all in its power to assist the army in putting an end to the war.”105 
                                                 
104 CINC Asiatic, “Squadron General Order No. 2”, Jun. 27, 1899; AF 10; RG 45; NAB. 
105 CINC Asiatic to SECNAV, Jun. 15, 1899; ibid. 
 40
 
7. Monsoons and Reorganization 
It is important to take a brief minute to juxtapose several key items that occurred 
during the summer of 1899. The summer is monsoon season in the Philippines and not 
much happens on the ground during this time. By the end of May, weather conditions and 
the imminent withdrawal of the state volunteers restricted the 8th Corps’ movements.106 
The southern punitive expedition that resulted in the Zapote River Campaign would be 
the last for the army until fall, and as stated earlier, the 2nd Division in the north was at a 
standstill. In his report to the adjutant-general in late June, Otis wrote that the rainy 
season had started and little campaigning was possible in Luzon. The current line being 
held by the army extended from Imus in the south to San Fernando in the north. The 
insurgent Army of Liberation, consisting of about 4,000 troops, were in the province of 
Tarlac, and roughly 2,000 men were in the southern provinces of Cavite and Batangas.107 
Organization of American forces in the Philippines was an issue. By mid-July, the 
War Department was interested in organizing the Philippines into military departments 
(Department of Visayas having already been established). Otis recommended that four 
military departments be created with headquarters at Manila, Dagupan, Iloilo, and 
Zamboanga. The only problem was that Dagupan and Zamboanga were not in American 
possession.108 The issue remained idle until the War Department in September directed 
Otis to draw the department lines and expedite the taking of Dagupan.109 Otis suggested 
that the first department would be that of Northern Luzon and consist of all portions of 
the island north of the provinces of Bataan, Pampanga, Bulacan, and Infanta, with its 
headquarters in Dagupan. The second department would be that of Southern Luzon 
consisting of the remainder of Luzon and the southern islands north of the 12th parallel of 
latitude to include the island of Samar, with its headquarters in Manila. The third 
department would be that of the Visayas and include all Philippine Islands situated 
                                                 
106 Linn, 121. 
107 Otis to AGWAR, Jun. 26, 1899, Correspondence, 1019. 
108 Otis to AGWAR, Jul. 16, 1899, ibid., 1033. 
109 Corbin to Otis, Sep. 17, 1899, ibid., 1070-1071. 
 41
entirely north of the 9th parallel of latitude and east of meridian of longitude 121° 50’, 
with its headquarters in Iloilo, Panay. The last department, fourth, department of 
Mindanao and Jolo, would consist of all the remaining islands, with its headquarters in 
Zamboanga.110 
 The actual implementation of the department organization would not be put into 
effect until the proceeding year, but its importance is instrumental in two facets. First, the 
placing of the island of Samar into the Southern Luzon district was a paramount mistake. 
Samar is actually part of the Visayan island group, and placing it under a different 
authority than the islands in close proximity created a lack of unity of command. Second, 
the navy was subsequently looking to organize itself. During this first year it employed a 
system of “parent ships”, which will be covered in-depth later in this chapter. But, the 
following year, it would adopt an organization similar to that of the army and use four 
patrol districts. 
The most significant issue faced by American forces was that of manpower. 
Military obligations had already stretched resources thin for the army, so the additional 
loses to typhoid, cholera, and dysentery greatly exacerbated an already pressing problem. 
Added to this was that the majority of troops were state volunteers. Having enlisted in 
state militias for use during the Spanish-American War as United States Volunteer 
troops, once Spain ratified the peace treaty on April 11, 1899, these obligations ended. 
Not able to be spared, the volunteers were retained until regular army troops could arrive, 
but the process was slow. The army did not have nor was authorized the regular troop 
strength required to occupy the Philippines. By the end of May, Congress and State 
pressure forced the War Department to begin to repatriate the volunteers. While loosing 
16,000 volunteer soldiers, barely 7,000 regular troops arrived.111 Even with the passage 
of the Army Act of March 2, 1899, which increased the strength of the army and 
authorized up to 35,000 new U.S. Volunteers for service in the Philippines, a sizable 
force could not be in theater until the fall of 1899.112  
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The navy at the same time was facing similar shortages in personnel and vessels. 
On May 20, 1899, the hero of the Battle of Manila Bay, Dewey departed on the Olympia. 
Captain Albert S. Barker, commanding officer of the battleship Oregon, the only one of 
its class on Asiatic Station, assumed command of the Asiatic Station until the Rear 
Admiral John C. Watson arrived and assumed command on June 20, 1899. With the 
departure of Dewey, greater emphasis was placed on the blockade and will be discussed 
in the section devoted to the blockade. The composition of the fleet at this time was the 
Oregon, cruiser Baltimore and gunboat Concord anchored off Manila. The monitor 
Monterey and gunboat Callao were guarding the Cavite Arsenal. The monitor 
Monadnock was assigned to protect the right flank of General Ovenshire’s brigade south 
of Manila. The gunboat Helena was engaged in transporting Army troops to Jolo to 
relieve the Spanish garrison there. The gunboat Castine was steaming to Zamboanga, 
Mindanao to offer protection to Spanish troops during their evacuation. The gunboat 
Petrel was cruising along the east coast of Luzon. The gunboat Yorktown was stationed at 
Iloilo, Panay, and the cruiser Boston was at Cebu. The former revenue cutter Wheeling 
was blockading the port of Dagupan on Lingayen Bay in northern Luzon. And, the 
cruiser Charleston was ferrying Senator Albert J. Beveridge around the major ports of the 
archipelago during his independent inspection into the state of affairs, a trip that no doubt 
led to his famous speech before Congress on January 9, 1900, justifying the annexation of 
the Philippines.113 The gunboat Princeton arrived on May 26, 1899 and was immediately 
ordered to Iloilo, Panay to assist in blockading duties. On June 4, 1899 the gunboat 
Bennington arrived on station. The former Spanish gunboats Albay and Samar, now U.S. 
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naval vessels, began cruising among the islands using Iloilo as a base while the gunboat 
Manileño cruised using Cebu as its base. The gunboat Helena returned on June 9, 1899 
from Jolo and aided in the Army’s advance on June 10, 1899, as previously discussed.114 
When the army took initial possession of the former Spanish gunboats, Otis 
planned to use them to support garrisons and suppress smuggling, but an infuriated 
Dewey swore that he would attack any such vessels as being pirates and sink them.115 A 
compromise was reached where the Army would retain the Laguna de Bay, Napindan, 
and Oesta, and the navy would take the seagoing gunboats. A rough joint relationship 
evolved in which army post commanders would request assistance from the senior naval 
officers present. Naval officers were in turn ordered to cooperate fully with the Army. 
Rear Admiral J.C. Watson’s assumed Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval 
Force on Asiatic Station on June 20, 1899, with the Baltimore, Monterey, Monadnock, 
Helena, Manila, Petrel, Callao, Panay, Urdaneta, and Mariveles all assembled in Manila 
Bay for his review. His first action was to dispatch the gunboats Mindoro, Manila, and 
Basco to patrol off Batangas Bay in southern Luzon and for the Helena and Mariveles to 
patrol Iloilo, Panay.116 In an effort to reorganize the navy within the Philippines, on July 
1, 1899, Watson issued Squadron General Order Number 3 which reorganized the ships 
operating in the Philippines. This policy was actually a continuation of the policy set 
forth in a Memorandum for Gunboats issued on May 26, 1899, by Lieutenant E. W. 
Eberle by direction of the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic then, Captain Barker. In it he 
assigned each gunboat to a specific parent ship (see Table 1), and the parent ship was 
responsible for manning, equipping, arming, and repair.117 Coal, oil, waste, and water 
were to be provided by the Army in Manila, and docking was accomplished in Hong 
Kong when needed and vessels could be spared.118 
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As the navy reorganized itself during this period, it faced crew shortages. On May 
21, 1899, the gunboat Albay was given to the navy by the army, and on the 26th, three 
more gunboats were manned by the navy. General Otis had purchased all the remaining 
Spanish gunboats (thirteen) in the Philippines, not already destroyed or captured, on 
March 19, 1899 (this does not include the captured Spanish gunboats Isla de Cuba, Isla 
de Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria which were being repaired at Hong Kong).119 By late 
May 1899, the army had turned all these gunboats over to the Navy.120 The navy’s 
attempt to man all the gunboats created a great strain. In a letter from Secretary of the 
Navy John D. Long to Watson on October 27, 1899, he admitted difficulty in obtaining 
men needed just for the gunboats Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria. 
 
 
Table 1. Parent Ship Assignments121 
Vessel Name Parent Ship Patrol Duty 
Pampanga (Gunboat) Princeton (Gunboat) Lingayan Gulf 
Paragua (Gunboat) Concord (Gunboat) Lingayan Gulf 
Samar (Gunboat) Oregon (Battleship) Panay and Negros 
Albay (Gunboat) Yorktown (Gunboat) Panay and Negros 
Calamianes (Gunboat) Bennington (Gunboat)  
Panay (Gunboat) Monadnock (Monitor) Luzon 
Manileño (Gunboat) Charleston (Protected Cruiser Leyte and Samar 
Mariveles (Gunboat) Helena (Gunboat) Leyte and Samar 
Mindoro (Gunboat) Baltimore (Protected Cruiser) Batangas Bay 
Basco (Gunboat) Baltimore (Protected Cruiser) Batangas Bay 
Gardoqui (Gunboat) Monterey (Monitor) Navotas 
Urdaneta (Gunboat) Oregon (Battleship) Manila Bay 
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The number of sea going officers in the navy was not sufficient to meet the 
demands of the squadron. To rectify the problem, Long directed that the battleship 
Oregon, and monitors Monadnock, and Monterey be placed in reserve and their crews 
reduced by one-third so as to free up manpower to crew the gunboats. His reasoning was 
that the three ships (Oregon, Monadnock, and Monterey) were not considered available 
for general cruising purposes in the Philippines and thus of little use.122  By November, 
signs that the problem was being addressed appeared. In Fleet General Order Number 22, 
Watson announced that a gradual change would be made from the present system of 
parent ships.123 In Fleet General Order Number 24, Watson formalized the establishment 
of complements for gunboats, and designated that crews were to be transferred from the 
ships that had previously acted as the parent ship.124 Whereas previously, crews of the 
gunboats were temporarily assigned from the larger vessels, a system of permanent 
assignment was created by taking the largest of the warships (monitors and battleships) 
and placing them in reserve. 
Manning and organizational issues dominated both the army and navy during the 
initial onset of hostilities, and subsequently for the years following. Both services faced 
an uphill battle as they fought against the context of the Constitution in which the 
services main purpose was for the defense of the United States. While the army and navy 
could be increased during times of war, and augmented with state militias, the Philippine 
Insurrection created the need for a permanent-large size military force. With the lull in 
the fighting during the summer monsoons, American forces dealt as best they could with 
their problems, and by the fall, they were ready for action. 
8. Cavite, October 7 – 13, 1899, and January 4 – February 9, 1900 
The Cavite Campaign was similar to the San Isidro Campaign in that it consisted 
of two separate expeditions. The first consisted of a punitive expedition launched in 
October 1899. The second was launched in January 1900 as the last conventional 
campaign on Luzon after the Army of Liberation disintegrated in the north. 
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The conclusion of summer brought the end of the monsoon season and the arrival 
of fresh troops. Otis set about launching a final campaign into the north to encircle the 
Army of Liberation, Aguinaldo, and thereby end the insurrection. Unfortunately, as Otis 
made preparations to move in the north, insurgent activity occurred along the southern 
lines. Attacks at Calamba, Los Baños, Imus, and Bacoor south of Manila, necessitated 
that the insurgents in Cavite Province be punished. On October 7, 1899 three columns set 
out to accomplish this objective (see Figure7). Along the shore of Manila Bay, Brigadier 
General Theodore Schwan, Otis’ Chief of Staff, advanced under the fire support provided 
by naval warships. U.S. Marines concurrently moved down from the Cavite Arsenal 
along the peninsula, also supported by the navy. And, Lawton swept along Laguna de 
Bay supported by the army’s gunboats. Schwan’s force left Bacoor and proceeded 
towards the town of Novaleta. Meeting heavy opposition, Marines, under the command 
of Lieutenant Colonel George F. Elliott, and the gunboat Petrel provided timely and 
effective assistance. The Petrel and USMC drew off a considerable number of insurgents 
facing the army and prevented re-enforcements of the insurgents; thus, allowing the 
Army to capture Putol.125 Further resistance was not encountered, so the expedition was 
halted on October 9, 1899, and the northern campaign began.126  
The second expedition of the Cavite Campaign occurred in early January 1900. 
Lawton was to begin operations in the south against the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, 
Batangas, and Tayabas. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1899, while taking the town of 
San Mateo in northern Luzon, General Lawton was struck in the chest while walking the 
firing line and died.127 In an ironic tale, the General famed for the capture of Apache 
Chief Geronimo was struck down by insurgent troops under the command of General 
Licerio Geronimo.128 
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On January 4, 1900, Major General John C. Bates was given Lawton’s 1st 
Division and began the final campaign to occupy the southern Tagalog provinces and 
wipe out armed resistance. Using two brigades under Schwan and Wheaton, the 
expedition departed for Cavite Province, the birthplace of president Aguinaldo. Cavite 
province turned out to be apparently quiescent, so General Bates turned his attention 
toward Laguna and Batangas.129 
The plan was for Schwan to push south on the eastern side of Lake Taal while 
General Wheaton pushed south on the western side of Taal. Both brigades would then 
meet up at the twin towns of Lemery and Taal (see Figure8). As Schwan prepared to take 
the town of Batangas on the west coast of southern Luzon, intelligence was received that 
insurgents were holding nine American soldiers at the town of Loboo, eight miles to the 
south. With the only access route being a rough trail and impassible, the gunboat 
Mariveles was used to convoy a detachment to the town. On January 16, 1899, the small 
force was landed, but after a brief search, found the no prisoners.130  Schwan then sent 
troops north to Taal to meet up with Wheaton. 
As Wheaton’s troops moved against the towns of Lemery and Taal on January 17, 
1899, they were aided by the navy. Major William H. Johnston attacking Lemery found 
stiff resistance, so using a navy gunboat along Balayan Bay on the west coast of Luzon, 
he landed a battalion at Taal, the insurgent headquarters, which drew off troops and 
allowed the taking of Lemery.131 On the outskirts of Taal, the 46th infantry battalion 
confronted 1,000 dug in Batangueno militia. Flanked by the sea and Lake Taal, the 
army’s only access was a narrow bridge protected by insurgent artillery and breastwork. 
Sensibly, Major Johnston called in the gunboat Marietta. On January 19, 1900, the 
Marietta, landed 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, stores, and a detachment of 
marines, the Marietta then took position of enfilade the insurgent trenches. When the 
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assault started, the Marietta opened fire helping the army take the bridge and 
subsequently the town of Taal.132  
9. Tarlac, November 5 – 20, 1899 
The Tarlac Campaign was the single military campaign in which no naval vessel 
was employed. Since the campaign occurred in central Luzon with no rivers, lakes, or sea 
in proximity, naval utility was negated. But, the campaign must be briefly discussed as it 
was part of the larger grand strategy of Otis for capturing the Filipino government, 
Aguinaldo, and destroying the insurgent army, a strategy that encompassed three separate 
campaigns, Tarlac, San Isidro, and San Fabian, the last two of which did employ the use 
of naval assets.  
On November 5, 1899, MacArthur advanced up the rail line in an attempt to hold 
the attention of the insurgent army while the San Isidro Campaign, commanded by 
Lawton with Young, blocked the escape routes to the east, and the San Fabian Campaign, 
commanded by Wheaton, was landed by the navy on the Gulf of Lingayan and blocked 
the north.133 But, as MacArthur entered Tarlac on November 13, 1899, Aguinaldo and his 
army had already fled and the city fell under American control.134 
As MacArthur continued his push along the railroad north, the final-battle to end 
the Army of Liberation never fully materialized. By November 20, 1899, MacArthur had 
reached the rail terminus and the city of Dagupan on the Gulf of Lingayan. While 
President Aguinaldo had escaped, portions of the insurgent army were trapped and fled 
into the western province of Zambales. For months afterwards, elements of MacArthur’s 
division would be relegated to fighting small engagements, cleaning up the remnants of 
the Filipino Army.135 
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Figure 8.   Southern Luzon (May, Battle for Batangas, 109) 
 
10. San Fabian, November 6 – 19, 1899 
The San Fabian Campaign was the last phase of Otis’ plan to capture Aguinaldo 
and the Filipino Army of Liberation. With Lawton and Young sealing off the escape 
routes in the east, and MacArthur pushing the Army of Liberation up from the south, it 
was up to Wheaton to close the door on the northern escape route. Departing Manila on 
November 6, 1899, Wheaton and his forces arrived off san Fabian, on the shores of 
 50
Lingayen Gulf, on the transport ship Sheridan accompanied by the gunboats Princeton, 
Manila, Bennington, Helena, Callao, and Samar.136  
On November 7, 1899, the six navy gunboats subjected the extensive and 
elaborate trench fortifications about San Fabian to withering gunfire. The Helena was 
credited with knocking out the insurgent’s only artillery piece, and the Samar and Callao 
steamed so close in that they were constantly exposed to musketry fire accomplishing 
their valuable work. After three hours of naval bombardment, the defenders abandoned 
their entrenchments and fled. For the next two hours and twenty minutes, Wheaton 
landed his expedition of two thousand men unopposed137 
While Aquinaldo slipped through between General Wheaton and General Young, 
the Army of Liberation was not so fortunate. Insurgent Brigadier General Manuel Tinio 
had marched to the town of San Jacinto with 1,200 troops, four miles south of San 
Fabian. After landing at San Fabian, General Wheaton sent out patrols south towards 
Dagupan. On November 11, 1899, the 33rd Infantry Battalion approached the town. 
Coming under intense insurgent fire, American forces proved too much for Tinio’s 
untrained troops. The last of the Army of Liberation fled, leaving 134 of their dead 
comrades behind.138 With the disintegration of the Army of Liberation in the north, the 
last campaign was launched in January 1900 into the province of Cavite as covered 
previously.  
B. THE BLOCKADE 
The naval blockade was the most important contribution by the navy. It struck at 
the crucial necessities of the insurgency: inter-island communications, operations, 
supplies, and finances. By severing waterborne traffic, the navy isolated each islands’ 
resistance movement and prevented the transfer of reinforcements and the establishment 
of sanctuaries. Of equal importance was the destruction of the insurgent financial system 
which prevented the paying and feeding of insurgent troops. Unintentionally, at the same 
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time it exacerbated an already present food crisis within the archipelago. By July 1899, 
the insurgent General Vicent Lukban commanding the island of Samar, who had crossed 
over from Luzon on January 26, 1899, with six hundred men and would become as 
famous as Aguinaldo, complained that the blockade had reduced him to eating little more 
than yams and rice. Within the American armed forces there were differing opinions 
concerning the blockade. Watson was concerned about its legality, Hughes was an 
enthusiastic supporter, and Otis was ambiguous, feeling that it increased problems of 
order and stability, but that it was necessary. The military commander on Cebu, General 
Smith, protested its existence.  
The largest difficulty in discussing the naval blockade during 1899 is clear 
structure. As previously stated, under Dewey there was a distinct lack of organization and 
direction. Through the comments of naval officers rather than issued directives, it is clear 
that vessels were dispatched at different times to cruise around the islands and interdict 
illicit trade. It was not until after Dewey departed that fleet circulars and general orders 
began to appear that defined the blockade and mandated specific reporting requirements. 
As 1899 came to a close, traces of monthly and quarterly reports began to appear that 
provide a greater insight into the actual daily activities of the ships stationed throughout 
the islands. This section seeks to attempt to piece together what actually transpired during 
the first year of hostilities in regards to the blockade. 
A major concern since the build up of tensions and the following hostilities with 
the insurgents was the importation of contraband of war from abroad. The President 
himself directed that no arms or ammunition of war were to be landed in the 
Philippines.139 In the President’s instructions on the administration of affairs in the 
Philippine Islands, he specifically stated at the end of December 1898, “All ports and 
places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the 
United Sates will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares, 
not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority, will be 
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admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of 
their importation.”140  
Throughout the Philippine Insurrection, intelligence from abroad would indicate 
that the insurgents were attempting to import arms and ammunition. In March 1899, the 
Counsel General of Hong Kong, Rounsevelle Wildman, wrote to the Counsel General 
Pratt in Singapore concerning a possible insurgent arms shipment from the Netherland’s 
Indies to the City of Malacca, then to Mindanao, and finally to a port in Luzon.141 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that any large arms shipment was interdicted in the 
Philippines by the navy. While it is plausible that arms shipments did reach the 
insurgents, it is also possible that the navy’s blockade served as a deterring factor. 
Evidence and opinion seem to support this later belief as the insurgents were always short 
of ammunition and arms.142 From insurgent records it has been learned that the shortage 
was so bad that insurgent General Macabulo resorted to offering rewards for captured 
rifles and ammunition. Aguinaldo’s attack on American forces in San Miguel de Mayume 
on May 25, 1899, failed because of a lack of ammunition, and General Antonio Luna’s 
defeat at BagBag has been attributed to the lack of ammunition.143  
Another factor is the efforts of the State Department and Department of the Navy 
to prevent shipments of arms from outside the Philippine Islands. At key points outside 
the islands, such as Singapore, China, and Japan, diplomats and gunboats sought to stop 
illicit trade in war materials from ever leaving for the Philippines. It is assumed that these 
efforts, diplomatic and naval, combined to significantly curtail if not stop arms shipments 
to the insurgency.  
Singapore became such a focal point for possible arm shipments that the  
Princeton was directed to visit Singapore to look into rumors about certain “finance 
people” aiding the insurrection. Arriving on March 25, 1899,  the crew of the Princeton 
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inquired about town concerning the allegations, but no substantial basis was found.  What 
was discovered was that arms could be transported through the port, as Singapore was a 
free port without customs, and invoices of shipments might easily be falsified. Such 
methods had supplied arms to the Achenese guerillas in Dutch Sumatra during their 
insurgency since 1873. A recommendation at the time by the British Governor, in 
breaking up such illicit trade, was to employ a fleet of gunboats. Following the Spanish-
American War, a number of Spanish Flagged coasting vessels that had fled to Sandaken, 
North Borneo, and begun trading again amongst the islands. While this was forbidden, 
the promise of large returns attracted speculators in Singapore. While regular commercial 
channels of cash payment had been disorganized by the war, bartering voyages, receiving 
hemp primarily for foreign goods, netted gains of up to eighty percent profit.144 
Within Manila Bay itself, illicit trade was often conducted right in front of the 
U.S. fleet. While assigned to patrol Manila Bay in April 1899, the  gunboat Princeton 
interdicted numerous boats running the blockade within the bay. In many instances the 
boats were too near to land for even a gunboat, but a shot or two would send the crew to 
shore, abandoning their cargo. Larger prizes were also caught within the bay; a number of 
two-masted schooners were seized and turned over to the commandant at Cavite Arsenal 
by the Princeton. Cargo more often than not consisted of tobacco, clothing, and 
foodstuffs: none of the vessels had permission to trade within the bay.145 When the 
Princeton was sent the following month, May 1899, to the town of Batangas to deliver 
the Proclamation of the Commission, she interdicted illicit trade enroute. While in the 
vicinity of Batangas and Taal, she seized several vessels for illegal traffic, including the 
American brigantine Champana, schooner Carmen a Venus, and the schooner Nuestra 
Señor del Remedio.146 
If the navy’s campaign in the early part of 1899 appears sporadic and 
disorganized, that is because it was. The blockade under Dewey lacked serious direction 
and organization. Vessels were often dispatched haphazardly to interdict illicit trade or 
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simply engaged in the blockade during or when not employed in other tasks. This was in 
due partly because there were not enough vessels to adequately patrol the archipelago, 
but also because Dewey failed to provide a structural basis for implementing a blockade 
and specific instructions. While the Military Governor was tasked to define the policy, 
the navy was instructed to carry it out.147 In an example of the problems regarding the 
blockade, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces on Asiatic Station, Captain A.S. 
Barker, had to explain to the Secretary of the Navy that gunboats were adhering to orders 
given by Dewey to seize vessels trading without licenses or at ports not in American 
control.148 With the changing of the guard to Admiral Watson, a clearly defined policy 
and strategy began to materialize. As the system of “parent ships” was implemented, the 
senior officers began to provide instructions for the gunboats under their command. The 
Yorktown issued instructions to the effect that the mission of the navy was the 
annihilation of trade with Philippine ports not in possession of the United States and to 
aid in the protection of the military through naval cooperation. Under Watson, as 
previously mentioned, gunboats started operating under a system of “parent ships”, which 
were assigned to certain ports, Manila, Iloilo, or Cebu, and created informal patrol areas 
that would be formalized the following year.149  
Unfortunately, Otis, the Military Governor, continuously wavered on the blockade 
policy as the navy began to solidify its implementation. In early July, General Otis wrote 
that a number of ports in northern and southeastern Luzon, Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Cebu, 
and Negros were open for trade (none specified).150 But, in his annual report, Otis only 
acknowledged that six ports were opened during 1899: Manila on August 13, 1898, Iloilo 
on February 22, 1899, Cebu on March 4, 1899, Zamboanga on December 2, 1899, Jolo 
on December 26, 1899, and Siassi on December 26, 1899.151 In his annual report, Otis 
made no mention of the ports in northern or southeastern Luzon, Samar, Leyte, Bohol, or 
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Negros which he had earlier claimed as open, but were not under U.S. control until the 
following year, 1900. In a letter to Watson on July 27, 1899, General Otis explained his 
reasoning for advocating the opening of certain ports in the Philippine Islands that were 
still in the control of insurgents, and in direct contradiction to previous orders. His 
reasoning was based upon the populations need for food that it could not supply itself, the 
manufacturing industry needed the raw materials to continue furnishing employment to 
thousands of natives, and foreign business interests had large stakes in the tobacco, hemp, 
and sugar crops. But, while Otis advocated opening trade with insurgent ports, he only 
advocated it for the brief period during the harvesting of crops, and he still insisted that 
the trade must be checked by the navy152  
This left the navy facing a serious quandary. They (the navy) were supposed to 
implement a blockade policy as directed by the Governor General (Otis), but they were 
given conflicting orders. With the army only in possession of six major ports in the 
Philippines until 1900, the navy chose to simply continue to enforce a blockade that 
prohibited trading with ports not in American possession and of illicit cargo. Both 
infractions being in accordance with Army General Order 69, issued by Otis, which 
forbid coastal trade by foreign ships, native coastal trade without licenses, and trade 
within unequipped ports (not occupied by Americans), without the permission of the 
Military Governor, Department, or District commander. 
While Otis felt that the starvation exacerbated by the blockade was detrimental to 
American efforts, not all Army officers believed the same. Because of crop failures, 
scarce labor, and the collapse of trade, early signs of an agriculture crisis appeared on the 
Island of Panay. With General Hughes assuming command, he imposed a strict blockade 
on foodstuff, only allowing trade within the port of Iloilo. Those outside the city were 
only allowed one day’s worth of rations. The outcome had the effect Hughes was 
seeking; by August the native population in the American zones, towns under U.S. 
control, had doubled.153 Hughe’s success would later lead to the policy of concentration 
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or reconcentration throughout the archipelago and the adoption of similar strategies in 
other areas. 
While the debate over inter-island trade ensued, the threat of the importation of 
foreign war materials continued. In June, 1899, reports of arms and ammunition being 
smuggled from Hong Kong, marked as “agricultural implements” was received, and in 
August, reports were confirmed that the insurgents were trying to obtain eight rapid-fire 
guns from Europe that had been purchased in Germany.154 Between July and August 
1899, a flurry of official correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy, Office of 
Naval Intelligence, the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Station, United States Ministers, 
United States Consuls at Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Hankow, and the Naval 
Attaché at Tokyo transpired concerning the Belgian Steamer Equatoria. The steamer was 
allegedly to be carrying 150 tons of war materials for the Philippines under coal in the 
forehold.155 Unfortunately, there is no further documentation concerning the Equatoria. 
Whether she was interdicted, delivered arms to the Philippines, or was found not be 
carrying arms remains unknown. 
In another incident, this one drawing press attention in Japan, the Japanese 
steamer Nunobiki-Maru was alleged to have been attempting to smuggle war materials 
from Japan to the Philippines. Confirmed by the Naval Attaché in Tokyo, the steamer 
was loaded with a considerable quantity of gun powder and munitions. Of the five 
passengers aboard, four were Filipino. Departing from Nagasaki for Formosa on July 17, 
1899, the vessel foundered in heavy weather near Saddle Island off Shanghai and was 
abandoned.156 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, under pressure from the U.S. 
Minister, made a private investigation, but reported that nothing was found to substantiate 
the  allegations. A further investigation, by the Naval Attaché in Tokyo, suggested 
otherwise. The attaché, using contacts in Kobe and Nagasaki, ascertained that an officer 
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of the Japanese Army was onboard the Nunobiki-Maru,. He (attaché) reported that it 
seemed most improbable that with Japan’s rigid and strict laws concerning arms and 
ammunition, that war material would be put on board without the knowledge of the army. 
It was the personal opinion of the attaché that the Japanese government covered up the 
affair to hide the army’s involvement. He further believed that the investigation and 
public press would greatly hinder further attempts on part of the Japanese to smuggle war 
materials into the Philippines.157 Later, it would be found that the shipment was 
organized by the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen in an attempt to contribute to the 
Asian resistance against the West.158  
In late December 1899, in a confidential circular to commanding officers, Watson 
informed all commanding officers that the German steamer Emma J.C. Luyken was 
sailing with arms and ammunition, the Hamburg-American steamer Savoai sailed 
carrying one hundred and seventy boxes of rifles, and an unknown vessel sailed with a 
large quantity of ammunition in route for the Philippines.159 In a manner that became so 
common in regards to the shipment of large arm caches, further information is 
nonexistent. But, on the issue of these three vessels, the tracking of their progress would 
continue into the next year, and will be covered in the next chapter.  
Regardless of the problems over policy and possible shipments, the ships of the 
Asiatic Station continued their daily implementation of the blockade as seen through the 
individual reports of ships. While operating off the island of Panay, the gunboat Samar, 
commanded by Ensign H.C. MacFarland, destroyed 13 schooners engaged in illicit trade 
from June 4 to June 8, 1899.160 Commander C.S. Sperry of the  Yorktown, station ship at 
Iloilo, Panay, reported that insurgents were infiltrating into the islands of Negros and 
Leyte from southwestern Luzon and Panay. General Hughes, the Army District 
Commander, was of under the same belief, so the gunboat Samar was given cruising 
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orders to break up this traffic.161 This cruising area would become a primary area of 
concern and a major focus for the navy throughout the remainder of the conflict. On June 
21, 1899, Watson, ordered the gunboats Mindoro and Basco to the area of Batangas Bay 
in southern Luzon for the purpose of breaking up illicit trade.162 In a demonstration of the 
results accomplished by the navy’s blockade, the gunboat Mariveles reported that from 
July 30, 1899 to August 3, 1899, in vicinity of Panay, she inspected 18 vessels and found 
10 to be engaged in illicit trade.163 
As Otis vacillated on the issue of the blockade, as noted earlier, the navy’s policy 
was formalized by mid-year.  Commander E.D. Taussig (of the famous naval family), 
captain of the station ship Bennington, issued instructions for gunboats operating out of 
Cebu. Using orders by the Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic Station, he stated the purpose 
of cruising “is the annihilation of trade with Philippine ports not in the possession of our 
own forces”.164 To further clarify instructions for vessels, on August 19, 1899, Watson 
reiterated that “illicit trade” will be applied to 1) any vessels flying the Filipino flag, 2) 
trading with closed ports, or 3) carrying contraband.165 Since only three ports were open 
at this time, Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, and since contraband included matches, rice, oil, 
and hemp, illicit cargo applied to most of the waterborne trade throughout the islands. 
Vessels that were caught engaged in illicit trade would be destroyed or be towed to the 
nearest American port. In either instance, an appraisal report of the vessel and its cargo 
was prepared. Very few of these appraisals remain, but the report on banca boat No. 
15780, captured by the gunboat Petrel and  prepared by the Board of Appraisal at Cavite 
Station, provides an example of what the navy was interdicting (see Table 2). 
It’s hard to imagine that the listed items of the appraisal report were vital to the 
insurgent cause or a threat to American forces. But with the volume of Filipino small-
boat traffic, these numbers have to be taken in the context of the larger picture. The 
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insurgents needed supplies, and while one or two banca boats may seem insignificant, if 
these numbers were ten, twenty, or thirty, you have the means to supply a small army. It 
can also be looked at from the standpoint of trade and financial gain for the insurgents. 
While customs and duties on such small inter-island trade would be small, if the quantity 
of shipments was large, this could prove to be a large source of revenue. It is not revealed 
why banca No. 15780 was captured; if she was flying the Filipino flag, trading in a closed 
port, or if her cargo was the sole reason. But, as will be demonstrated by such efforts, the 
interdiction of such coastal commerce (as banca boat No. 15780) greatly aided in the 
army’s pacification of the Philippine Islands by denying food, supplies, communication, 
transportation, and a tax resource to the insurgents. 
 
Table 2. Appraisal Report for Banca No. 15780166 
Quantity Item Value 
1 Banca 100.00 
35 boxes Bread 35.00 
20 sacks Limes 20.00 
4 sacks Flour 14.00 
3 Shovels 7.50 
5 gallons Linseed oil 10.25 
7 bottles Vino 3.50 
5 pounds Onions .10 
10000 Cocoanuts 25.00 
9 boxes Sardines .45 
250 pounds Soap 7.50 
32 packs Playing cards 3.20 
4 cases Matches 4.00 
3 boxes Cigars 3.60 
1 package Brown linen 3.00 
4 bottles Varnish 1.20 
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Quantity Item Value 
12 Umbrellas 9.00 
1 box Pepper 1.00 
4 bags Good tobacco 100.00 
1 box Cigarette tobacco 75.00 
17 bags Course cut tobacco 255.00 
50 pounds Sugar 2.50 
7 pounds Sweets 1.00 
1 Lantern 1.00 
20 Torches 2.00 
1.5 pounds Linen thread .75 
2500 packages Cigarette papers 125.00 
120 yards Cotton drilling 6.00 
30 yards Bleached drilling 4.50 
1 lot Assorted Cotton cloths 3.00 
1 lot Yankee rations 1.00 
1 Iron pot 1.00 
2 Glass jars .50 
1000 packages Cigarettes 50.00 
 
While enforcing the blockade, illicit trade was not the only item the insurgents 
were transporting by water. On October 14, 1899, after being informed by the Visayan 
Military District Commander, Brigadier General Hughes, that insurgents were trying to 
cross over from Iloilo, Panay to Negros, the Concord was directed to proceed to the Iloilo 
Straits.  While searching the shore with search lights the gunboat came under heavy small 
arms fire to which she responded in kind, driving away the insurgents. Later that evening 
the Concord discovered a number of vessels standing out from Guimbal, but quickly 
drove them to shore. She encountered no more activity from the insurgents during her 
patrol of the area and upon returning to Iloilo, the commanding officer and General 
Hughes agreed to launch a combined expedition later in the week to force the insurgents 
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back into the interior and destroy any boats.167 Whether the expedition was launched the 
following week or not is not documented, but it demonstrates the willingness of both the 
army and navy to work together to combat the insurgency. 
As to the tactics employed in the blockade, other than routine patrolling, little is 
known from sources. But, in a letter from the parent ship at Cebu, the monitor 
Monadnock, to the gunboats Calamianes and Panay, one tactics is discussed.. The 
Calamianes was ordered to Point Kalunangon, Leyte on the morning of November 7, 
1899, and was directed to search the coast southward, driving any illicit vessels toward 
the south. The Panay in the meantime would be stationed at the southern end of Leyte, in 
a blocking position to capture any fleeing vessels. Once the operation was complete, the 
gunboats were then ordered to conduct operations on the remaining sides of Leyte using 
the same tactic.168 
As the army slowly established itself in the southern islands, the policy of the 
blockade again came under scrutiny. Brigadier General John Bates was ordered by Otis, 
to treat the ports in the Sulu island group the same as all the other ports in the Philippines, 
meaning to stop illicit trade. The problem that arose was confounded by two issues. First, 
the agreement with the Sultan of Sulu called for the reintroduction of trade. Second, the 
Sulu island group and Mindanao, for which the sultan commanded, was inhabited mainly 
by Moros who where Muslims and staunchly adverse to the Christian Filipinos waging 
the insurgency. Moros often attacked and killed the insurgents. In response, the army 
acknowledging that the destruction of native boats trading with Sulu ports would cause 
serious trouble, only forbid trade to ports specifically controlled by insurgents, which 
were very few.169 But, while inter-island trade was finally allowed in a limited manner in 
the south, all foreign trade within the Sulu Archipelago was forbidden with ports not 
actually in possession of U.S. forces. This policy instigated another problem as the 
British protested.  
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From the Government House in North Borneo, the Chief Government 
Commissioner, Alexander Cook, claimed that the actions of the Commander-in-Chief 
U.S. Naval Forces Asiatic were contrary to the Protocol of Madrid, March 7, 1885. The 
Protocol, signed by Spain, Germany, and Great Britain, guided trade within the 
Archipelago, and Cook asserted that in taking possession of the islands, the United States 
assumed the treaty obligations.170 British protests over the protocols prompted General 
Otis to inquire from the War Department if the protocol continued with the cession of 
territory to the United States.171 While waiting for a response, merchants in Singapore 
and Sandakan, Borneo sought clearance to trade with Jolo further complicating the issue. 
Otis reported that one merchant vessel was seized and fined and another forced to 
discharge its cargo for attempting to trade in the southern islands without U.S. 
permission. Finally, in response to Otis’s inquiry, Adjutant General Corbin responded 
that the Secretary of War was of the opinion that the protocols had lapsed and could not 
be invoked.172 
As Watson implemented his policies for the Asiatic Station, a semblance of clear 
reporting began to emerge and further demonstrate the navy’s accomplishments in the 
blockade. In a report to the Bureau of Navigation in October 1899, Watson reported that 
over a two-month period, from September to October, 70 vessels had been seized.173 In 
his monthly report on the movements and appraisals of various ships and gunboats, 
Watson reported sixty letters of appraisals (letters from commanding officers concerning 
the vessels and cargo of ships destroyed for engaging in illicit trade) for the month of 
November.174 The navy was clearly actively engaged in the blockade and producing 
results. In his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, Watson told of the excellent 
service rendered by the former Spanish gunboats that the navy accepted from the army. 
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The gunboats were actively employed upon patrol duty breaking up illicit traffic to a 
degree that was inestimable.  
With the success of the conventional war in Northern Luzon by December, 1899, 
Otis wrote that by January 1, 1900, all ports in northern Luzon would be open.175 As the 
final campaigns in Luzon wrapped up, Hughes ended the stalemate on Panay. Increasing 
his efforts to starve the insurgents by shutting off trade from Iloilo to the interior, and 
with the use of naval gunboats, he banned all coastal trading, and on December 9, 1899, 
captured the provincial capital of Capiz.176  
As 1899 came to a close and 1900 began, the navy would find itself still heavily 
engaged in enforcing a blockade, but as more and more ports were opened the following 
year and trade increased, so did the importance of the blockade. 1900 would see new 
efforts by the navy to reorganize (patrol districts), but old problems such as the army’s 
varying stance on the blockade would persist. The one constant was that the navy relied 
upon the gunboat to accomplish its tasks within the Philippines, a task that not only 
encompassed cooperation with the army and the blockade, but included other operations. 
C. OTHER OPERATIONS  
While cooperating with the army in its conventional campaigns and enforcing the 
blockade, the navy also participated in other operations expanding American presence 
throughout the archipelago. In this endeavor the navy at times assisted the army in 
establishing posts and rendering aid to remote army units, but also at times working 
independently to establish U.S. presence single-handedly. The navy in addition engaged 
in reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and generally filling the gap left by the army, 
whom required that, the limited number of troops be concentrated on Luzon. The 
problem in discussing these peripheral operations is that they were sporadically in time 
and in place. But, they must be covered; because, they demonstrate a role and a need that 
the navy filled. 
The port of Cebu on the island of the same name surrendered on February 21, 
1899, to the gunboat Petrel. It was Dewey who ordered the gunboat to the port, but the 
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unexpected naval capture of Cebu placed Otis in a predicament. Short of men, he had to 
dispatch two battalions to take possession of the island; something he was furious about 
and demonstrates that cooperation did not always go so smoothly.177 The army 
established the sub-district of Cebu, separate of the Visayan Military District, and placed 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Hamer in charge. Lacking the manpower to occupy the 
entire island and quell the small insurgent force present, Hamer was forced to turn to 
diplomacy to pacify the island. Viewing the naval blockade as detrimental to the situation 
on Cebu, he allowed trading with closed ports and in illicit cargo, except for two ports he 
considered to be in insurgent hands.178 When diplomacy failed, the army began 
operations against the insurgents. In what might possibly be the first instance of a Naval 
Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO), Naval Cadet E.N. McIntyre joined the 23rd Infantry 
under command of Captain Pendleton advancing upon insurgent strongholds in the 
mountains of Cebu on September 12, 1899. While under heavy insurgent fire, the naval 
party called in fire support missions upon the insurgent mountain fortifications from the 
monitor Monadnock, using “wig-wag” flags, and dislodged the insurgents.179 
On February 24, 1899, as Spanish forces prepared to withdrawal from the Sulu 
archipelago, and Island chain between Mindanao and Borneo, the Sultana of Sulu 
requested the immediate presence of American forces at the capital city of Jolo.180 With 
matters in Jolo improving, Otis began preparations to send General J.C. Bates to make an 
agreement with the Sultan of Sulu.181 On August 20, 1899, Bates negotiated an 
agreement with the Sultan of Sulu who accepted U.S. sovereignty, and in return promised 
free trade and protection from insurgents and foreign powers. Brigadier General J.C. 
Bates attributed his successful expedition to Jolo in large part to the cooperation of the 
Navy’s, Manila, Charleston, Castine, and Yorktown, for providing transportation, 
intelligence, and assistance to the expedition.182 
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On April 3, 1899, Dewey instructed the gunboat Yorktown to rescue a number of 
Spanish soldiers and priests from a large Filipino force at Baler, Luzon. Arriving on April 
12, 1899, Lieutenant James C. Gilmore took a small landing party ashore to 
reconnaissance the Baler river and town. What exactly happened next would remain a 
mystery as Gilmore and his fourteen men went missing. Dewey would report that the 
boat was ambushed, fired upon and captured, fate unknown.183 But, after the capture of 
San Fabian, Commander Edwin K. Moore, of the gunboat  Helena, learned that 
Lieutenant Gilmore and four other Americans had been seen alive in insurgent hands.184 
Young on December 4, 1899, ordered Colonels Hare and Howze to pursue the retreating 
enemy through the mountains of northern Luzon and free Lieutenant Gillmore and his 
party. On the 8th of December Hare and Howze were informed that the party they were 
pursuing was being taken towards the port city of Aparri. On December 14, 1899, after 
traveling over twenty miles a day, and 300 miles since leaving San Fabian, the army 
expedition received supplies along the coast of northern Luzon from the navy; having 
worn practically through their shoes, the navy supplied the party with brand new 
boots.185  Continuing their pursuit, Howze and Hare found the Gillmore party on 
December 18, 1899, abandoned by their insurgent captors who refused the order to 
execute the prisoners rather than surrender them.  Out of food, delirious, and bleeding, 
the group (the rescuers and rescue’s) was saved from uncertain fate on January 2, 1899 
by a party sent from the gunboat Princeton. The navy immediately rushed supplies up 
river and brought the expedition down to the town of Aparri in the conclusion of one of 
the most heroic marches of the Philippine Insurrection.186 
On May 11, 1899, insurgent troops on Mindanao attacked the Spanish garrison at 
Zamboanga in an effort to occupy the town prior to the arrival of American forces as the 
Spanish withdrew. Three days later, on May 14, 1899, Manila received the report that the 
besieged Spanish garrison requested immediate assistance, but engaged in Luzon and 
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occupying Jolo, Otis did not have the manpower to spare. The solution came from the 
Secretary of War who recommended that a navy gunboat be dispatched.187 On behest of 
President McKinley’s concern over the issue at Zamboanga, Dewey dispatched the 
gunboat Castine by May 17, 1899, to cover the withdrawal of Spanish forces and 
maintain stability until army forces could be sent. But, when the gunboat arrived, the 
town was already occupied by insurgents, so she instead enacted a blockade of the port. 
Under constant harassment of the navy’s blockade and the hostile Moro’s around 
Zamboanga, the insurgents finally surrendered the town to Commander Samuel W. Very 
(Castine) on November 20, 1899.188 Not intending to occupy the city until a later date, 
the army had to send several companies from neighboring Jolo, and by the end of the 
week Zamboanga was occupied by U.S. forces.189  Bates, District Commander of 
Mindanao and Jolo, wrote from Zamboanga, Mindanao, concerning his sincere 
appreciation for the assistance of the navy in and around the Island of Mindanao: the 
navy’s blockade of Zamboanga had “literally starved the natives into subjection”.190 
The tale of the gunboat Urdaneta is tragic story that demonstrates the risk 
involved in naval operations during the Philippine Insurrection. On Sunday, September 
17, 1899, the gunboat  Urdaneta left her anchorage off Balanga and steamed up the Orani 
River to inspect cascos (small canoe type vessels) near the town. After inspecting every 
vessel in sight and finding no contraband or resistance, the Urdaneta began to turn 
around, but grounded on a sand bar. As the tide fell and any hopes of getting off the bar 
quickly diminished, all hands were ordered over the side to paint and scrape the exposed 
haul. As the day waned and the sailors of the Urdaneta finished their hull maintenance, 
insurgents attacked. Volley for volley of insurgent fire was answered with the ship’s 
Nordenfeldt 37mm gun, Colt gun, and 1-pdr. cannon. With the Colt red hot, the firing 
pins on the 1-pdr. broken, and one barrel of the Nordenfeldt not firing, wounded Naval 
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Cadet W. C. Wood, ordered his crew into the ship’s boat in an effort to try to escape to 
shore. As the crew rowed for shore, insurgents rushed down the river in pursuit. Cadet 
Wood was dead by this time, and as the crew attempted to swim the last leg to shore, 
Seaman William Mitchell, Samuel Stone, Machinist (1/C) Arthur W. Drummond, and 
Fireman (second class) Thomas Gray were killed. The remaining survivors, Coxswain 
Benjamin J. Green, Apprentice George D. Powers, Fireman John J. Farley, Ordinary 
Seaman Tilden Herbert and Edward Burke were captured by the Insurgents, but would be 
rescued by the army several months later.191 An expedition by the navy to reclaim the 
lost  Urdaneta was launched at the beginning of October, 1899. Led by the gunboat  
Petrel and assisted by the gunboats Helena, Barcelo, Mindoro, Gardoqui, Manila, 
Callao, and Basco, the expedition steamed up the Orani River to the wreck of the 
Urdaneta. Gunfire from the gunboats drove insurgents away and protected the working 
party while they attempted to re-float the Urdaneta. After effecting repairs for the better 
part of a day, the Urdaneta was re-floated and towed out to sea and back to Manila where 
she was eventually repaired and put back into service.192  
On Luzon, as the army fought through the interior, the  Charleston, Monterey, and 
Concord battled insurgents along Subic Bay. On the morning of September 23, 1899, the 
ships engaged insurgent entrenchments, barracks, and a mounted gun at the mouth of the 
Kalaklan River. After opening fire and driving the insurgents from their trenches, a 
landing party was deployed to the beach. After several attempts, the emplaced gun was 
finally destroyed and the landing force withdrew.193 
As Wheaton marched to San Fabian in the last part of the San Isidro Campaign, 
he dispatched Captain Batchelor with three companies, on November 22, 1899, to 
proceed to the new insurgent capital at Bayombong. For reasons unknown, the ambitious 
captain acted contrary to his orders and continued past his objective toward the Cagayan 
Valley and the town of Aparri. When an attempt to locate and arrest the captain for 
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disobeying orders failed, Otis requested assistance from Watson. Watson dispatched 
Captain Bowman H. McCalla, commanding officer of the  Newark, on December 3, 1899 
from Cavite, to steam to Aparri and enter the Aparri River to locate the renegade army 
captain.194 Upon arriving at Aparri along with the Helena, Callao, and Princeton, 
Commander McCalla made contact with insurgent General Daniel Tirona who 
surrendered all the forces of the Cagayan and Isabela Provinces on December 11, 1899.  
Captain McCalla sent a steamboat up the Cagayan River for Captain Batchelor, whose 
party was found battered and beaten some ninety miles up the Aparri River.195 In a 
personal note to Watson, McCalla, after the surrender of the Northwest Provinces, 
explained how the population was in want of supplies, and being pacified, he hoped that 
trade would be authorized at once, in the interests of the people. He reasoned that “the 
more quickly trade begins here, the sooner the war will be over, and the greater the effect 
of our occupation upon the other provinces of this island”.196 
As General Young mopped up in the Ilocos provinces, General MacArthur 
focused on the insurgent troops that had had been trapped and fled west. Brigadier 
General Frederick D. Grant was dispatched after the remnants of Army of liberation 
which escaped into the southwest Province of Zambalas and Bataan. Re-supplied by the 
navy, he arrived on Subic Bay on December 10, 1899, and immediately took Olongapo 
and captured the naval station and arsenal there. With the assistance of Navy, he 
proceeded next to launch landings up and down the coast against the few remaining 
insurgents.197 
As introduced earlier under the section on the navy’s blockade, the most 
influential individual who would shape the future pacification campaign in the central 
Philippines was Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, military commander of the Visayan 
Military District. His strategy focused on depriving the enemy of all means of sustenance. 
With the blockade of the navy and his own efforts in controlling the trade of foodstuff 
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into the Island of Panay, Hughes took the defensive and began to starve the insurgents 
out.198 As his plan worked through the summer and into the fall as previously discussed, 
troop numbers increased, and he launched a military campaign to root out the remaining 
insurgents in late 1899. While Hughes was leading a column through the center of the 
Island, on December 5, 1899, a battalion of the 18th Infantry was sent to occupy the 
important towns on the East Coast of Panay. Using the gunboat Elcano as a transport and 
protected by the gunboats  Concord and Paragua, troops were landed at Bonati, Ajui, 
Conception, and Estancia. While unloading a month’s supply for the garrison at Sara, 
insurgent attacks were repelled by the gunfire from the two gunboats.  
During Hughes’ advance, insurgent documents were captured that indicated that 
the insurgent’s communications were forwarded north and south through the central point 
of Romblon Island. The gunboats Concord and Paragua were dispatched with a small 
military force to disrupt the insurgent’s line of communications. Upon arriving at 
Romblon, the American force found substantial breast works and an old Spanish fort 
manned by insurgent troops with several old cast iron smooth bore guns. As two 
companies of the 18th Infantry were landed, the insurgents opened fire. Quickly the two 
gunboats answered back with fire upon the fort and trenches, displacing the insurgents. 
Within forty minutes of the first shot, the entire town was in the possession of U.S. 
troops, with only two U.S. Army casualties taken.199 
D. CONCLUSION 
The distinguished author Ronald Spector asserted that the navy played a relatively 
minor role in the Philippine Insurrection.200 Based upon the evidence shown in this 
chapter, he was incorrect. The Navy was crucial during the first year after the onset of 
hostilities in three facets: conventional military campaigns, blockading, and other 
operations. The navy was doing exactly what the Secretary of the Navy informed the 
President and Congress that they were doing in his annual report of 1899: “The principle 
duties of the Asiatic Station were to cooperate with the army in the capture of ports, 
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landing, and protection of the Army. In patrolling, vessels were to maintain a blockade to 
such extend as determined by the general policy of the campaign laid down by the War 
Department”.201 While the army most assuredly deserves praise for conducting the 
majority of the fighting against the insurgents during the first year, it is in part due to the 
efforts of the navy that success was achieved. 
In every one of the Army’s conventional campaigns, except for one, the navy or at 
least the army’s navy, played a role. From the beginning of hostilities, with the navy’s 
bombardment of the southern line that enabled General Overshine’s troops to breakout, to 
the last campaign, and the navy’s shelling of enemy troops around Taal, the navy played 
a pivotal role. The blockade prevented insurgents from obtaining the arms and 
ammunition they needed to fight the American Army, and without trade to obtain funds 
from, the insurgent’s ability to afford to feed and supply their troops decreased. The 
blockade also served to intercept the Filipino lines of communication and operations. 
Plus, in an archipelago that cultivated in cash crops, the blockade enabled the army to 
control necessities such as food to deprive the insurgents of sustenance and control the 
native population. With the army short of personnel, it fell upon the navy to fill the gap 
and project American presence throughout the island. While the army did establish a 
number of posts, supplying, transporting, and communicating was only achieved by aid 
of the navy.  
While this chapter has discussed the three roles that the navy filled during the first 
year of hostilities, two major trends arose that warrant mention. First, the navy employed 
gunboats to accomplish the bulk of its tasking throughout the archipelago. These shallow 
draft vessels proved to have far greater utility against the insurgents than the larger and 
deeper draft vessels that were for the most part relegated to remaining import. On January 
5, 1899, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, urged 
the Secretary of the Navy to send light-draft vessels to the Asiatic Station to be used in 
the Philippines. At the time there were only officially (not including several captured 
Spanish gunboats) the gunboats  Petrel and  Concord assigned to the Asiatic Station. 
Crowninshield realized the need for the light-draft vessels in opening communications 
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with the numerous small ports throughout the islands, and recommended sending the 
gunboat Bennington from Guam.202 The manning of the gunboats became such a 
necessity, that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Charles H. Allan, informed Dewey 
that decommissioning the monitors (Monterey and Monadnock) was being considered as 
a way to free up personnel to commission the captured Spanish gunboats.203 On May 11, 
1899, Dewey emphatically informed the Secretary of the Navy that gunboats were 
urgently needed in the Philippines.204  
While gunboats patrolled the islands, the larger and less mobile cruisers of the 
fleet remained for the most part anchored in one of the few deep water ports within the 
islands. When the larger vessels did venture out, it was at great risk. In a telling example 
of the futility of larger vessels within the archipelago, the cruiser Charleston, on March 4, 
1899, while navigating among the islands looking for illicit trade, reported that 
navigation in these parts is often done by good lookouts searching for rocks and shoals. 
This manner of navigation was not possible for vessels with draft depths of nearly thirty 
feet, of which was the case of the Charleston.205 Ironically the  Charleston struck a 
sunken, uncharted reef at 5:30 am on November 2, 1899. Grounding off the north end of 
Kamiguin Island, she was abandoned and considered a total loss; fortunately, there was 
no lose of life.206 While gunboats did not possess the firepower of the larger cruisers and 
monitors that did prove successful in several battles, the maneuverability and 
accessibility of the gunboat more than made up for it. 
The second trend during this time period concerned the policy of pacification and 
the blockade. The goal was to stop illicit cargo from reaching insurgents and also stop 
trade that was financing the insurgency. The problem was how to accomplish this without 
negatively effecting the native civilian population and allowing legitimate foreign trade. 
General Otis vacillated as pressure from two sides, appeasement and provocation, sought 
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to ensure a policy that they believed worked best. General Hughes, facing insurgents on 
Panay, advocated a strict blockade. General Smith on Negros and Colonel Hamar on 
Cebu both took a benevolent approach and opened ports. What exacerbated the situation 
was the close proximity of the islands to each other and the fact that technically, Hughes 
was overall incharge as the Visayan Military District commander. But, violating the 
principle of war of “unity of command” Otis allowed the islands of Cebu and Negros to 
be sub-districts separate from Hughes authority. This conflict would be an ongoing 
debate that would last for another year, and will be discussed in the following chapters. 
Added to this already complex problem was the navy, which advocated the strict 
blockade, conflicted with the American government, which under pressure of merchants 
back home, pressed for the opening of ports. In the following year, the debate would gain 
in intensity as Otis was instructed to open more ports and increase trade.  
The onset of hostilities brought a war that the United States did not want and was 
not prepared for. As time progressed, U.S. military forces adjusted to the situation at 
hand. Through the combined efforts of campaigning, blockading, and other operations, 
the army and navy achieved great success. But, on November 13, 1899, unbeknownst to 
American forces, Aguinaldo ordered the disbandment of the Army of Liberation and the 
shift to guerilla warfare. The army and navy would once again be forced to adapt as the 








III. THE HEMP EXPEDITION AND GUERILLA WARFARE (1900) 
As the conventional army campaigns on Luzon came to a close in early 1900, the 
focus of American efforts in the Philippine Islands shifted. The new year saw the Filipino 
army evolve into a guerilla force throughout the archipelago, and the U.S. army was 
pushed by Washington to expand its presence throughout the islands and open up trade. 
On November 17, 1900, in his annual report to the President, Secretary of the Navy John 
D. Long, said: “The fleet on the Asiatic Station has cooperated with the army in the 
Philippines, transporting and convoying troops, patrolling a wide area of badly charted 
waters, sending out landing parties, and keeping the coast clear of the enemy. The small 
gunboats have been of great value in preventing the landing of arms for the insurgents 
and cutting off illicit trade with and among the islands”. 207 The navy’s role in the 
Philippine Insurrection appeared to have changed little from the previous year, but its 
importance had actually grown. 
U.S. forces in the Philippine Insurrection during the year 1900 were faced with 
four primary issues. First, the army was directed by Washington to open up trade within 
the islands and expand its presence; this required considerable resources to be diverted 
from the major theater of operation in Luzon. Second, the insurgents reverted to guerilla 
warfare and the army had to adjust from fighting conventional battles to counter-
insurgency operations. Third, the navy had to maintain a strict blockade that became even 
more important as the army’s pacification efforts expanded. Lastly, hostilities broke out 
in China that required the attention of both the army and navy. To accomplish all these 
tasks both the army and navy saw changes in policy and organization during the year. 
As politicians and the army struggled with the best approach to the Philippine 
Insurrection, the navy underwent a number of changes. With the ever increasing demands 
made upon the navy on the Asiatic Station, the force continued to be augmented with 
ships and men. On February 24, 1900, General Otis turned over to the navy the former 
                                                 
207 United States Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1900), 3. 
 74
Spanish gunboats Alava, Quiros, and Villalobos.208 When Rear Admiral John C. Watson 
was relieved by Rear Admiral Geo C. Remey on April 19, 1900, as Commander-in-Chief 
of the U.S. Naval Forces on the Asiatic Station, he reported that the principal operations 
of the navy had been in Philippine waters acting with the army against insurgents, 
transporting, convoying troops, bombarding, patrolling to prevent the landing of arms and 
illicit trading. In this work he claimed that the small gunboats were of the greatest 
value.209  
Nine days later, Remey was given an assistant, Rear Admiral Louis Kempff, to 
insure rank and experience if the ships on station had to be divided between the 
Philippines and elsewhere. Almost immediately, circumstances within China made it 
necessary to maintain a separate force off China, so the Second-in-Command (Kempff) 
aboard his flagship, the cruiser Newark, was dispatched to Taku, China. Kempff was 
placed in commanded of all vessels of the station north of Hong Kong: Monocacy, 
Nashville, Oregon, and Yorktown.210 For the year of 1900, it was the gunboats that 
accomplished the navy’s task on the Asiatic Station within the Philippines by patrolling, 
supplying, communicating, interdicting illicit trade, convoying the army, and just about 
every imaginable task. The larger vessels, the monitors and cruisers, were relegated to 
menial tasking. Coming into 1900, it was aboard the navy gunboats that “All were 
enthusiastic for the new-strange adventures, so different from the peace routine of a 
large-man of war”.211 
A. THE HEMP EXPEDITION 
On January 1, 1900, the ports in Luzon of Dagupan, Vigan, Aparri, Candon, San 
Fernando de la Union, Laoag, Currimoa, and Salamague were opened to trade.212 While 
commerce was returning to the Philippine Islands, it was not reviving at the speed desired 
by the U.S government. America wanted hemp. Hemp is a tough fiber used especially for 
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cordage, and Manila hemp or abaca was the considered the best in the world. But, four 
years of war and the navy’s blockade had sent prices skyrocketing by 300 percent. 
American farmers and businessmen predicted a possible agricultural depression without 
sufficient hemp for twine and rope.213 
Sending urgent inquiries and expressing an anxiety about the hemp trade, 
Washington on January 9, 1900 sent messages to Major General Otis concerning opening 
up hemp ports. For two days Otis and the adjutant general debated about launching an 
expedition to open ports. The response from Otis was that he was unable to move troops 
to the hemp districts because of the lack of manpower, lack of coasting vessels which 
where busy supplying troops, and the U.S. transport ships had too great a draft to be 
useful.214 Finally, Washington ordered Otis to occupy the “hemp ports” in the provinces 
of southeastern Luzon: Sorsogan, Albay, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, the 
Visayan islands of Leyte and Samar, and northern Mindanao (see Figure9). Otis 
begrudgingly responded that he would open the main hemp districts by the end of the 
month.215  
The hemp expedition was mounted with great haste and little preparation. Its 
success was due only to the cooperation of the army and navy. The army was led by 
recently promoted Brigadier General William A. Kobbé commanding the 43rd and 47th 
Infantry; the navy was represented by Commodore Raymond P. Rodgers who 
commanded the gunboats Helena, Nashville, and Mariveles. The expedition set sail from 
Manila on January 18, 1900. On January 20 the expedition arrived off Sorsogon, Bicol 
Peninsula, Luzon. As Kobbé’s troops embarked into their landing boats, Kobbé requested 
that the Helena, Mariveles, and Nashville anchor close to shore to provide support in case 
of hostilities. Then, Kobbé and Colonel Howze (of the Gilmore rescue, page 45) went 
aboard the Mariveles, the shallowest draft vessel, to reconnoiter and select the landing 
place. Finding no resistance, the army landed at the port’s wharf and took possession of 
                                                 
213 Linn, 174. 
214 Corbin to Otis, Jan. 9, 1900, Correspondence, 1130-1131. 
215 Otis to Adjutant General of the War Department (AGWAR), Jan. 10, 1900, ibid., 1131. 
 76
the town. On January 21, 1900, the Nashville and Mariveles took aboard a company of 
the 47th Infantry and transported the troops to nearby Bulan. 
 
Figure 9.   Hemp Expedition (After: 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rp.html)  
 
After landing, the army took peaceful possession of the town. That same day the 
Helena embarked two companies and transported them to Donsol where they effected 
another peaceful landing of sorts. Upon their arrival, the Helena found trenches in front 
of the town filled with 200 to 300 insurgents; with the vessel’s decks cleared for action 
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and all batteries aimed at the trenches, the army landed safely. The insurgents then “lined 
up in fine style” and fled.216  
Arriving off Legaspi on the morning of January 23, 1900, the main port of the 
Albay Province on Luzon, the expedition found some 200 riflemen and 400 bolomen  
defended by earthworks and firing pits. Bolomen are natives armed with an indigenous 
knife called a “bolo”; the bolo is a fifteen inch, heavy bladed, machete (see Figure10). 
The Nashville slowly cruised the waterfront reconnoitering the trenches and defenses. 
Extending from a point north of the northernmost wharfs to south of the southernmost 
wharf, the insurgents had constructed trenches and placed a field battery to the south. 
General Kobbé decided to land north of the insurgent lines, so the Nashville took 
position, and as the troops landed, the Nashville opened fire. Using a combination of 
shrapnel and shell, the Nashville’s 4-inch guns, 6-pdrs., 1-pdrs., and 6mm automatics 
poured effective and severe fire into the insurgent trenches. As American troops 
advanced, so did the Nashville, sweeping the trenches and enfilading streets and buildings 
at ranges from 400 to 700 yards. At the southernmost wharf the Filipinos attempted to 
make a stand, but between the cross fire from the army and navy, the insurgents were 
obliged to run. It was at this time that the insurgent field battery, three pieces, opened 
fire, but the Nashville quickly silenced them. It was later found that the Nashville had 
dismounted one of the guns with its fire. By early afternoon, the town of Legaspi was in 
U.S. possession as well as the neighboring towns of Albay and Daraga. In all, the 
Nashville had fired 176 rounds of 4-inch shells, 211 rounds of 6-pdr. shells, 132 rounds 
of 1-pdr, and 2750 rounds from her 6mm Colt automatic guns. The next day, January 24, 
1900, the Nashville escorted troops to the port of Virac on the island of Catanduanes, and 
finding no signs of resistance, the town was taken peacefully by nightfall.217 
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Figure 10.   Bolo Knife (From: www.oriental-arms.co.il/OA/items/000198.html)   
 
On January 26, 1900, Otis reported that Kobbé occupied the hemp ports of 
Sorsogon, Donsol, Bulan, Albay, and Legaspi in southeastern Luzon and Virac on the 
island of Catanduanes, and would probably occupy the ports of Calbayog, Catbalogan, 
and Tacloban on Samar and Leyte within days. He (Otis) reported that the only resistance 
encountered was at Legaspi, but troops landed safely under the protection of the navy’s 
fierce bombardment of fortifications at close range. Upon occupation, these ports were 
found to contain great quantities of hemp ready for shipment and would be opened on 
January 30, 1900.218 
Regrouping back at Sorsogen, the expedition set off on January 25, 1900, for 
Calbayog on the island of Samar, with the Nashville, Helena, and Mariveles escorting the 
transports Venus, Aeolus, Salvadoro, Castellano, and Mendez Nunez. The expedition 
arrived at sunlight the following day off Calbayog, and the Mariveles stood in to shore 
with Kobbé to reconnoiter, while the Nashville and Helena approached the shore to 
within 1000 yards to cover the landing. Finding no signs of resistance, the signal to 
“land” was given, and the U.S. ensign was hoisted above the town by 8:30 that morning. 
On January 27, 1900, the expedition set sail for Catbalogan, Samar, and arrived after a 
few hours. Kobbé again boarded the Mariveles to reconnoiter the beach, but while close 
in, a white flag was displayed on the beach. Under a flag of truce, the insurgents 
informed the Americans that they would fight and also set fire to the town. As the 
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Mariveles withdrew, the insurgents held to their word and started setting fires to 
buildings, buildings that were later learned to have been already drenched in petroleum. 
The signal to “land” was immediately given and the Nashville anchored 600 yards from 
shore to cover the landing. Once the Americans landed, the insurgents in position in the 
surrounding hills opened fire with field pieces and rifles, but the Nashville, Helena, and 
Mariveles returned fire and eventually the insurgent guns lay silent. The Helena silenced 
a battery using 4-inch common shells and 4-inch shrapnel shells, the army going in 
immediately after the last fall of shot to find the emplacement abandoned. Later that 
evening, a party of insurgents attempted to approach the town, but the Nashville fired 
several rounds of shrapnel and shell from her 4-inch gun and drove the insurgents off. 
Through the night, the Nashville and Helena used their search lights to sweep the hills, 
shores, and waters around Catbalogan.219  
On January 29, 1900, the Nashville continued at Catbalogan, landing stores and 
animals for the newly established garrison. The Mariveles was dispatched for the nearby 
port of Calbayog on Samar and to search the Surigao Straits between the islands (Leyte 
and Samar). Her (Mariveles) mission was to cut off any escape attempt by General 
Lukban, and then to proceed to San Pedre Bay, Leyte to await the arrival of the 
expedition. The Helena was ordered to remain at Catbalogan for a number of days as 
guard-ship, and aided the infantry stationed there by carrying a detachment to the mouth 
of the Gandara River in hopes of finding insurgents. The Nashville departed Catbalogan 
on January 30, 1900, with the transports Garonne, Salvadoro, and Aeolus for Tacloban 
on the island of Leyte. On February 1, 1900, the Nashville arrived off the port of 
Tacloban and rendezvoused with the Mariveles. Upon arrival, the expedition discovered 
500 of insurgent General Mojicas' best fighters manning an elaborate array of trenches 
and defenses. As U.S. troops landed and began their advance, the insurgents opened fire. 
The Mariveles quickly opened fire with its Colt gun and main battery and the Nashville 
followed suit and opened up with its fore and aft 4-inch guns, firing shell and shrapnel 
into the enemy’s position. Caught between the naval bombardment and the advancing 
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troops, the insurgent force ran. This loss by the insurgents on Leyte facilitated the 
adoption of guerilla warfare on the island.220 
Short of troops, Kobbé was ordered to concentrate his troops at the more 
important ports and permit trade. After leaving garrisons at all the hemp ports, Kobbé’s 
expedition finished without taking the western Bicol province of Camarines and northern 
Mindanao.221 On January 30, 1900, the ports of Virac, Sorsogon, Donsol, Bulan, Albay, 
Legaspi, Calbayog, Catbalogan, and Tacloban were all declared open for trade. Two days 
later the ports of Batangas and Taal in southern Luzon were opened. The opening of these 
ports signified the return of trade to the most important hemp ports in the Philippines. 
From January 30, 1900, to February 14, 1900, eight more ports in Samar and Leyte were 
opened for trade. By February 15, 1900, Kobbé occupied southeastern Luzon, from 
Tabaco in the north to Donsol in the south, along with all the important ports of the 
islands of Catanduanes, Samar, and Leyte. All coasting vessels were engaged in 
transporting merchandise and products.222 Thirty merchants engaged in transporting 
hemp to Cebu and Manila.223 By March 1, 1900, 13,000 tons of hemp and 70,000 bales 
of tobacco had been collected in Manila since opening island ports.224 
The Military Governor, Otis, was the one who declared the ports open, and 
transmitted the opening through the CINC Asiatic to naval vessels. The ports of Nueva 
Caceres and Pasacao on Luzon were opened for coastal trade on February 28, 1900. On 
March 2, 1900, the ports of Lemeri, Luzon, and Calivo, on Panay were opened to trade. 
The ports of Bongao on Bongao, Mati on Mindanao, Balambam and Danao on Cebu were 
opened for trade on March 13, 1900.225 On March 17, 1900 the port of Carigara-Garugo, 
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Leyte was likewise opened.226 The port of Isabella on the island of Basilan was opened 
for coastal trading on April 1, 1900.227 The gunboat Bennington, with the senior officer 
present afloat in Cebu, reported that Kobbé had recently returned from opening 18 ports, 
with such rapidity, that the Bennington had to issue station orders to commanding officers 
to exercise discretion and honor the signatures of army officers at ports when overhauling 
vessels, as sometimes notification of port openings was delayed.228 
As soon as a hemp port fell into American possession, Otis declared it open. 
Merchants then converged on the ports and soon bought up all the hemp in the towns, and 
then petitioned the army to push troops into the countryside and to open new ports. 
Already stretched small detachments sent out patrols to protect hemp gatherers and 
convoys. These merchants were already paying the guerillas to protect their fields and 
workers, and it was discovered by the army that the insurgents were also collecting taxes 
on hemp going through the ports or being smuggled. Removing the restrictions on coastal 
trade inadvertently assisted illicit traffic. Far from cutting off the illicit hemp trade and 
revolutionary funds, the opening of the hemp ports may have increased them.229 While a 
brisk trade emerged, water communication also allowed insurgent communications 
between Luzon and the southern Islands and insurgents and other disaffected Filipinos 
driven from Luzon to relocate.230 
B. GUERILLA WARFARE AND PACIFICATION 
Back on November 13, 1899, Aguinaldo had instructed his principal officers to 
resort to guerilla warfare.231 As Filipino forces throughout the archipelago received the 
word and experienced the last conventional defeats in early 1900, during the Cavite 
Campaign and Hemp Expedition, the shift to guerilla warfare took effect. The dazzling 
conventional military victories, experienced by the Americans, were no longer attainable; 
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there would be few opportunities for glory in guerilla warfare.232 With Aguinaldo’s 
escape into northeastern Luzon, he spent until September 1900, eluding patrols, securing 
food, and seeking shelter. While he did finally establish a permanent headquarters at the 
remote village of Palanan, he was isolated and unable to exercise control of the 
insurgency. Aguinaldo became a symbolic importance instead of a military one. The 
effect was that the local political-military leaders, such as Martin Delgado on Iloilo, 
Vicente Lukban on Samar, and Moxica on Leyte, carried on the struggle in what became 
a series of complex regional guerilla conflicts.233 The objective of the insurgents was not 
to vanquish the U.S. army, but to inflict constant casualties and discourage American 
efforts. In essence, the insurgents adopted a strategy of attrition.234 
Otis assumed that the insurgent resistance stemmed entirely from ethnic Tagalogs. 
The decision to launch the Hemp Expedition in early 1900 was seen to take away 
precious resources and manpower from the strategic areas of Luzon. Scattered garrisons, 
with no reinforcements, presented major risks to the army. MacArthur, who relieved Otis 
on May 4, 1900, also believed that Luzon should have been pacified first and then the rest 
of the archipelago. 235 The decision to divert focus outside of Luzon (Hemp Expedition) 
turned the entire archipelago into a battlefield. In a report to the adjutant general on April 
10, 1900, Otis reported that insurgent forces that fled into northern Luzon in November 
had scattered and were operating with ladrones (bandits) and mountain tribes. The 
guerillas and landrones were often fighting each other and only attacking to rob and 
murder peaceable citizens, or very small army detachments. The army had assumed the 
role of protecting smaller towns.236 During the first 6 months of guerilla warfare, Otis 
focused on civic action for the army’s pacification program. He believed that Filipinos 
would welcome the benefits of American rule: law, education, peace, trade, and 
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municipal government.237 While the policy of appeasement was also advocated by the 
Philippine Commission, under William H. Taft, the policy was negated in many ways by 
the presidential election race of 1900 between President William McKinley and William 
J. Bryan. In hopes of influencing the election and winning independences should Bryan 
win, the insurgents saw a reason to continue the armed struggle.238  
While the disbandment of the insurgent field armies had been followed by a 
considerable period of inactivity; this lull only covered the time necessary for the 
insurgents to prepare for the new method of warfare and to organize for resistance by 
means of a general banding of the people in support of the guerrillas in the field.239 As 
the United Stated sought a policy and strategy that would win the conflict, the insurgents 
faced an equally perplexing problem in that while the insurgents could abandon the 
coastal towns and take to the mountains, the resistance needed the townspeople and 
merchants of the coast who dominated the revolutionary committees. These town elite 
depended upon foreign trade and were hurt by the navy’s blockade of abaca shipments 
and slowly realized that the Philippine Republic could not protect their interests. 
Aguinaldo and the central insurgent government further complicated the matter by only 
appointing Tagalog political-military leaders. The ethnic divide often created problems 
outside Luzon as the insurgents demanded food, money, and recruits for the insurrection 
from the local populace, and in return offered few troops or arms.240 The year of 1900 
became the year that both the U.S. and the insurgents sought how best to “win the hearts 
and minds” of the populace. 
The insurgent revolutionary organization consisted of regulars and militia troops 
arranged along territorial/provincial lines. The regular troops seldom numbered more 
than a few hundred in any province, and consisted of groups of 10 to 60 riflemen and an 
equal number of bolomen. The bands of regulars would roam and holed up in barrios or 
in the mountains. The insurgent militia consisted of all males of military age within 
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towns, villages, and barrios, they were armed with spears and bolos. While they (militia) 
remained in the towns, they provided security, built fortifications, collected taxes, and 
intimidated or eliminated collaborators. These two forces (regulars and militia) would 
combine to attack isolated American patrols and garrisons, logistical lines, and 
communications.241 
Like most guerilla wars, the insurgent logistical base was at the front. 
Neighboring pueblos contributed to the maintenance of the insurgent army, exacting and 
collecting contributions, supplies, and recruiting men, and offering secure places of 
refuge.242 Food and stores were collected in the towns and then transported in carts or by 
porters to camps and supply dumps.243 The guerillas’ relationship with the population 
was a source of strength and weakness. Dependent upon the population for shelter and 
supplies, if these were not given willingly, the insurgents would take them by force, 
becoming a burden if not menace on the locals. The local elite, who led the resistance in 
the towns, often found the cost of war too high to bear, theirs was the land sequestered, 
taxed by both sides (Americans and insurgents), and their families and fortunes were at 
the greatest risk.244 
While guerilla operations occurred on Luzon in the Southern Tagalog Region 
with insurgent General Miguel Malvar, the primary focus for 1900 would be in 
combating the insurgents in the southern Islands. As mentioned earlier, the army’s 
primary fear that guerilla warfare would erupt throughout the archipelago was realized in 
1900. On January 16, 1900, General Arcadio Maxilom, insurgent commander on Cebu, 
received Aguinaldo’s order to adopt guerilla tactics.245 Insurgent General Ambrosio 
Mojica arrived on February 14, 1899, on the island of Leyte and took over as commander 
of insurgent forces from insurgent general Vincente Lukban, who remained in command 
of the Island of Samar. On March 2, 1900, Mojica received word from Aguinaldo to start 
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guerilla warfare. He developed a system using units of 10-20 men to harass enemy 
American forces by waiting in ambush until within 40 meters, opening fire, and then 
running.246 Mojica divided Leyte into four insurgent military districts, protected by four 
infantry companies, three artillery companies, and an assortment of bolomen, and began 
waging guerilla warfare.247 
The American opinion on how to wage war against the insurgents varied. 
Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young signified the growing unrest of subordinates over 
the lack of military use when he advocated the use of “remedial measures that proved 
successful with the Apaches.” Many officers felt that if the punishment authorized 
suspension of civil rights, trial by provost court, confiscation, deportation, property 
destruction, and summary execution, the war would be over in a few months. At the heart 
of the matter was General Order No. 100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field”, also known as the Lieber Code, which was issued by 
President Abraham Lincoln on April 24, 1863, to govern the army during times of war 
and dealt with operations among a hostile population.248 The humanitarian aspects of 
General Order 100 had been in effect since the arrival of the first expedition, but by June 
1900, the Judge Advocate justified the application of all of G.O. 100 when it ruled that 
“martial law applies throughout the archipelago”, but neither Otis nor MacArthur 
(initially) authorized the enforcement of the order in their entirety. 249  
The American leadership thought it better to wait and let the cruelty of the 
guerrillas and their allies, the ladrones, drive the masses into the arms of the Americans. 
When the resources of the country were exhausted, the guerrillas still demanded their 
tribute in men, money, and supplies; when not given, they used force, punishment, and 
terror.250 For the insurgents to be successful, they required the unwearied support of the 
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entire population, but the unrelenting pursuit of the guerrillas by the Americans forced 
them in their necessity to make ever increasing demands upon the exhausted people. The 
distinction between the insurgents and bandits of the hills grew less, but support of the 
insurgents among the barrios and towns was not totally eradicated.251 While Washington, 
Otis, and MacArthur (at first) pursued a policy of “benevolent assimilation”, what 
eventually emerged was something quite different. Stricter measures were taken towards 
the native population that included coercing the populace to reside within the garrisoned 
towns and central trading ports. This program of pacification sought to isolate the people 
from the insurgents, a policy practiced most notably by Brigadier General Hughes as one 
of “concentration”, a policy that the navy assisted with.252 While this policy was not 
officially adopted by the senior leadership in Manila until MacArthur, in December 1900, 
its practice and those of the stricter measures of G.O. 100 were being employed 
throughout the archipelago for much of 1900. The first step was to keep the guerillas on 
the run. 
On January 9, 1900, General Hughes, district commander, informed the Concord, 
station ship at Iloilo, Panay, that intelligence had been received that 2,000 insurgent 
troops were massing near San Jose de Buena Vista, in the province of Antique, Panay, 
and was getting ready to sail on the steamer Isabel. The Pampanga was immediately 
dispatched to prevent the Isabel, a steamer already known about from the gunboat Samar 
which had seen and fired upon here several months earlier, from departing. An expedition 
was at once launched, and on January 13, 1900, the army land component set off (see 
Figure11). On January 16, 1900, the gunboats Concord and El Cano transported General 
Hughes, his staff, and a battalion of the 19th Infantry to San Joaquin where they were 
landed. The next day, as the army crossed the mountains, the Concord and Pampanga 
steamed up the coast to arrive off Antique before midnight. The town of San Jose de 
Buena Vista, the former seat of the insurgent government in the province of Antique was 
three miles north of the town of Antique. It was here that the insurgents expected to make 
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a stand against the advancing American troops coming from the San Joaquin Mountains, 
near the coast from the south.  
As U.S. troops marched directly toward the unseen insurgent trenches, the 
Concord directed several shots from her 6-pdr. to warn the American troops of danger. 
The army at once initiated cheers and then came under brisk fire from the insurgents. 
 
Figure 11.   Operations on Panay (After: Linn, The Philippine War, 242) 
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As America troops took cover and disappeared from sight, the insurgents turned 
their fire solely upon the Pampanga, placing the vessel under “very hot fire”253 After 
some time, Pampanga’s Colt gun jammed and the 37mm machine gun ran out of 
ammunition, leaving only one 6-pdr. to fire. The Concord then closed in as far as she 
could and opened up with her 6-inch shrapnel, silencing the insurgents who could be seen 
retreating. Moving up towards the next town of San Jose, the Concord found the village 
empty except for several insurgent signal stations on top of a hill in back of the town. A 
volley of well placed 6-inch shells was enough to drive them out, and the ship landed a 
battalion of bluejackets to occupy the town until the army arrived. The following morning 
the Concord ascended the nearby river and found the insurgent steamer Isabel. Since she 
had been discovered previously by the Samar, the insurgents had moved her further up 
river, cut off her masts, and camouflaged her with palm leaves. The Pampanga would tow 
the Isabel to Iloilo within the week and turn her over to the army for use transporting 
supplies to the numerous small ports where troops where stationed.254 
In the southernmost reaches of the Philippines, on January 14, 1900, Admiral 
Watson informed the Yorktown, the senior officer at Mindanao, that all Mindanao was 
under his cognizant and ordered to patrol the entire island. On January 29, 1900, Major 
General Bates, commanding the Military District of Mindanao and Jolo, requested the 
navy’s cooperation in the army’s upcoming expedition to occupy Surigao, Cagayan, 
Iligan, and Dapitan, on Mindanao. On January 31, 1900, the gunboat Marietta was 
ordered to escort the army expedition under Major General J.C. Bates to the north coast 
of Mindanao.255 But while the expedition was delayed for several weeks, the gunboat 
Manila visited the town of Dapitan and ascertained that the port was free of insurgents, 
and the natives were actually requesting American occupation.256  
On February 12, 1900, the gunboat Albay arrived at Zamboanga from Cotta-Bato 
on the Island of Basilan, south of Mindanao. The Albay reported that the colonel 
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commanding the district requested the immediate dispatch of a vessel to look after a 
raiding party of 300 Moros that was said to have left Sulu for Basilan. While at Cotta-
Bato, it was also the opinion of the army that “visits of the gunboats have had a most 
important and salutary effect”. With Cotta-Bato harboring some unrest, the necessity for 
keeping a gunboat in the vicinity appeared to be imperative. The power of the gunboats 
both for protection and offensive was highly regarded by the natives in the southern 
Philippines. In his report, the senior officer, Yorktown, acknowledged that it would be 
more convenient to patrol the north coast of Mindanao from Cebu, but it was a matter of 
much importance to the Military Commandant to have the naval headquarters for the 
district at the same place as his own, Zamboanga. Information contained from naval 
patrol was always placed at the disposition of the military authorities, and the vessels 
played the most important part of the means of communication between posts.257 
As discussed earlier (see pages 92-99), the Hemp Expedition fell short in 
occupying ports in southern Luzon and northern Mindanao. It thus fell upon Major 
General Bates to lead troops against the guerillas in Camarines (Sur and Norte) and 
northern Mindanao. Insurgent troops had fled from the Cavite Campaign and taken 
refuge in the Camarines. On February 15, 1900, the gunboat Marietta transported Major 
General Bates and his staff, and escorted the transports Athenian, Venus, Salvadora, and 
Castellano from Manila to Legaspi. The expedition arrived in the Gulf of Albay on 
February 17, 1900, and while the transports anchored, Bates aboard the gunboat Marietta, 
proceeded to the port of Legaspi. After communicating with the garrison commander, the 
expedition set off for San Miguel Bay and arrived on February 20, 1900, anchoring off 
the mouth of the Bicol River. 258 Two places on opposite sides of the Bicol River were 
selected for landing: Barcelona and a place designated “Marietta Landing”. Using boats 
manned by men detailed from the Marietta, the navy landed the army at the two landings. 
While the landing at Barcelona was without opposition, the Marietta Landing 
encountered some opposition, but suffered no casualties and the insurgents were easily 
repulsed. On February 21, 1900, the gunboat Paragua arrived and in cooperation with 
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Bates, the small gunboat proceeded up the Bicol River to assist in transporting troops and 
supplies for the army. Fording up the Bicol River to the capital of Nueva Caceres, the 
army was greatly aided by the gunboat’s efforts, and took the capital on the 22nd.259 On 
February 23, 1900, the town of Libmanan was taken. The navy gunboats assisted in the 
following days with unloading and the movement of troops.260 As the expedition 
continued on into March, the gunboats assisted in landings in Norte Camarines near Daot 
and Mambulao.261 In his report on March 5, 1900, General Bates claimed that the navy 
rendered valuable aid in landing troops and supplies.262 Having concluded his expedition 
to the southern Luzon provinces, Bates returned to Manila before departing for the 
second half of his mission in northern Mindanao.  
Bates’ expedition next proceeded to occupy Surigao, Kagayan, Iligan, Misamis, 
and Dapitan, on the north coast of Mindanao. The Yorktown, station ship at Zamboanga, 
Mindanao, departed on March 25, 1900 to rendezvous and assist the expedition.263 On 
March 20, 1900, the Manila departed Manila with Bates and his staff. The party 
proceeded to Pasakao and then Bulan in Southeastern Luzon to communicate with the 
army garrison commanders and then to Legaspi to rendezvous with four transports to take 
the troops to northern Mindanao. On March 25, 1900, the expedition reached the 
northeast end of Mindanao and anchored off the port of Surigao. One company was 
landed to a friendly reception and on the 28th of March the expedition left for Cagayan, 
reaching that port on the 29th. Once again, no shot was fired and Cagayan was easily 
taken. The Yorktown, having joined on the 28th took position off the landing wharf and 
directed her guns to command the approaches of the landing while the Manila took 
position near the mouth of a river, on the banks of which the first landing was made. The 
gunboat Panay joined the action at this time and took station next to the Yorktown. The 
expedition next arrived at Iligan on March 31, 1900, and landed a battalion. On the 
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morning of April 1, 1900, the Manila, Callao, and Panay crossed the bay and landed two 
companies at the town of Misamis. Without a shot the American flag was hoisted above 
the fort. In the meantime, the Yorktown transported troops to occupy the town of Dapitan. 
On April 2, 1900, the remaining gunboats proceeded to the town of Oroquieta.264 
On April 9, 1900, Bates returned from the Department Mindanao and Jolo region, 
where, attended by naval gunboats, he had occupied the important points, a total of  
eleven in Mindanao and three in Jolo.265  In appreciation for the navy’s assistance in his 
expedition, Bates wrote nothing but praise for the navy’s role in establishing garrisons in 
Northern Mindanao. While commenting on the Yorktown, Manila, Callao, and Panay, 
Bates singled out the effort of Captain Sperry of the Yorktown in joining the expedition 
from Zamboanga and ordering the inclusion of the Callao. He praised Captain Nazro of 
the Manila for the courtesy of headquartering the General on board and for taking charge 
of the fleet of transports.266 
With the vast majority of the important points within the archipelago occupied by 
American troops, the need for better organization was once again raised (see pages 56-
62). On March 26, 1900, Adjutant General, Henry C. Corbin inquired of Otis concerning 
the division of the military within the Philippines and the announcement of the lines of 
the departments and department commanders.267 In response on March 27, 1900, Otis 
recommended the establishment of four departments (see Figure12). First was the 
Department of Northern Luzon to be commanded by Major General Arthur MacArthur. 
Second was the Department of Southern Luzon to be commanded by Major General John 
C. Bates. The third was the Department of the Visayas to be commanded by Brigadier 
General Robert P. Hughes. The fourth was the Department of Mindanao and Jolo to be 
commanded by Brigadier General William A. Kobbé Jr.268 On March 29, 1900, General 
Order No. 38 was issued by the War Department under direction of the President. The 
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Department of the Pacific was discontinued and the Division of the Philippines was 
established, commanded by Otis, with the authority of military governor, and creating the 
departments as prescribed by Otis.269 
When MacArthur took over from Otis in May 1900, he inherited an unbalanced 
pacification program. The civic action component was working, but the military side of 
pacification was degenerating: casualties and engagements had increased. With the 
coming election between presidential candidate William J. Bryan and incumbent 
President William McKinley, the approaching summer monsoon season, forces stretched 
thin, and the hostilities growing with the Boxer Rebellion that would erupt in June (to be 
discussed later), little could be done until fall.270 
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Figure 12.   U.S. Army Departments (After: Linn, The Philippine War, 4) 
 
On June 21, 1900, General MacArthur, after obtaining permission from the 
President and Secretary of War, issued amnesty to all insurgents, in hopes of expediting 
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pacification.271 But while peaceful methods to end the insurgency continued, the army 
elsewhere continued in its relentless pursuit of the enemy. 
On June 12, 1900, the gunboat Pampanga assisted the army garrison at 
Catbalogan, Samar. The garrison, harassed for over a week by insurgents from the 
surrounding hills, was unable to permanently dislodge the insurgents. Upon the 
Pampanga’s arrival, the gunboat directed shots that dislodged the insurgents so 
effectively that they ceased to cause any more trouble. The gunboat also aided in 
providing men and machine guns for expeditions to Santa Marguarita, Silanga, and 
Carayman, in which the vessel also provided transportation to the army. The gunboat’s 
mere presence in the harbor ensured that outposts were not annoyed at night, and the 
troops were finally able to get some much needed sleep.272 Major J.C. Gilmore, Jr., of the 
43rd Infantry at Calbayok, Samar, wrote to the gunboat Pampanga requesting that the 
vessel stay until affairs had quieted down, a gunboat was needed in the waters.273 
In the monthly report from Iloilo, the Helena reported on June 26, 1900, that local 
disturbances had necessitated Brigadier General R.P. Hughes to request that the vessel 
remain anchored off Iloilo for the entire time. The gunboat Paragua cruised off the west 
coast of Panay for eight days, destroying three vessels engaged in illicit trade. But, while 
the insurgents were acting aggressively on Panay, as a rule they remained far back from 
the coast so the navy could not reach them.274 
On July 11, 1900, the Pampanga and Panay shelled insurgent trenches, beaches, 
and hills occupied by the enemy around Calbayog, Samar. The following day a small 
army detachment sent south came under fire and the Panay and Pampanga cruised along 
the shore firing 6-pdrs. and 1-pdrs. at a range of 1600 yards as U.S. forces drove back the 
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insurgents.275 On July 15, 1900, the gunboats again provided naval gunfire support to 
other army outposts on Samar under fire from insurgents.276 
On July 26, 1900,  Major Hannay of the 3rd Infantry, reporting from San 
Fernando, northern Luzon, made the suggestion that “to clean the swamp area of robbers, 
pirates, and insurgents the method best to be employed should be to destroy all isolated 
huts and houses, all small barrios not in direct communication with the pueblos. Remove 
large barrios or convert them into pueblos with a strong military detachment. Limit all 
passage by water to certain principal rivers and allow no native watercraft on other rivers 
or creeks”. The idea was endorsed up through the commanding officer of the 3rd infantry, 
brigadier general commanding 5th district of northern Luzon, and Major General 
Wheaton in charge of the department of northern Luzon. He (Hannay) also suggested the 
need for small vessels to ply waters and enforce the policy. This suggestion was a clear 
example for the desire of the “concentration” policy.277 
As expressed earlier, it was the gunboats that were actually combating the 
insurgent guerillas. As the army with greater and greater frequency in 1900 began to 
pursue the insurgents, it was the navy which provided the mobility to the army in an 
environment of dense jungles and high-mountain ranges. As the army sought to break the 
bond between the insurgents and the populace, it was the navy that enforced a tighter and 
tighter blockade that hampered insurgent communications, supplies, and movement. The 
monthly “Report of Distribution and Employment of Vessels” on the Asiatic Station for 
August 1900, demonstrates that these missions were being accomplished by the navy’s 
gunboats. The vessels of the Asiatic station during August were employed in two major 
tasks: in the Philippines, “Patrolling to prevent illicit trading, operating against Filipino 
insurgents, and cooperating with the army,” or in China, “for protection of American and 
Foreign interests”. Of the thirty-two warships, not counting axillaries, twenty-fiver were 
gunboats (Bennington, Concord, Isla de Cuba, Helena, Isla de Luzon, Manila, Marietta, 
                                                 
275  Panay to CINC Asiatic, Jul. 16, 1900; ibid. 
276 Sawyer, 48. 
277 Major Hannay to Adjutant 3rd Infantry, Jul. 26, 1900, Records of Other Units, Entry 5765, Records 
of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942, Record Group 395 (RG 395), 
NAB. 
 96
Arayat, Callao, Manileno, Pampanga, Panay, Paragua, Quiros, Samar, Villalobos, 
General Alava, Basco, Leyte, Urdaneta, Don Juan de Austria, Castine, Monocacy, 
Princeton, and Yorktown), all of which were employed. Of the seven larger combatants, 
monitors, cruisers and battleship, three were undergoing repairs (Newark, Monterey, 
Oregon), and one was operating with a reduced crew (Monadnock). Seven of the thirty-
two warships were stationed in China with the others (twenty-two), excluding those 
under repair, stationed in the Philippines.278 
September 1900 was a bad month for American forces in the Philippines as the 
guerilla war gained strength. While U.S. forces were engaged throughout the archipelago 
battling the insurgency, three episodes erupted that served as telling reminders that the 
insurgency was far from being defeated. 
On September 11, 1900, Company F of the 29th Infantry was landed by the 
gunboat Villalobos at Torrijos intending to march overland to Santa Cruz. 
Communications were lost, and the party was captured by insurgents (see Figure13). The 
Yorktown and two other gunboats were dispatched with an army rescue party.279 On 
September 26, the Yorktown escorted the 38th Infantry, under Colonel G.S. Anderson 
from Batangas, southern Luzon to Santa Cruz, Marinduque. Arriving on the morning of 
the 26th, the expedition was joined by the gunboat Villalobos. Finding the landing in very 
shoal water and some distance from the anchorage, the army troops embarked in the 
gunboats’ boats for the landing. While landing, a signal that the party was receiving fire 
was given, a gig, armed with a Colt automatic was sent to provide assistance under the 
command of Ensign A. MacArthur, Jr., but the landing occurred unopposed. The 
following day the gunboat Quiros arrived, and the gunboats continued to assist in 
protecting the army and transporting it to the town of Torrijos, but the prisoners were not 
found.280 The rescue attempt failed, but with the assistance of the navy, General Hare led 
12 companies to suppress the insurrection on the island.281  
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It would not be until October 11, 1900, when the Bennington received word that 
the army prisoners, taken the previous month on Marinduque, were being held at a 
hacienda near Buena Vista, that the prisoners would be rescued. The gunboats 
Bennington, Villalobos and the transport Venus proceeded to Buena Vista on October 14, 
1900. Arriving off Buena Vista, the release of the prisoners was subsequently arranged 
with the insurgent leader, and Captain Devereaux Shields and forty-nine men were 
released to the navy.282 
 
 
Figure 13.   Operations on Marinduque (After: http://marinduque.net/around.htm)  
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Back in the middle of March, 1900, with progress being made on the islands of 
Panay, Negros, and Cebu, district commander Hughes occupied the island of Bohol on 
March 17, 1900, without opposition.283 But as insurgents were defeated on the larger 
islands (Cebu), they moved to Bohol. Hostilities broke out on September 1, 1900. The 
army’s meager garrisons in various ports came under peril of imminent attack and 
required urgent reinforcements. The army requested that a gunboat be sent to patrol the 
coast from Tublgon to Talibon, the army also desired to use the gunboat to transport 
troops along the coast to conduct expeditions against the insurgents. The gunboat Panay 
crossed through uncharted waters to re-supply garrisons at Tubigon, Laon, Tagbilaran, 
Jagna, and Ubay with troops and ammunition. The Panay, also carrying the senior officer 
present at Cebu, ordered the Marietta to cooperate with the army on Bohol.284  
On September 15, 1900, the gunboat Concord relieved the Marietta as station 
ship at Cebu and began assisting in the search for the German SS Amoy, which was 
suspected of carrying contraband. On the 16th, a telegram was received from the army 
post at Ormoc, Leyte that the insurgents had broken out and were attacking the garrison; 
a gunboat was immediately requested, so the gunboat Elcano was dispatched to Ormoc 
since the Panay was busy assisting the army in transporting men to Bohol. As the army 
garrison expected continued trouble from the insurgents on Bohol, the Panay returned to 
Cebu and transported a second reinforcement force to Bohol.285 
On October 10, 1900, an army expedition under the command of Colonel 
Cheathan discovered the insurgent steamer Antonia in a lagoon near Binangonam, 
northern Luzon. A small naval party from the Yorktown found the steamer afloat in the 
inner harbor of Port Lampong. The steamer was said to have been up the creek for two 
years. Ensign MacArthur Jr. then proceeded to bring the captured steamer down stream 
and turn it over to American authorities.286 
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The benevolent policy was in trouble by late 1900. Soldiers were increasingly 
enforcing their own interpretation of G.O. 100. Crop and property destruction increased, 
and guerillas, spies, and others who violated G.O. 100 lost the right to be treated as 
prisoners of war. McKinley’s reelection in November and the arrival of army 
reinforcements, bringing manpower to 70,000, enabled General MacArthur to plan a 
four-month campaign. On December 19, 1900, MacArthur informed commanders of a 
new and more stringent pacification policy. The following day he enacted G.O. 100 in its 
entirety. This signaled a change in official policy, but more importantly, coordinated 
Manila’s strategy with that of the regional commanders; it removed the emphasis on civic 
action and conciliation, replacing it with one of punitive measures and removing 
restrictions. 287 The previous policy of the army had allowed little recourse for army 
commanders to punish insurgents and insurgent supporters, but the new policy allowed 
for the arrest and detainment of insurgents and their supporters and the confiscation and 
destruction of personal property of those providing aid to the insurgency. MacArthur’s 
conclusion that his policy of treating the insurgents with consideration was not having the 
desired effect meant that he would take a tougher line in by implementing General Order 
100, of 1863. G.O. 100 was originally promulgated to help control guerilla warfare in the 
border states during the Civil War, and it meant that the Filipinos aiding the insurgents 
were going to be subjected to exemplary punishment in the upcoming year, 1901. 288 
C. THE BLOCKADE 
The naval blockade of the Philippines cannot be underestimated in its importance. 
Frederick Sawyer, commander of the gunboat Panay stated, “Importance of [the] 
blockade on war like Hannibal, Napoleon, Southern Confederacy, blockade [was a] 
humane and effective [way] to impose peace”.289 
The insurgents depended heavily upon the waterways of the archipelago for lines 
of communication, lines of operation, and for trade as a source of revenue. Dating back to 
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October 14, 1898, insurgent General Lukban had ordered the purchase of all abaca at the 
fixed price of 5 pesos. The price steadily rose to 16 and 22 pesos, bringing large profits 
for the insurgent coffers and personal gain. Abaca proved to be an important source of 
money for Aguinaldo and the Philippine Republic. While the opening of ports, 
accomplished by the Hemp Expedition, was intended to eradicate the illicit trade of the 
insurgents by allowing legal trade, the opposite tended to occur, as Manila clearing 
houses became infested with insurgent financial agents.290 
Aguinaldo, realizing the importance of trade to the insurgency, organized various 
provinces in the Visayas under the Filipino Revolutionary Republic. Aguinaldo deemed 
the flourishing hemp trade, especially in Samar and Leyte, as vital to his government, and 
appointed General Vicente R. Lukban (Samar) and General Ambrosio R. Mojica (Leyte) 
to control customs and import duties collected from the cash commodity. Before the 
arrival of the Americans, insurgent coffers were filled through the production, trade, and 
sale of hemp.291 
For the Americans, the Philippines seemed ideal for a blockade. The insurgent 
lines of communications from Luzon to the southern islands appeared very susceptible to 
interdiction. Islands like Samar, that produced the cash crop of hemp, needed rice and 
other foodstuff to survive, so the blockade served as a strong disposition for peace. 292 
But, while the orders of the Governor General were for the navy to break up illicit traffic, 
blockade foodstuff and arms, these items still tended to get through, like on the island of 
Samar. But, this failure was due more to the army’s dispute over policy than with the 
navy’s inability to fulfill its mission. The army forces on Samar, under Colonel Hardin, 
felt their work was made more difficult by the relaxation of the blockade by Otis and 
Colonel Arthur Murray (Leyte) under the policy of “appeasement”.293 
Regardless of the dispute inside the army over policy, the navy engaged in its 
mission to stamp out insurgent communications by sea and enforce the blockade during 
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1900.294 The gunboats of Asiatic Station plied the waters of the Philippines in four patrol 
districts, as described by Frederick Sawyer (see Figure14).295 The standard procedures 
for interdicting illicit trade was for the vessel caught in illicit trade (prize), to be stripped 
of any papers, the usable cargo taken, and the boat destroyed. The crew was taken to the 
nearest barrio with personal belongings, unless it was practical to turn the vessel over to 
the army’s provost guards at Manila or a nearby garrison.296. 
 
Figure 14.   U.S. Navy Patrol Districts (From: Williams, “The U.S. Navy in the Philippine 
Insurrection”, 114) 
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On January 17, 1900, the Naval Attaché at Tokyo reported that the Naval Attaché 
at Berlin had received word that the German steamer Emma Luyken had sailed on 
December 16, 1899, from Hamburg, Germany, for Hong Kong. It was suspected that her 
cargo of  30,000 Mauser rifles and ten million rounds of ammunition were to be 
transferred to Shanghai, and then to the Philippines. The steamer Savoia, with 3,000 
Vitali-Vetterli rifles, was though to be in route to the Philippines via Macao. At the same 
time these reports were received, intelligence reported that large quantities of ammunition 
had been received at Hamburg, Germany and Antwerp, Belgium for transshipment to the 
Philippine Islands via Singapore. The navy and all personnel were informed to keep an 
eye on both vessels.297 In a confidential circular to commanding officers throughout the 
archipelago, Watson ordered the lookout for the named steamers.298 But, Otis reported on 
March 4, 1900, that the Hamburg shipments reported by Washington on January 18, 
1900, had reached Hong Kong and Shanghai with no incident and nothing more was 
reported.299 
On February 22, 1900, the subject of the Japanese vessel Nunobiki-maru, 
discussed in the previous chapter (page 57), which was abandoned off the coast of 
Shanghai the previous July, came to be an issue again. While the United States alleged, 
along with the Japanese press, that the vessel was carrying cargo of munitions of war for 
the Philippine insurgents, Viscount Aoki Siuzo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, finally 
acknowledged that the vessel was carrying war materials, but stopped short of conceding 
that it was bound for the Philippines or that there was any Japanese complacency in the 
matter. The minister went on to assure the United States that the Imperial Government 
had issued instruction to the prefectural and customs authorities to exercise particularly 
strict vigilance in the future with regard to cases like the one in question.300 
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On March 17, 1900, intelligence was received of a possible arms shipment from 
Japan to the insurgents of 8,000 rifles and ammunition, to be unloaded near Patapa, 
Ilocos Norte, Luzon. This information was provided to captain McCalla, station 
commander and commanding officer of the Newark, for action as this area was under his 
responsibility.301 The Newark reported on March 21, 1900 that the gunboat Samar was 
patrolling the northern coast and reencountering the conditions at Claveria and Bangui, 
the suspected landing area for arms. The Mindoro embarked a marine guard and was to 
land the party between Bangui and Claveria to reconnoiter the locality in response to the 
possibility of the arms shipment. Unfortunately, the ship’s commanding officer and the 
marine commander aborted the mission after only one failed attempt at landing. But, the 
navy continued to patrol the area in hopes of interdicting any landing of arms.302 
In an urgent letter from the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces on Asiatic 
Station, Rear Admiral Geo C. Remey, forwarded by the Secretary of the Navy, John D. 
Long, to the Secretary of State, John Hay, on April 10, 1900, it was relayed that a 
gunboat was urgently needed on the east coast of Luzon to assist in maintaining the 
current patrols to prevent the importation of arms from Hong Kong. It was navy’s desire 
that steps be taken to prevent the exportation of arms from Hong Kong. Remey and Long 
begged that a consistent policy of notifying foreign governments of possible arms 
shipments and securing their aid in the prevention of such be implemented. It was 
believed by the navy that this would greatly decrease the demands put upon the naval 
forces in the Philippines. Remey and Long also desired that all consular officers at sea 
ports in China and elsewhere, where such shipments might originate from, exercise 
extreme vigilance in detecting and reporting such shipments.303 On April 24, 1900, 
Secretary of State, John Hay wrote the American Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph H. 
Choate, and asked him to bring to the attention of Lord Robert Salisbury, British Prime 
Minister, the possible violations of British neutrality acts by the shipment of arms from 
Hong Kong to the Philippine Insurgents. The purpose was to put pressure on Her 
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Majesty’s Government to take such action as appropriate in enforcing its neutrality 
laws.304 While there is no record of a response from the British, the apparent trend 
throughout this study is that the British adhered to a strict policy of neutrality. 
The Princeton reported on May 1, 1900, while in Cebu as the station ship, that 
April was a busy month. The gunboats, Isla de Luzon, Marietta, Pampanga, Callao, and 
Manila all were patrolling for illicit trade and enforcing the blockade from Luzon to 
Mindanao. Insurgent trouble in Leyte was considerable. Insurgents were responsible for 
the steamer Escano’s destruction off the south end of Leyte in which the officers were 
killed and the steamer looted; the Callao and Isla de Luzon were dispatched to 
investigate. The commanding officer, Commander Harry Knox stressed the importance 
and need of an additional gunboat that “would be very useful”. The Princeton was 
practically confined to the harbor to maintain custody of two large captured steam 
launches and in addition had boarding duty for the port, charges that are usually 
accomplished by the custom house authorities or by the Captain of the Port, none of 
which were present.305 
In correspondence by the consul general of Hong Kong, the Hon. Rounseville 
Wildman, to the secretary of state in mid-May, it was noted that the insurrection’s Hong 
Kong junta had plenty of arms and money and was preparing for shipments during the 
rainy season. The consular advised stationing a gunboat at Macao. Over the last six 
months the junta had obtained from the islands roughly half a million dollars from the 
sale of insurgent crops payable by orders on Hong Kong. It was estimated the junta had 
received roughly 18 million pesos prior to the outbreak of hostilities and a steady flow of 
money from Manila to Hong Kong had transpired. Large arms purchases in Germany 
were arranged by the junta and arrived in February, 1900, in Hong Kong where they were 
stored in Hong Kong, Macao, and other northern ports. Also stored in Hong Kong were 
insurgent arms from Italy. The junta’s base of operations was actually out of Macao, 
away from British involvement and away from American eyes, but still close to Hong 
Kong. The colonial government and the Government Police in Hong Kong were prepared 
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to aid America in any and every way; a proclamation prohibiting the export of arms from 
Hong Kong without permission from the government was in force.  
The consul believed that a gunboat stationed at Macao would frighten both the 
Portuguese and Chinese, and make it impossible for the junta to employ crews for 
filibustering expeditions. He desired that an American gunboat be stationed at Macao, so 
that “the Philippine Islands can be saved from the fate of Ache”.306 In a letter to the 
secretary of the navy, Remey acknowledged that information concerning the Filipino 
junta attempting to land arms and ammunition for the insurgents from Macao, had been 
received. In response the Don Juan de Austria was sent to Macao in hopes of 
disconcerting and retarding the junta’s plans.307 On May 18, 1900 the adjutant general of 
the War Department  directed General MacArthur to dispatch an officer to Hong Kong, to 
report on the activities of the junta located there, and their efforts in furnishing aid and 
assistance to the insurgents, and to suggest how best to frustrate them.308 
In a memo from Commander Harry Knox, commanding officer of the station ship 
at Cebu, Princeton, a quandary over the problem of illicit trade and the blockade was 
demonstrated. Illicit traffic, as defined by Rear Admiral John C. Watson, on August 19, 
1899, was to apply to “any vessel flying the Filipino Flag, any vessel attempting to trade 
with closed ports, or any vessel carrying contraband of war, when determined that its 
destination was within insurgent lines”. The admiral also directed that the commanding 
general be consulted in carrying out his ideas (commanding general). Vessels with 
regular papers, passing directly to and from ports occupied by U.S. forces, with no 
suspicious circumstances, were to be passed. Small vessels, less than 15 tons, permitted 
by clearance papers of U.S. port authorities to go to and from unoccupied ports, adjacent 
to opened ports, were to be passed at the discretion of commanding officers, under 
General Order No. 38.  
General Order 38,  had been issued by Otis on March 24, 1900, to provide 
guidelines to help determine which vessels might be violating trade restrictions, separate 
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from the merchants trying to avoid payment of license fees and customs. General Order 
69, issued by Otis on December 21, 1899, similar to G.O. 38 (not available), highlights 
the problem, “Vessels licensed for the coasting trade will not be allowed to call at 
unequipped ports along the cost of the archipelago without special permission of the 
military governor or department or district military commander, who, in authorizing such 
trade, will prescribe the conditions under which it is permitted”.309 On April 20, 1900, 
Hughes, district commander of the Visayas, directed the commanding officer of First 
District at Tacloban that no port clearances were to be made to closed ports; such action 
was to be stopped immediately.310 Further in his memo, Knox questions the authority of 
Hughes, who desired to stop all trading with closed ports. But, under General Order No. 
38, as interpreted from Manila, discretion is given to district commanders in clearing 
small vessels for near ports.311 On May 11, 1900, Hughes wrote to Knox concerning 
trade within the department. He stated that “no port official in this department has been 
authorized to issue clearances for closed or unoccupied ports. Troops being on board the 
vessel does not alter the situation. The object is to stop contributions to insurgent war 
fund and to stop obstinate insurgents from doing business. General Kobbé’s order is 
superseded by General Order 38, Military Governor”.312 This highlights the policy 
contention within the army, an issue that would not be solved for sometime and will be 
discussed in further length in the following chapter. The problem revolved around two 
issues. The first was that Hughes, while commander of the department, had little 
authority over the district commanders under his responsibility, and lacked the 
coordination with the department commanders in close proximity. The result was that 
conflicting orders in regards to allowable trade were issued. The second problem was that 
while relatively peaceful islands and areas practiced the policy of appeasement, the 
district commanders failed to realize that this tended to contribute to the insurgent cause 
in more hostile neighboring districts by allowing illicit waterborne trade.  
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In May, the consul general at Shanghai, the Honorable John Goodnow, wrote to 
assistant secretary of state Thomas W. Cridler, concerning the British steamer Marjorie 
from Trieste bound for Shanghai. It was alleged that the vessel contained 308 boxes of 
munitions, possibly bound for insurgents in the Philippine Islands.313 A letter from Hay, 
to the Secretary of War, explained that the steamer Marjorie would be inspected by the 
authorities upon its arrival at Shanghai.314 No further documentation on the Marjorie 
could be found, but the case highlights the cooperation of American civil and military 
officials in coordinating efforts to pressure foreign governments in stopping illicit arms 
going into the Philippines. 
On June 7, 1900, the Assistant Secretary of War wrote the Secretary of the Navy 
to inquire as to who issued in May 1899, the order “By the direction of the Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force on the Asiatic Station; All trade with the Philippines is 
prohibited, except with the ports of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, and Bakalote. Ships are hereby 
warned to go nowhere else in the Philippines”.315 In response, on June 14, 1900, Admiral 
Remey reported on his findings. In May 1899 all trade not in American possession was 
forbidden; especially in the islands of Samar, Leyte, and Cebu. This originated from an 
order from the Military Governor on April 24, 1899 in which he stated, “I am now trying 
to prevent all supplies reaching the insurgents from Manila . . . I hope that no ships are 
being cleared from this port for ports in the south not in our possession, as all the 
information makes it conclusive to my mind that they are an aid to the insurgents both in 
supplies and information. I intend to do everything in my power to break up this trade.” 
In his findings, Remey determined that commanding officers often acted under oral 
instructions only, of which there is no record.316 
As the debate over the blockade ensued, the navy continued to conduct its job. In 
a report from the Nashville at the beginning of June 1900, it was reported that the coastal 
shipping was gradually conforming to regulations. The cordon of army troop attachments 
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along the coast along with the frequent patrols of the small gunboats made it extremely 
difficult to smuggle arms and ammunition, making it rare and meager.317 The port of 
Antimonan, in the province of Tayabas, Luzon, and the port of Ibajay, on Panay, were 
opened to coasting trade on June 10, 1900.318 On June 12, 1900, the passage of vessels 
between the Island of Maricaban and Luzon was allowed.319 And on June 15, 1900, the 
ports of Silay and Dumaguete on the Island of Negros were opened to coasting trade.320  
In a request for further trade clarification, Commander Harry Knox on June 12, 
1900, requested instructions regarding illicit trade. He had found it difficult to frame 
instructions for the stations’ gunboats. Based upon instructions from Admiral Watson, 
consequent developments of the war, and general orders of Otis, Knox issued a 
memorandum on May 20, 1900. He held that there were divergent views by different 
army authorities at different times and in different places in regard to trade. These views 
were broadly divided into two classes: the view that all trade should be stopped where not 
strictly held in American hands, so as to starve out the insurgents and stop revenue to 
fund the war. Another view held that since the United States could not occupy all the 
small ports, Americans should encourage the natives to believe in their kind intentions by 
permitting them to trade as freely as possible. 
The result of the unclear policy had caused considerable diversity of practice in 
different islands and ports. Knox acknowledged that diversity may be wise, as the 
inhabitants of one island may differ radically from those of another, and it was the army 
that would be the first to feel the ill effect of any mistaken policy, so it was Knox’s 
instructions to fully consult army district or post commanders and honor their papers. 
But, some port authorities were very lax, and sometimes made trade practically free. 
While Hughes held strong views in regard to restricting trade, he was unable to carry 
them out in his own department, as the order from Manila gave discretion to district 
commanders. Hughes also acknowledged that he had in an instance or two cleared vessels 
                                                 
317  Nashville to CINC Asiatic, Jun. 2, 1900; ibid. 
318 CINC Asiatic, “Fleet Circular No. 10”, Jun. 10, 1900; ibid. 
319 CINC Asiatic, “Fleet Circular No. 6”, Jun. 12, 1900; ibid. 
320 CINC Asiatic, “Fleet Circular No. 7”, Jun. 15, 1900; ibid. 
 109
for a closed port himself, as a matter of military policy or to conciliate an ally or a useful 
informant. This demonstrated how hard it was to lay down inflexible rules for the navy 
enforcing the blockade.321 
While evidence of the gunboats’ blockade against large arms shipments from 
outside the Philippines is lacking, the gunboats nevertheless were busy interdicting inter-
island illicit trade. During the month of July, the gunboat Pampanga, patrolling around 
Leyte in company with the Panay, overhauled the S.S. Albert making for a closed port, 
destroyed two banca boats engaged in illicit trade, overhauled the lorchas Maud and 
Yngles, and destroyed two more bancas. Also during their cruise, the gunboats were 
requested by the army to shell the insurgent town of Carygan. While at anchorage in 
Calbayog, the Pampanga inspected all boats entering and leaving port. On July 29, while 
cruising off the coast of Samar for illicit trade, the ship destroyed 7 banca boats and 
another on July 31.322 
The cruising report for Panay for the month of August revealed that the vessel 
captured thirty-seven vessels and destroyed twenty-five during which time she also 
cooperated with the army four different times.323 For September, the Panay captured four 
vessels, destroyed another four, and cooperated with the army twenty times.324 The 
commander of the Panay shed insight to the growing tensions between the army 
commands on Samar and Leyte, who differed in their policy approach. On Leyte, where 
the insurgency was relatively quiet, the policy of “appeasement” was practiced by 
Colonel Murray and backed by Otis. But, on Samar, which was engaged against a very 
active insurgency, Colonel Hardin felt the relaxation of the blockade on Leyte allowed 
arms, food, and insurgents into Samar, a view that was shared by the department 
commander Hughes.325 
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As mentioned earlier, there were indications that Japan was secretly attempting to 
aid the insurgents, but nothing could be proven. That changed with the capture of 
insurgent documents. Among the documents belonging to insurgent Lieutenant General 
Mariano Trias, one contained the Filipino account of a conference with Japanese consul 
Taiyo Hojo, chancellor of the imperial Japanese consulate of Manila, in Cavite province 
on October 11, 1900. The Japanese Consul advised Trias to visit Japan to negotiate 
voluntary contributions of arms and concerning the future of archipelago. Trias expressed 
the view that the Filipinos were more agreeable to make concessions to Japan, because of 
kindred blood, than to the Americans. The consul said Japan desired coaling stations, 
freedom of trade, and to build railroads in the Philippines. Individual Japanese assistance 
to the insurgents had been suspected, but official intervention and encouragement shed 
new light on the situation. MacArthur claimed that it answered the defiant attitude of 
many insurgent leaders, their wavering policy, and the continued resistance in southern 
Luzon.326 Further evidence of involvement by the Japanese does not exist, but the 
attempt had to be noted to validate American claims throughout this study in regards to 
attempted arms shipments from Japan. 
As 1900 came to a close in December, the navy continued its policy of patrolling 
against illicit traffic among the islands. Around Vigan in northern Luzon, the Yorktown 
and Samar patrolled to keep arms from being imported from China. Among the Visayan 
Islands, the Bennington, Castine, Concord, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Petrel, 
Arayat, Leyte, Mindoro, Pampanga, Panay, Paragua, and Villalobos patrolled to interdict 
inter-island insurgent trade and communications. Around Mindanao and the southern 
reaches of the archipelago, the Isla de Luzon, Marietta, Calamianes, and Callao patrolled 
to stop arms shipments from the south and interdict any inter-island trade from the north. 
And, in and around central and southern Luzon, the Albany, Manila, Princeton, 
Gardoqui, Urdaneta, Basco, and Quiros patrolled. The gunboats Albay, El Cano, 
Manileno, Mariveles, and Mindanao were all out of commission for repairs. In stark 
contrast, the great warships of the Asiatic Station, the Brooklyn, Newark, Monadnock, 
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Monterey, Nashville, New Orleans, and Oregon sat idle, providing more of a visual 
deterrent than a practical one.327 
By December 1900, General MacArthur came to the conclusion that the policy of 
“appeasement” was simply not working. In a letter to the Adjutant General of the War 
Department on December 25, 1900, MacArthur wrote that the pacification of the 
Philippines was going slowly and a more rigid policy was needed. MacArthur expressed 
his desire to close ports in the Camarines and Albay provinces on Luzon, and on Samar 
and Leyte. On December 26, 1900, Corbin responded emphatically that the Secretary of 
War disapproved of closing any ports.328 While MacArthur instituted General Order 100, 
the most pressing facet, the closing of ports, an issue that had so far plagued America 
with inconsistency and debate, would remain unresolved as the insurrection began the 
new year, 1901. 
D. THE CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION 
While the China Relief Expedition is outside the scope of this study, since it 
occurred within the area of responsibility of the Asiatic Station and during the time 
period of interest, a brief overview must be given. As stated previously, Rear Admiral 
Louis Kempff had been assigned as the Second-in-Command of U.S. naval forces on the 
Asiatic Station in April, 1900, and placed in charge of the naval forces north of Hong 
Kong, which other than the vessels that reported to China for repairs, consisted of the 
gunboat Monocracy, Don Juan de Austria, and his flagship the Newark.  
By May 18, 1900, Kempff reported that the anti-foreign society Fists of Righteous 
Harmony (I Ho Ch’uan), or Boxers, were rapidly spreading. On May 12, they had 
attacked a Catholic village killing 61 Christians. Unless the Chinese government began to 
take action, the situation was likely to become very serious. The presence of warships at 
Taku was suspected to have good influence on the Chinese Government, and was seen to 
be needed.329 In relaying a message from John Fowler, consul of the United States at 
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Chefoo, China, the Secretary of State stated that a gunboat was absolutely necessary and 
the Yorktown was ordered to Taku.330 The American consul at Amoy, China also 
requested gunboats, and the Don Juan de Austria and Princeton were sent to Amoy.331 
As the conflict increased, the need for American ground forces to protect U.S. 
interests increased. On May 31, 1900, the Newark landed fifty-six men who were sent to 
Peking under the command of Captain McCalla along with forces from England, France, 
Russia, Italy, Japan, and Austria. While the affairs appeared to be quieting with some 20 
men-of-war at Taku, an impending crop failure was forecasted to cause probable 
trouble.332 On June 1, 1900, Special Order No. 65 was issued by General MacArthur, 
ordering the 9th Regiment of Infantry to Taku, China, to protect the American Legation 
and to report to Kempff, then at Taku.333 
In response to the increasing problem in China and the apparent drain on 
resources, Rear Admiral Remey emphatically stressed that no vessel could be spared 
from the Philippines: “the most important service to be performed by the Naval vessels 
on this station lies entirely within Philippine waters… there is no likelihood that any 
vessels can be spared for service in northern waters for as long a time to come as can be 
now foreseen”. He expressed his view that the men-of-war of other nations in China 
lessened the need of such U.S. reinforcements.334 
By June 5, Russian forces had begun fighting and Kempff requested the 
immediate presence of the gunboat Helena to protect American interests or any other 
vessel with a maximum draft of eleven feet. In his words, “An American gunboat will be 
very useful as a temporary base, inside of the river”.335 Remey responded that while the 
use of a gunboat as a base for the landing force was desirable, none could be spared for 
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this purpose.336 The siege of the American Legation at Peking began on June 20, 1900 
and lasted till August 14, 1900. The China Relief Expedition, for which the China Relief 
Expedition Medal was awarded, lasted from May 24, 1900 to May 27, 1901. The only 
vessels to receive a medal were Brooklyn, Buffalo, Iris, Monocacy, Nashville, New 
Orleans, Newark, Solace, Wheeling, Yorktown, and Zafiro, none of which saw action.337 
The focus of the Asiatic Station remained on the Philippines.  
While the number of vessels in China did increase significantly during the Boxer 
Rebellion, these vessels were for the most part large capital ships (cruisers and 
battleships) that had little use in the Philippines as already demonstrated. In Chinese ports 
these ships proved of modest use as the conflict consisted entirely of land forces 
marching to Peking. What is revealing is that the second-in-command (Kempff) and the 
commander-in-chief (Remey) argued vehemently, not about the larger vessels, but about 
gunboats.   
E. CONCLUSION 
At the conclusion of 1900, the navy’s role in the Philippines had remained 
unchanged in regards to its cooperation with the army (transporting, supplying, 
communicating, and supporting) and blockading; except, that the navy’s importance in 
these two areas had definitely increased. In regards to the navy’s organization and the 
policies laid down by the army, these changed in an attempt to counter the insurgent’s use 
of guerilla warfare. 
The assertion by top military officials that the navy was engaged in cooperating 
with the army was not simply lip service, at least not among the rank and file. As stated 
by Commander Frederick Sawyer, commanding officer of the gunboat Panay during 
1900, “Close operation with [the] army [was] without exception”. The army had the 
tougher job, as asserted by Sawyer. manning over 400 garrisons throughout the 
Philippines, the navy had to give the army a hand, and from the evidence of the gunboats, 
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it did.338 Gunboats continued to prove of such worth, that the army continued to operate 
its own gunboats. The army gunboats on Laguna de Bay, the Florida, Laguna de Bay, 
and Oeste continued to patrol, render assistance, transport, and land troops within the 
interior of Luzon, similar to the services provided by the navy along the coasts.339 
Amphibious operations in the Bicol Peninsula and Eastern Visayas demonstrated 
the flexibility that the navy added. Tactics were relatively simple between the army and 
navy; the Americans would arrive at a port at dawn, inducing a civilian exodus, send an 
officer ashore under the white flag to persuade the insurgents to lay down their arms, and 
if this failed, the army would load into boats towed by a steam launch, and race for the 
shore as the navy provided cover. This would be the most critical time as the soldiers 
were defenseless until they reached shore.340 Repeatedly during 1900, the army and navy 
conducted joint-amphibious operations. On April 7, 1900, the Marietta ferried and landed 
the 34th Infantry from Baler to Kasiguran Bay.341 The Villalobos on many occasions, day 
and night, in all sorts of weather, transported and landed the 38th Infantry. 342 
The navy was also often sequestered by the army to assist its many small 
garrisons. During insurgent attacks upon Ormoc, Leyte, it was the Panay that provided 
vital gunfire support that aided the exhausted American garrison.343 With insufficient 
troops on Samar, often on shoestring manning, it was the responsibility of the navy to act 
as a force multiplier. The many efforts of the navy’s gunboats were much appreciated by 
the army, especially in the ports of Calbayog and Catbalogan.344 
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American strategy and policy in the Philippines often varied. While politicians 
desired a benevolent assimilation and a number of military leaders backed the policy of 
appeasement, there were a number that advocated a stricter policy. It would later be 
learned that in May 1900, the Filipino junta was actually worried that the United States 
would end the war and put into effect laws that would consider the insurgents bandits, 
and instead treat them not as lawful combatants, but as robbers and  brigands.345 On  
December 23, 1900, MacArthur did just that by enacting General Order 100. 346 
But, while a more severe pacification policy was needed, there was also 
legitimacy to the claim that one policy could not be applied uniformly across the 
Philippines. Mindanao and Jolo were too far from, and the inhabitants too unlike the 
people of Luzon for insurgents to establish a strong foothold in the southernmost islands. 
The Moros often fought and killed the small number of Filipino Christians on 
Mindanao.347 The Moro datu (a regional tribal leader) of the section around Zamboanga, 
Mindanao requested U.S. occupation and permission to drive out the small number of 
insurgents. American occupation of the coastal towns in Moro territory went relatively 
smoothly. It was not until years later, when U.S. forces attempted to penetrate the interior 
and enact laws, that conflict with the Moros would erupt.348 
In regards to the rest of the archipelago, General MacArthur saw that opposition 
came from the towns, and the guerrilla bands could not survive without their support base 
within the towns. But, in September 1900, MacArthur believed in waiting and having 
patience. Four months later, he realized that the result could only be accomplished by 
turning the screw, so an entirely new campaign based upon the idea of detaching the 
towns from the immediate support of the insurgents in the field. On December 30, 1900, 
MacArthur published prescription of the laws of war, and the duties of noncombatants, 
and ordered that violations would be met with exemplary punishment.349 
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The lack of naval officers and crews on the Asiatic Station shaped the need for 
creative thinking. The continued problem was that the navy had scores of gunboats, but 
did not have crews to man them. At the same time, the navy had several large 
combatants, monitors, cruisers, and battleships, that were not well suited for the tasks 
required among the Philippine Islands as echoed by the Chief of the Bureau of 
Navigation when he claimed that monitors Monadnock and Monterey were of little use 
against the insurgents.350 Facing a severe ship and manning shortage, due to the 
requirements of the Asiatic Station, the navy was unable to reestablish the European 
Station which had been disestablished during the Spanish-American War. The North 
Atlantic and Pacific Stations were run with reduced numbers.351 
On April 12, 1900, the Secretary of the Navy, realizing that he was unable to 
supply officers and complements for all the vessels on Asiatic Station, directed the 
monitors Monadnock and Monterey to be laid up with only two officers, two warrant 
officers, and thirty enlisted men left aboard. Furthermore, the Oregon, the only battleship 
on Asiatic Station, was ordered to be reduced in crew by one-third. The reasoning for the 
Oregon was that she was too valuable to risk cruising among the Philippine Islands, and 
her officers and crew could be better utilized on smaller vessels.352 In his annual report 
(August 1900), the commander-in-chief of naval forces on Asiatic Station, stated that the 
northern part of station was only visited for repairs and docking until the Boxer rebellion.  
For 1900, the Asiatic Station consisted of one battleship, five cruisers, two 
monitors, fifteen gunboats, one converted cruiser, sixteen former Spanish gunboats, a 
number of auxiliaries, and two more gunboats that had not been commissioned. The 
Monadnock, Monterey, and Oregon, still all had reduced crews for scarcity of officers 
and men to man the gunboats. Another practice employed to man the gunboats was 
decommissioning one going into long repair or overhaul, so that her crew could put 
another one into service. The parent ship system of manning and equipping the gunboats 
was gradually discontinued, beginning in the latter part of 1899, and the change was 
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completed in 1900, so that each vessel was practically independent. Because the gunboats 
were so busy, no fleet drills or tactical maneuvers were able to be conducted during the 
year, for lack of opportunity.353 
While it was the gunboats that were engaged in patrolling, reconnaissance, 
landing troops, bombarding insurgents, and supplying, they still engaged in other duties. 
The gunboats were engaged in conducting surveys of the coast of the Philippine Islands. 
As directed from the Secretary of the Navy, as the situation permitted, the Bennington 
and such smaller gunboats that could be spared were directed to make surveys along the 
un-surveyed coast in order to facilitate the naval and military operations that were being 
carried on. The extent of the coasts of the islands was approximated to be 8,800 nautical 
miles, of which only 1,500 were regarded as relatively well surveyed.354 The navy also 
continued a number of independent operations such as on January 11, 1900, when the 
Princeton took peaceable possession of the Batan Island group.355 
In his farewell letter to the Secretary of the Navy, before being relieved as 
Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces on Asiatic Station, Rear Admiral J.C. Watson 
made some telling requests. First, he told of the urgent need for vessels in the Philippines 
of the Bennington, Helena, Nashville, and Marietta gunboat class. He stated that  it was 
impossible for the army to cover all landing points, and there were indications that the 
insurgents were buying small schooners for filibustering purposes in the Philippines. 
Because of this, it was necessary for incessant naval patrols, the smaller gunboats taking 
the inshore waters and the larger gunboats acting as bases. The illicit importation of arms 
he considered as the most pressing danger.356  
The effect of the navy’s blockade during 1900 is ambiguous to say the least. 
Numerous reports were received concerning the shipment of arms from Japan, Europe, 
and China, but no evidence of it being interdicted exists. But, to assume that it arrived, is 
also incorrect as there is no evidence to support this view either. What is available is a 
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number of references to the insurgents’ shortage of arms and ammunition during the 
insurrection. Insurgent field manuals and orders instructed troops to preserve weapons 
and ammunition. It was considered more important to save a rifle than a wounded 
comrade.357 On Cebu, they lacked weapons and ammunition, so they had to resort to 
buying arms in small quantities from private persons and manufacturing their own guns 
and cartridges. The insurgents established makeshift munitions factories called 
maestranzas in different provinces, a policy also adopted on Samar.358 Cartridge shells, 
manufactured in the maestranzas, were made from galvanized iron roofing, frying pans, 
and silver coins.359 While the diplomatic efforts of the State Department deserve 
recognition for helping to curtail the shipment of arms from abroad into the Philippines, it 
must also be assumed that the other factor in deterring arm shipments was the presence 
and efforts of the gunboats on Asiatic Station. 
The other area of the blockade was in regards to inter-island shipping. As seen 
through the insurgent generals Vicente Lukban on Samar, Ambrosio Moxica on Leyte 
and Vito Belarmino in the Bicol area, the naval blockade prevented these commanders 
from coordinating the resistance in the hemp provinces.360 Efforts to interdict gun 
running and illicit trading outside of occupied ports, from Leyte to southern Luzon were 
accomplished by gunboats such as the Panay which during a twenty day period captured 
34 native craft engaged in illicit trade, and greatly aided in cutting off communications 
between Leyte and Samar.361 It is deduced that the Panay’s accomplishments thwarted 
insurgent efforts effectively since insurgent General Lukban, commanding in Samar, put 
a $5,000 reward on the heads of the captains of the Panay and Pampanga, and also 
inquired into the possibility of conducting night attacks on the gunboats while they were 
at anchor.362 It is also from the Panay that it was learned, from confiscated letters, the 
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difficulties of the native craft in evading the gunboats; one vessel had been hiding on the 
Island of Bohol for over a month.363 
The coming year of 1901 would be called the “year of victory” by author John 
Gates. The army’s pacification policy would change or more aptly become consistent, 
and 21 of 38 un-pacified provinces at the beginning of the year, would be pacified 
through the combined efforts of the army and navy. Shadow insurgent governments were 
broken; crop and property destruction became more common, a tactic that became termed 
“burning”. In more places the army imposed its policy of “concentration” the separation 
of civilians into towns or “protected zones”, outside of which everyone was regarded as 
an enemy. The harsh tactics worked for Major General MacArthur, as when General 
Chaffee took over in September 1901, only the Tagalog provinces in Luzon, the Island of 
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IV. THE FALL OF THE GENERALS, BATANGAS, SAMAR, AND 
THE END 
The last period of the Philippine Insurrection, from January 1, 1901, to July 4, 
1902, was as problematic as the first two periods covered in the proceeding chapters. The 
year and a half of hostilities would see continued problems in strategy, organization, and 
manning for the army, navy, and insurgents. Several key factors from the end of 1900, 
notably Major General MacArthur’s issuance of General Order 100 and the reelection of 
President McKinley, combined to enable the army and navy to achieve success 
throughout the archipelago during the first several months of the new year (1901), but 
success was short lived as the last remaining insurgents in the Province of Batangas on 
Luzon and on the Island of Samar proved difficult to defeat, and in the case of Balangiga, 
Samar, inflicted severe casualties on U.S. forces. 
The navy’s role in the insurrection continued to consist of cooperating with the 
army and enforcing a blockade. But unlike in the previous two chapters, where there was 
a somewhat divergence (though diminishing) between the two tasks, the coming year 
would see the synthesis of the two into a policy intertwined with that of the army’s 
pacification of the islands. This is to say that unlike at the onset of hostilities, where ships 
would be tasked to support the military campaigns in Luzon or to conduct general patrols 
in search of illicit trade (mainly arms), during 1901 and into 1902, a large portion of the 
squadron was centered around Samar to cooperate with the army and specifically 
blockade that island to assist in the army’s pacification strategy. This close cooperation 
led directly to the success eventually achieved there. 
To understand fully the navy’s role in the insurrection and thus be able to assess 
its impact and success, it is important to understand the broader picture. While the navy is 
the focus of this study, it can only be understood within the larger context of the conflict. 
This mandates, as in the other chapters, that due attention be given to the efforts of the 
army and the civilian administration. As stated in a previous chapter, the navy’s role was 
to assist in the policy laid down by the War Department, which equated to the policy 
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espoused by the Military Governor, so to deduce if the navy was accomplishing its job; it 
must be explored to find out what that job exactly was. 
A. THE ARMY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Major General MacArthur in late December 
1900, decided to pursue a harsher pacification policy. To accomplish this strategy he 
issued General Order 100 in an effort to directly attack the insurgent’s center of gravity, 
the people. MacArthur would later claim that “Rarely in a war has a single document 
been so instrumental in influencing ultimate results. The consequences in this instance, 
however …seem to preclude all possibility of doubt, and also seem to justify the 
conclusion that the effective pacification of the Archipelago commenced December 20, 
1900.”365 As evidence will show, MacArthur was correct. 
The Secretary of War, reporting on 1901, informed the President and Congress 
that the army had established 502 garrisons throughout the archipelago at every important 
town and strategic point to suppress the insurgents, protect the population, and establish 
civil government. But the insurgents were receiving funds and supplies from the towns 
and countryside in which they operated, and it was the past policy to rarely interfere with 
these supporters. Furthermore, it was the practice that prisoners taken in battle were 
disarmed and released. This previous policy had been instituted in the hope of peacefully 
pacifying the native population, but, on the contrary it had the opposite effect. There was 
a sense of suspicion about the beneficence and it was looked at as an indication of 
weakness. For these reasons a more rigid policy (G.O. 100) to deal with the residents of 
the archipelago was issued by the military governor on December 20, 1900, followed by 
the expulsion of some 50 insurgent supporters and agitators to Guam, and a vigorous 
campaign by the army that led to the capture or surrender of the majority of the 
prominent insurgent leaders. 
The army continued to face manning problems. On January 4, 1901, MacArthur 
requested additional troops for a rigorous prosecution of the insurgents. The army’s total 
strength in the Philippines on December 31, 1900, was 67,479 troops. But even with such 
a large number of troops, the army was more active than at any other time since 
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November 1899.366 In an attempt to deal with the problem of troop strength, the War 
Department worked to withdraw troops from Cuba for use in the Philippines.367 The 
Volunteer forces, raised under provisions of the Army Act of March 2, 1899, were to 
return stateside when their contracts expired on July 1, 1901. The Army Act of February 
2, 1901, allowed the President to assign troop strength in the Philippines from 59,131 to 
100,000 troops, but with improvements in the Philippines by mid-1901, he put the 
number at 77,287.368 By the time the Army had finally obtained the authorization and 
allocation for the desirable number of troops in the Philippines, the conflict was almost 
over. By the end of 1901, the army’s troop strength had diminished to 1,111 officers, and 
42,128 enlisted personnel in the Philippines.369 It begs the question of if the army had 
had an overwhelming force in the beginning, would the insurrection have lasted as long 
as it did, or if it would have begun at all. 
Along with his request for troops, MacArthur discussed the military need to close 
ports in southern Luzon, on the Island of Samar, and the Island of Leyte. As seen in the 
previous year, hemp was an important commodity to Washington, but MacArthur 
explained that the impact of closing ports would be negligible when compared to the 
military advantage obtained; Rear Admiral Remey and Brigadier General Bates also 
supported such a policy.370 Unfortunately, the Secretary of War was not open to 
interfering with the commerce within the Philippines unless it was an absolute military 
necessity (which MacArthur claimed it was). The Secretary of War directed MacArthur 
to make a full report on the advantages expected from closing ports and the reasons for 
such expectations.371  
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Macarthur’s response, on January 9, 1901, was: 
Hemp in Southern Luzon in same relation to present struggle as cotton 
during rebellion [Civil War]; fields nearly all in possession of insurgents; 
large sums collected from contraband trade, which can only be controlled 
by closing ports, the military advantage of which would arise from self-
interested action of hemp dealers to induce pacification, and also action of 
natives to same end. Every effort being made to utilize this advantage for 
purpose of obtaining decisive results; temporary closure of ports powerful 
factor, which shall abandon with reluctance; final results can not be 
predicted, but we are now nearer pacification that at any time since 
outbreak.372  
On January 11, 1901, the Secretary of War gave his “constrained approval” for 
the closure of ports, but in the case of the ports of Tabaco and Surigao on Luzon, he 
demonstrated that this approval was not without limits, as he ordered them reopened in 
early February.373 The problem that arose seems to be linked with speculators, for on 
February 9, 1901, the Secretary of War reported that banks and capitalist in Manila were 
interested in keeping the price of hemp inflated, and were possibly stirring up the 
insurrection to prevent the flow of hemp. The Secretary was adamant that he did not want 
the department to be used by the speculators, and thus did not wish to interfere in any 
action that would effect trade; unless, it was a military necessity.374 
By the time of MacArthur’s relief, by Major General Adna Chaffee, the 
insurgency had for the most part been confined to just a couple of areas. On July 4, 1901, 
the post of Military Governor was disestablished and William H. Taft assumed the role as 
Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, and Chaffee relived MacArthur in charge of the 
U.S. Army’s Philippine Division. Secretary of War, Elihu Root, made it clear to Chaffee 
that his primary task was to divorce the army from its civil functions and restore military 
efficiency. Four years of imperial warfare had cost the army thousands of veterans, badly 
trained recruits, and new officers whose experience was in civil government or small-unit 
command.375 In a rush to defeat the insurgency, the army had lost many of its seasoned 
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veterans to wounds or death, hurried training for new recruits, and transformed itself into 
a counter-insurgency force, and the army leadership wanted to reverse this trend. 
Chaffee’s first act was to reorganize the army by abolishing the department-
district system. He instead divided the Philippines into the Department of Northern 
Philippines (Luzon) and Southern (everything else), and within these two departments he 
created “separate brigades”. In regards to pacification, he made few changes to a policy 
that was already successful. In September he ushered in the army’s premier counter-
insurgency expert, Brig. General J. Franklin Bell, to clean up the Province of Batangas. 
And after the September 28, 1901, Balangiga massacre on Samar, Chaffee would assign 
Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith to the island. Both Bell and Smith would later be 
accused of atrocities and army misconduct that would tarnish the reputation of the army 
forever and led to a Senate inquiry. But on July 4, 1902, their extreme measures enabled 
President Roosevelt to declare an end to the insurrection.376  
B. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 
Back on June 3, 1900, William H. Taft arrived as part of 2nd Philippine 
Commission. As president of the commission, he was charged with establishing 
municipal and provincial governments and supervision of the transfer of power from 
military to civilian rule. In September 1900, the commission had assumed legislative 
duties for the archipelago, and as provinces were declared pacified and safe by the army, 
they were turned over to the commission. Unfortunately, both viewed each other with 
indignation. While after July 4, 1901, Taft was to exercise executive authority in all civil 
affairs previously held by the military governor, the commanding general of the 
Philippine division would exercise control of districts in which the insurrection 
continued. The Commission quickly assumed responsibility for civil governments, and 
despite objections of field commanders, on July 20, 1901, 23 formally hostile provinces 
were transferred to the commission.377 
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While Taft and Otis and MacArthur were not known for agreeing or 
compromising with each other, Chaffee and Taft were a different matter, but that may be 
mostly to do with President Theodore Roosevelt who assumed the presidency on 
September 14, 1901. On October 6, 1901, Roosevelt wrote both concerning a 
disagreement between Chaffee and Taft over the legality concerning deserters from the 
army. He wrote that “I am deeply chagrined to use the mildest possible term, over the 
trouble between yourself and Taft. I wish you to see him personally and spare no effort to 
secure prompt and friendly agreement in regard to the differences between you. Have 
cabled him also. It is most unfortunate to have any action taken which produces friction 
and which may have serious effect both in the Philippines and here at home. I trust 
implicitly that you and Taft will come to agreement.”378 While this demonstrates a 
problem with the civil-military affairs within the islands; except for a few problems 
encountered around Samar, the transition from military to civil progressed smoothly. 
C. THE NAVY 
In his annual report for the year, 1901, the Secretary of the Navy restated what 
had been basically put forth for the previous two years: “the vessels of this squadron 
(Asiatic), detailed for service in Philippine waters, have been employed in cooperating 
with our military forces, in maintaining an effective patrol of the various islands, and in 
preventing the insurgents from receiving supplies of arms.”379 The navy continued to use 
the same patrol stations as was adopted the previous year (see page 64), designated by 
respective headquarters as Vigan, Iloilo, Cebu, and Zamboanga.380 It remained the 
gunboat that held the lion’s share of responsibilities for conducting operations in the 
Philippines. For the month of January 1901, the distribution of vessels on Asiatic Station 
looked similar to previous months (see table 3).381 
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Of all the gunboats within the navy, all were on Asiatic Station. The Asiatic 
Station had during its peak in 1901: 18 gunboats and 15 small gunboats.  
 
Table 3. Distribution of Vessels on Asiatic Station for January 1901 
SHIP LOCALITY EMPLOYMENT 
Brooklyn (Armored Cruiser) Manila Flagship  
Newark (Protected Cruiser) Cavite Flagship  
Albany (Protected Cruiser) Hong Kong Repairs 
Bennington (Gunboat) Hong Kong Repairs 
Castine (Gunboat) Iloilo Station vessel 
Concord (Gunboat) Samar, Cebu, Mindanao Cooperating w/Army 
Don Juan de Austria 
(Gunboat) 
Cebu, Samar, Leyte “  “ 
Helena (Gunboat) Shanghai Protecting U.S. interests, 
Repairs 
Isla de Cuba (Gunboat) Samar, Cavite Patrolling, Repairs 
Isla de Luzon (Gunboat) Cavite, Hong Kong Repairs 
Manila (Gunboat) Cavite Repairs 
Marietta (Gunboat) Zamboanga Patrol, Station ship 
Monadnock (Monitor) Hong Kong, Amoy, 
Shanghai 
Repairs, Protecting U.S. 
interests 
Monocacy (Gunboat) Taku Station Vessel 
Monterey (Monitor) Canton Protection U.S. interests 
Nashville (Gunboat) Nagasaki Repairs 
New Orleans (Protected 
Cruiser) 
Chefoo, Nagasaki Protection of U.S. interests 
Oregon (Battleship) Woosung Protection of U.S. interests 
Petrel (Gunboat) Southeastern Luzon Patrolling, cooperating w/army 
Princeton (Gunboat) Cavite Repairs 
Yorktown (Gunboat) Vigan station Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Gardoqui (Gunboat) Subig Bay Guard vessel 
Urdaneta (Gunboat) Subig Bay Guard Vessel 
Arayat (Gunboat) Cebu;, Samar, S.E. 
Luzon 
Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Basco (Gunboat) Manila Bay Guard Vessel, cooperating 
Calamianes (Gunboat) Zamboanga Station Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Callao (Gunboat) Zamboanga Station Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Leyte (Gunboat) Iloilo Surveying harbor 
Mindoro (Gunboat) Samar Patrolling illicit traffic, 
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SHIP LOCALITY EMPLOYMENT 
cooperating w/army 
Pampanga (Gunboat) Cebu, Samar Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Panay (Gunboat) Samar, Cebu Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Paragua (Gunboat) Panay Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Quiros (Gunboat) Vigan Station Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Samar (Gunboat) Cavite, Zamboanga Repairs, Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
Villalobos (Gunboat) Samar, Cebu, Panay Patrolling illicit traffic, 
cooperating w/army 
General Alava (Gunboat) Cavite Repairs 
Albay (Gunboat) Cavite Out of Commission, Repairs 
Balusan (Gunboat) Cavite Out of Commission, Repairs 
Elcano (Gunboat) Cavite Out of Commission, Repairs 
Manileno (Gunboat) Cavite Out of Commission, Repairs 
Mariveles (Gunboat) Cavite Out of Commission, Repairs 
Mindanao (Gunboat) Cavite Out of Commission, Repairs 
 
Ships that served in China during the Boxer Rebellion in the previous year, and 
which had no part in any hostile operations, had begun returning to the Philippines by 
October 1900. The Monterey and Monadnock, stationed at Canton and Shanghai 
respectively, had no utility except as receiving ships, “they were only a burden before”. 
By the end of the year (1901), with the insurgency diminishing, it was hoped to send two 
gunboats to the North Atlantic Station, one to the Pacific, and commission two more for 
use in the Caribbean.382 The Asiatic Station grew to its greatest strength in May 1901 and 
consisted of 2 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 3 protected cruisers, 2 monitors, 18 
gunboats, 16 small gunboats, and 4 small gunboats not in commission or under repair. 
The eventual decline of the insurrection later in 1901 lead to a reduction in force (see 
table 4). The gunboats El Cano, Mindanao, and Bulusan were not completed nor 
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commissioned during 1901 and the Bulusan was eventually condemned by survey and 
stricken from the list.383 
In his semi-annual report for 1901, ending December 31, 1901, Rear Admiral 
Frederick Rodgers reported from the Philippines that due to the belief by the War 
Department that the insurrection was on the decline in July 1901, the vessels Bennington, 
Petrel, Newark, Marietta, Concord, Castine, Oregon, Culgoa, Albany, and Nashville had 
left the station. 
Table 4. Asiatic Station Ship Strength for Fiscal Year 1901 






Battleship 1 2 1 
Cruisers (a) 3 5 4 
Monitors 2 2 2 
Gunboats (b) 28 33 27 
(a) Includes armored and protected cruisers. 
(b) Includes gunboats and small gunboats 
 
The rest of the squadron remained employed patrolling the coasts in suppressing 
illicit traffic, and cooperating with the army in convoying and transporting troops. 
Because of the breakout of hostilities on Samar, all vessels possible were concentrated 
there. He wrote that the principle item of food was rice, which was not grown in 
sufficient quantity to support the population on Samar, so the insurrectos attempted to 
take hemp, which grows in abundance, across to Leyte, to barter for rice and smuggle it 
back into Samar. The importance of the gunboats was in maintaining a strict blockade to 
prevent the egress of hemp and the ingress of rice to the insurgents.384 
As for the organization of Asiatic Station, it saw a number of changes during the 
year. On May 1, 1901, Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers arrived on Asiatic Station and 
assumed duty at senior-squadron commander with Rear Admiral Louis Kempff becoming 
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junior-squadron commander. Rear Admiral George C. Remey remained the Commander-
in-Chief of Naval Forces on Asiatic Station until March 1, 1902, when Rodgers assumed 
the position. 385 Rear Admiral Frank Wildes served as senior squadron commander until 
April 27, 1902, when Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans reported as senior squadron 
commander and Wildes assumed junior. Kempff, once relieved, left the Asiatic Station.  
On August 27, 1901, under Fleet General Order Number 13, the Asiatic Station 
was divided into a Northern Squadron, consisting of all naval forces outside Philippine 
waters, and a Southern Squadron, consisting of all naval forces in the Philippine 
Islands.386 The senior squadron commander, aboard his flagship in Manila Bay, was 
placed in charge of all naval forces in the Philippines and the junior squadron 
commander, aboard his flagship off Taku, was placed in charge of all other naval forces. 
The commander-in-chief oversaw both, and spent his time cruising aboard his flagship 
between Japan, China, and the Philippines. As the insurgency ended by mid-1902, the 
Navy Department was looking for a more permanent arrangement of vessels. The plan 
proposed was to divide the station into three squadrons, a battleship squadron consisting 
of the Kentucky, Oregon, Wisconsin, Monadnock, and Monterey, a cruiser squadron of 
the New Orleans, Yorktown, Wilmington, Helena, Vicksburg, Princeton, Annapolis, Don 
Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, and a gunboat squadron.387  
In 1902, the southern squadron had been actively engaged in cruising and 
patrolling, cooperating with the army, but that with the final surrenders on Samar, 
withdrawal of several of the small gunboats was finally allowed as the southern squadron 
had transferred from Samar to off Mindanao. Rodgers asserted that the “suppression of 
the insurrection in the island of Samar and the surrenders connected therewith are due as 
much, if not more, to the work of the navy about the coast.” As evidence, he used an 
extract from the cruising report of Lieutenant Commander H. P. Huse of the Villalobos 
concerning the dependence of Samar natives on rice and fish, the gunboats efforts in 
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cutting off both created a starvation that the army said to have forced the surrender of the 
insurgents on Samar. He (Huse) stated: “The Navy has not played a secondary part in the 
suppression of the insurrection. Its work has been at least as important and effective as 
that of the Army.”388 
D. THE INSURGENTS 
1901 saw time run out for the insurgents. They had rested much of their hope in 
the previous year on the American elections and believed that Bryan’s win would mean 
their independence, but that never came to pass. 389 Aguinaldo’s system of guerilla 
warfare was not working. The insurgents had to keep the people with them, either by 
making them feel their cause was theirs or making them fear their punishment more than 
the Americans. This policy began to fail because people grew wary of the exactions and 
abuses by guerillas, which drove them into making common cause with Americans.390 
In response to the new harsher approach of the Americans in dealing with the 
insurgents and treating them as common criminals, Aguinaldo, on January 17, 1901, 
protested against MacArthur and declared that in self-defense, Filipinos would exchange 
Americans for Filipinos sentenced to death. If not exchanged, the insurgents would resort 
to reprisals, meaning executing their American prisoners as was being done by U.S. 
forces to some captured insurgents. Aguinaldo was deplored that his officers were being 
court martialed as leaders of bandits and as assassins.391 Furthermore, the insurgent 
committee in Manila, previously active in levying taxes on hemp, was deported along 
with other insurgent supporters to Guam. Slowly, the insurgent support base was being 
eroded. For Aguinaldo, he had graver threats to face in the opening months of 1901.392 
E. FALL OF THE GENERALS 
1. Luzon 
It was on the main island of Luzon that the war would be won or lost. The island 
contained half of the archipelago’s population, it was the richest and most economically 
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diverse, it held the capital, and it was the home of Aguinaldo and the ethnic Tagologs that 
comprised the core of the resistance. For these reasons, Luzon continued to draw the 
greatest amount of American attention. While operations continued throughout the 
archipelago, the mainstay of operations centered on Luzon until their decline by mid-
1901. 
After MacArthur’s December 1900, proclamation (G.O. 100), Brigadier General 
Wheaton, district commander in northern Luzon, began implementing harsher tactics, 
using imprisonment, confiscation of crops, destruction of fields and buildings, and forced 
resettlement of the population. At the same time the army took the offensive, troops 
pursued the insurgents about the countryside in continuous expeditions. By mid-May 
1901, tired and beaten, 12,000 guerillas surrendered, turning in 6,000 rifles, and Wheaton 
declared his district pacified.393 Elsewhere in Northern Luzon, Brigadier General Young 
of the 1st District came to the conclusion that his benevolent civic action programs were 
not having the pacifying effect he was seeking. During the previous year he had overseen 
the establishment of 203 schools, had built roads, and formed municipal governments, 
but after repeated attacks by insurgents, he was ready for a change in policy. Beginning 
in 1901, he requested and received authorization, under G.O. 100, for a policy of blanket 
repression, retaliation, relocation or expulsion of civilians from hostile zones, devastation 
of crops and homes, and summary execution of guerillas.394 
As part of a more rigid policy, MacArthur desired to deport prominent insurgent 
leaders to Guam. On January 16, 1901, 32 insurgents were deported for Guam aboard the 
navy vessel Solace.395 One such deportee was Apolinario Mabini, a staunch nationalist 
and advisor to Aguinaldo. Deported in 1901 to Guam, he wrote La Revolución Filipina 
while in exile, and refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. He was only 
allowed back to the Philippines shortly before his death in 1903. While this may seem a 
cruel measure, MacArthur wrote that he (Mabini) was a most active agitator, persistently 
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and defiantly refusing amnesty, and maintaining correspondence with insurgents in the 
field while living in Manila, his exile was considered “absolutely essential”396 
The single most important event in Northern Luzon for the year and possibly for 
the entire insurrection was the capture of Aguinaldo on March 28, 1901, by Brigadier 
General Funston at Palanan, Isabela Province, Northern Luzon. Acting on intelligence 
received from surrendering insurgent soldiers, Funston organized an expedition to 
capture the most famous Filipino of the time.397 Leading an expedition consisting of a 
captured insurgent messenger, four ex-insurgent officers, seventy-eight Macabebe scouts 
(natives from the Province of Macabebe in Northern Luzon, and bitter enemies of the 
Tagalogs), and four U.S. Army officers (dressed as American army privates and 
representing prisoners) they set sail under secrecy on March 6, 1901, from Manila aboard 
the gunboat Vicksburg. 398 Under cover of darkness on a “thick and squally” morning, the 
party landed in the early hours of March 14, 1901, at the entrance of Casiguran Bay, on 
the coast of Luzon. 399 Marching in uninhabitable terrain, the expedition reached Palanan 
on the 23rd. Using the perfectly orchestrated deceptive plan of Funston, the disguised 
American force walked into Aguinaldo’s camp and captured the Filipino president and 
military commander. Meeting at the predesignated site of Palanan Bay, the Vicksburg 
rendezvoused with Funston’s party on March 25, 1901. Under rough seas and high winds, 
the navy extracted the army and on the morning of March 28, 1901, steamed into Manila 
with its prize of Don Emilio Aguinaldo. 400 In a letter to MacArthur, General Funston 
said: 
Too much praise cannot be given the officers and men of the Vicksburg 
for the invaluable service rendered the expedition by that vessel. Every 
suggestion or request that I [Funston] made to Commander Barry was 
complied with fully. He navigated his vessel fearlessly along the 
dangerous and inaccurately charted east coast of Luzon, running up the 
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narrow Casiguran Bay on a dark and squally night and disembarking the 
expedition so quickly and so quietly that its presence was not suspected by 
the natives. The task of re-embarking the expedition at Palanan Bay 
through heavy surf was of the same high order.401 
MacArthur had hoped that the capture of Aguinaldo would lead to the speedy 
cessation of hostilities throughout the archipelago.402 But, while Aguinaldo took the oath 
of allegiance to the United States on April 1, 1901, and wrote a proclamation advising his 
subordinates to give up the struggle and accept the sovereignty of the United States, 
MacArthur’s hopes were not fully realized. 403  Within six weeks after Aguinaldo’s 
capture, all but two major insurgent leaders remained in the field: General Vicente 
Lukban on Samar and General Miguel Malvar in Batangas. But as will be shown, these 
two individuals were persistent in their efforts to resist American occupation, and they 
would continue the conflict for another year.404 Records in fact show that Aguinaldo was 
little in touch with the insurgency from the beginning of guerilla warfare on November 
13, 1899, to his capture on March 23, 1901. In essence, he had only become a figurehead 
of the insurrection and was no longer a director.405 Symbolic or not, Aguinaldo’s capture 
appeared to provide a reason for the majority of the insurgency’s leaders to surrender. 
Insurgent General Licerio Geronimo, whose men were credited with killing 
General Lawton, surrendered on March 29, 1901. He commanded the Province of 
Bulacan, north of Manila, and surrendered 12 officers, 29 men, and 30 guns.406 On April 
30, 1901, General Tinio, commanding the whole of Northern Luzon, surrendered. With 
the two general’s surrender, hostilities in Northern Luzon came to a close.407 
In Southern Luzon, the story of surrender was much the same; except in the 
province of Batangas, which will be covered later. By early 1901, the army’s constant 
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pursuit and navy’s blockade had made the insurgent’s position desperate. As the 
insurgents became increasingly harsh with the local population and made ever increasing 
demands, the population was forced to return to the coastal towns and turned to the army 
for food and protection.408 Without its support base, the insurgency in southern Luzon 
crumbled. On March 11, 1901, insurgent General Mariano de Dios surrendered at Naic, 
handing over Cavite Province to American control.409 Lieutenant General Mariano Trias, 
the last insurgent of the rank of Lieutenant General and commanding all of Southern 
Luzon, surrendered over two hundred well armed men on March 15, 1901 to Brigadier 
General John C. Bates.410 
Part of the Department of Southern Luzon was the island of Marinduque. Major 
Smith, commanding Marinduque, instituted a policy of concentration: ordering all natives 
into five principle towns and claiming all people outside these towns would be 
considered insurgents. Smith enlisted the aid of the navy in blockading the island as he 
sought to starve the insurgents into submission. Upon hearing of these harsh measures, 
through the press, Washington inquired into whether there was any truth to the 
allegations. MacArthur responded that it was correct, and Smith’s actions were effective 
in suppressing the insurrection there which had proved obstinate.411 On April 15, 1901, 
insurgent Colonel Abad, surrendered to Major Smith, ending the insurgency on 
Marinduque.412 
With the combination of surrenders, captures, and expulsions of the insurgency’s 
top leadership and the decreasing support of the population, the insurgency began a 
downward spiral. On March 23, 1901, General Capistrano surrendered, and on April 6, 
1901, General Theodoro Sandico. Insurgent General Natividad surrendered on May 8, 
1901, and General Tomas Mascardo on May 15, 1901. Generals Alejandrino and Lakuna 
surrendered in late May, and General Juan Cailles (Laguna Province) surrendered on 
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June 24, 1901.413 On May 3, 1901, General  MacArthur transmitted to Washington that 
40,000 American troops would be needed to be maintained in the islands, 30,000 less 
troops than at the beginning of 1901.414 
2. The Visayas 
The Department of the Visayas, headquartered at Iloilo City, Panay, and 
commanded by Brigadier General Hughes, oversaw 25,300 square miles and a population 
of 2.5 million, with 8,600 U.S. soldiers. Formulating and instituting a coherent 
pacification policy for such an expansive and complex area presented an awesome 
challenge. Hughes considered the island of Panay the most important island. Beginning in 
December 1899, Hughes had been fighting against an insurgent force under General 
Delgado; during 1900 he led expeditions in large-scale sweeps into the interior. By late 
1900, with food shortages, more effective counterinsurgency methods, and abuses and 
exactions by revolutionaries, the insurgent had alienated their popular support.415 In 
1901, U.S. troops on Panay burned property and physically abused Filipinos, retaliatory 
practices legal under G.O. 100. The army on Panay practiced wholesale destruction of the 
countryside, destroying crops, boats, houses, and any centers of resistance. On an island 
that was already suffering from livestock disease, food shortages, and drought, the 
American policy forced the guerilla depredations on the populace to increase.416 But it 
was actually well before MacArthur’s G.O. 100 proclamation, that army officers on 
Panay recognized the causal link between the guerillas and the towns. The army on Panay 
under Hughes had instituted harsh policies early on and conducted investigations to break 
up collection networks among the populace, a practice that succeeded in Iloilo. By the 
end of 1900, negotiations and unremitting military pressure swung balance in favor of the 
United States. On February 2, 1901, General Delgado surrendered on the request of his 
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subordinates.417 Hostilities on Panay concluded on March 22, 1901, when the last 
remaining insurgents surrendered.418 
Leyte, was an island in the Military Department of the Visayas. Relatively small 
in comparison with its neighbor Samar (Department of Southern Luzon), Leyte had a 
rather large population. The island was divided by high mountain ranges and separated 
from Samar by a very narrow strait. The one unique aspect of Leyte, unlike its 
neighboring islands, was that enough food was grown on the island to sustain the native 
population, a factor that would come into play in the struggle for Samar. Leading the 
insurgent struggle on the island was General Ambrosio Mojica, and his opposing counter-
part was Colonel Arthur Murray. Initially overextended, the army, harassed by guerilla 
bands, sought reconciliation through civic action and municipal government. But, by the 
fall of 1900, Murray adopted harsher measures. He offered good treatment to those who 
moved within occupied zones, began restricting food transfer into the countryside, and 
proposed total destruction of the rice crop in unoccupied areas. Of course in their efforts, 
the army was assisted by the navy. 
On February 27, 1901, 1st Lieutenant Richard W. Buchanan of the 44th infantry 
expressed gratitude for the assistance of the gunboat Petrel in subduing a group of 
insurgents along the Pagsangaan River, near the town of Ormoc, Leyte. The navy was 
engaged in cooperating with the army garrison at Ormoc to find and destroy a large 
cuartel (Spanish word for military barracks) located among mangrove swamps and only 
accessible by boat. But upon arrival, the force found the insurgents waiting in an ambush, 
but with their superior firepower (gunboat) the insurgents fled. The cuartel was never 
found, and was most likely the failed attempt by the insurgents to kill Americans in an 
ambush, but thanks to the navy, this was averted.419  
Because of harsh tactics and the navy’s blockade, on May 18, 1901, Insurgent 
General Ambrosio Mojica of Leyte surrendered with forty-three officers and 1,386 men 
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to American officers.420 While the insurgency on Leyte ceased, it did not prevent the 
Filipinos on Leyte from aiding the efforts on neighboring Samar. Smuggling rice across 
the San Juanico Straits to Samar was a very lucrative business.421 This trade in turn 
exacerbated the problem between Murray and Hughes and the Navy. As Murray switched 
to a less strict pacification policy, he opened all the ports on Leyte, and as will be 
discussed in great detail in the next section, this severely eroded the pacification efforts 
on Samar. The navy continued to enforce a strict blockade and to burn and confiscate 
boats and cargo from Leyte. Murray was so furious at one point that he threatened to 
open fire on the navy’s gunboats. But interestingly, Murray stated that, “Kindness and 
consideration I regret to say appear to me largely if not wholly unappreciated by these 
people, who seem to regard our lenient and humane treatment as an evidence of weakness 
on our part”. The problem was that Murray had little understanding  of the insurgency. 
His initial efforts of appeasement did not work, so he adopted stricter measures, which 
appeared to work. The problem was that while the fighting subsided, the populace 
continued to support the insurgency in Samar. It was not till later that Leyte would be 
truly pacified.422 
Elsewhere in the archipelago, on February 1, 1901, the insurgent commander of 
the island of Masbate informed general Lukban that conditions on the island were hard. 
Rice was prohibited by the blockade, and the only food was provided by the Americans 
to the people. The insurgents, hiding in the hills had to contend with the bandits, were 
stronger than the insurgents.423 On March 29, 1901, Mindanao insurgent General 
Capistrano surrendered, ending trouble in Mindanao.424 Similar to the situation on 
Masbate, Capistrano faced a hostile Moro population, had it not been for the Americans, 
the Tagalog insurgents on Mindanao would have been overrun. In a cruising report from 
the gunboat Calamianes, she was requested to assist the army on the island of Negros. 
Intelligence had been received by the army indicating that insurgents were garrisoned at 
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San Matao with three canons and 30 rifles. On Feb 26, 1901, the gunboat embarked a 
company of army troops, ascended the Agusan River, and destroyed the town and 
insurgent barracks. 425  
F. THE PERSISTENT ONES (LUCKBAN AND MALVAR) 
Back on April 30, 1901, MacArthur reported that except for insurgents in 
southern Luzon under Malvar, and on Samar under Lukban, the insurrection was 
practically suppressed throughout the archipelago.426 As Taft and Chaffee took power on 
July 4, 1901, it was again reported that the insurrection was almost entirely suppressed. 
The only remaining resistance was in the province of Batangas, and islands of Samar, 
Cebu, and Bohol. While army and navy efforts were directed towards these areas, it was 
not until October 1901, that the most vigorous operations would be launched. In 
Batangas, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell was brought in to crush insurgent General 
Miguel Malvar. General Chaffee had first tried negotiations, but when those failed, Bell 
began operations which would result in the surrender of Malvar on April 16, 1902.427 On 
Samar the situation became dire after the massacre of American troops at Balangiga, and 
Brigadier General  Jacob Smith was brought in to combat Lukban. After one of the most 
controversial campaigns of the U.S. army in the Philippines, Lukban was finally captured 
within the first months of 1902.428 
The majority of the Philippines had been pacified by mid-1901. People were 
becoming increasingly tired of the conflict; they had endured a hard life with constant 
warfare dating to the Philippine Revolution against the Spanish from 1897 followed by 
the Spanish-American War, and then the Philippine Insurrection. Added to the normal 
hardships of war were endemic outbreaks of malaria and cholera, and render pest (a 
livestock disease) which decimated the native caribou (water buffalo) population. As the 
last remaining insurgents were forced to extract more and more from their support base, 
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the populace, the Americans adopted their harshest methods of the insurrection in the fall 
of 1901.  
3. Batangas 
The province of Batangas is located in Southern Luzon (see Figure15) and was 
part of the Department of Southern Luzon. Insurgent general Miguel Malvar, 
commanding forces in Batangas, was one of the most capable and popular supported 
generals. While he employed a strategy of attrition, the Americans began to substitute 
coercion for conciliation in 1901. Villagers were forced to move into garrisoned towns as 
there began a growing tendency toward the policy of “concentration”. In early 1901, with 
the assistance of navy gunboats, the army began landing at previously inaccessible 
coastal valleys, making small raids that pushed into the interior. The result, as previously 
mentioned, was that on March 15, 1901, General Trias, overall in charge of the entire 
Southern Luzon insurgent forces, staff, and 200 soldiers, surrendered, but not General 
Malvar.429 
 
Figure 15.   Batangas Province (Linn, The Philippine War, 163) 
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A civil government was sworn in at Batangas on May 2, 1901, but on July 20, 
1901, the commission transferred partial control back to the American military. The 
Army declared a “state of insurrection” and suspended habeas corpus, used military 
courts and commissions, and placed civil authorities under military officers. When Taft 
and Chaffee relieved MacArthur, they wanted the war to end and were increasingly 
willing to sanction drastic measures. To quell the growing resistance in Batangas, the 
choice of field officers, Taft and Chaffee was Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell. On 
November 19, 1901, Bell was ordered to replace General Sumner and took charge on the 
30th. Bell crafted one of the most coherent and well organized pacification campaigns of 
war. He sought not only to separate the guerrillas from the population, but to force the 
population to help America. Anyone who did not openly oppose insurgents (collect 
weapons, denounce spies and agents, identify guerrillas, or participate in operations) 
would be considered as hostile. He escalated food deprivation and destruction, burned 
and carried away hundreds of tons of rice and livestock, and continuously raided against 
the insurgents.  
Bell’s policy was one of “concentration” or “re-concentration”. A similar policy 
used by Spanish General Valeriano Weyler in Cuba that had created American opinion 
for favoring war with Spain. Using forced resettlement, on December 6, 1901, Bell 
ordered post commanders to establish protected zones, and after Christmas, anyone and 
anything outside these zones would be considered hostile and could be confiscated or 
destroyed, all males were to be arrested, or shot if escaping.  
The results were immediate. Malvar attempted to take the offensive, but he was 
beaten back, and U.S. forces took the initiative. Army sweeps were joined by natives, 
voluntarily or under coercion. On December 23, 1901, conditions in Batangas were 
described as a “Hot time in Batangas”.430 January 14, 1902, insurgent Colonel 
Marasigan, commanding some of the forces under General Malvar, surrendered at Taal, 
Batangas, ending hostilities in the western third of province.431 On April 16, 1902, 
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General Malvar, unconditionally surrendered to Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, 
officially ending the insurgency on Luzon.432 
The efforts of the army in Batangas were not alone. Aiding the army was the 
navy. On December 10, 1901, the ports of Batangas and Laguna were ordered closed to 
prevent the importation of food. As food began to run short, it became necessary for food 
to be imported by the navy into the army’s protected zones. The navy blockaded the 
coasts and also oversaw the importation of foodstuffs.433 When General Malvar 
surrendered on April 16, 1902, many of his men were so sick from malnourishment, that 
they required medical attention.434 General Bell captured or forced the surrender of 
between 8,000-10,000 insurgents, but once they took the oath of allegiance to the U.S. 
they were set free, and by July 1902, there were no political prisoners in the region.435 
The methods employed by General Bell were not new, not even within the United 
States. Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, commanding the district of the border (Kansas-
Missouri), with Headquarters at Kansas City, MO, on August 25, 1863, days after 
Quantrill’s Raiders burned Lawrence, Kansas, had ordered all inhabitants to relocate to 
within military stations within 15 days. He then order certain counties depopulated, and 
destroyed all forage and subsistence therein. All grain and hay was ordered taken to the 
stations, and if not convenient, it was burned. American commanders in the Philippines 
had not adopted a new method in dealing with guerillas, but simply employed an old 
one.436 Bell was aware of such a policy, from the Civil War, and came to the conclusion 
that the policy was needed.   
Another aspect of Bell’s policy was to destroy everything outside the army’s 
protected zones through military expeditions. Using General Order 100 as legal 
justification, spies were executed and insurgents were treated and tried as robbers or 
pirates. On December 18, 1901, Corbin wrote, “I can’t say how long it will take us to 
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beat Malvar into surrendering, and if no surrender, can’t say how long it will take us to 
make a wilderness of that country, but one or the other will eventually take place”. Bell 
had half of his 8,000 men in the field from January to April 1902. He launched 44 
Expeditions; one expedition destroyed 500 tons of rice, hundreds of hogs and chickens, 
corn, 6,000 houses, 200 caribou, 800 cattle, and 680 horses.437 
In another aspect of the campaign in Batangas was the army’s small flotilla of 
gunboats. The gunboat Napindan was used to prevent insurgents, on Talim Island, 
situated on Laguna de Bay, from crossing over to Cavite.on March 7, 1902.438 In a letter 
from Brigadier General J.F. Bell to the captain of Napindan, he explained that while 
instituting the policy of concentration, banco boats were allowed to bring palay (rice) into 
the towns and barrios controlled by the army until December 25, 1901, after which they 
should be destroyed for violating the concentration order.439 Reporting on January 1, 
1901, the army gunboat Laguna de Bay reported that she had been engaged in patrolling 
the lake, transporting troops, and rendering assistance to the forces along the lake. She 
visited the small garrisons located on the lake and rendered assistance, and while troops 
were engaging insurgents, she would lie off in the vicinity and prevent their escape. In 
one such instance, she interdicted 16 Filipinos trying to escape on banca boats.440 
In blockading Batangas, the efforts of the Austria, Petrel, Basco, and Calamianes, 
all operating in the most disturbed region, southeastern Luzon, proved to be of great 
value to the army.441 Unfortunately, while the navy patrolled extensively along the 
southeastern coast of Luzon, there is very little detail given in the reports of the vessels. 
This is not to say that the navy did not contribute significantly, to the contrary, looking at 
the evidence of the navy in the surrounding areas, it seems virtually certain that the navy 
effectively blockaded Batangas and sealed the fate of the insurgents. The gunboat 
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Mindoro, operating on Cebu Station was requested to aid the army garrison at Laon, 
Bohol, which was besieged by insurgents. Upon its arrival on May 10, 1901, the 
insurgents fled to the hills. From May 11-20, 1901, the gunboat patrolled the coast of 
Bohol destroying 27 bancos, and then on May 21, 1901, while returning to Cebu for 
coaling, she overhauled and destroyed 36 cascos (native canoes) off the coast of 
Batangas, which the captain viewed as used by the insurgents to receive supplies from the 
fishing vessels.442 
In six months, Bell hounded and starved Malvar’s army into submission and 
shattered the network of non-combatant support upon which the guerillas relied upon. 
Using a policy of concentration, ironically similar to General Weyler in Cuba, civilians 
were isolated from the guerrillas by urging or coercing them (civilians) into protected 
zones. At the same time, this allowed the army to operate with minimal restraint outside 
of the protected zones.443 On April 16, 1902, Malvar wrote that he surrendered because 
the people of the towns induced him. The lack of food, owing to the policy of 
“concentration”, and measures by General Bell created such suffering as to induce his 
surrender. American forces kept him constantly on the move, so that he found himself 
without a single gun or clerk.444  
What transpired in Batangas is not necessarily something to be proud of. 
Thousands of Filipinos perished from famine and diseases, not caused by the Americans, 
but most assuredly worsened by Bell’s policies. Nevertheless, the navy had an important 
role in these policies. It was the navy that assisted in creating a shortage of food by 
blockading the coastline. The navy also assisted the army in its ability to continually keep 
the insurgents on the run by landing raiding parties along the coast and accessing 
previously inaccessible areas. While these conditions may seem unthinkable by today’s 
standards, the situation would prove equally if not worse on Samar.   
4. Samar 
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Samar (see Figure16) presented four key hurdles to the American occupation of 
the island. First, outside of the island’s coastal towns, the terrain was rugged with 
swamps, mountains, and jungles. All communications went by water, either along the 
coast or along one of the many rivers. Second, the island’s chief crop was hemp, so the 
islands population depended upon the importation of food to subsist, but after years of 
war, drought, and the navy’s blockade, the food shortage intensified among the islands 
195,000 inhabitants. The third key factor was the insurgent general in charge of the 
island: Vicente Lukban. Lukban was a highly intelligent and capable general, well versed 
in the art of guerilla warfare. He also enjoyed mass support of the local population. 
Lastly, Samar is separated from Leyte by a very narrow channel. It was up to the 
Americans to turn the first two factors into advantages to enable the defeat of the last 
two, something U.S. Army and Navy forces accomplished in what has to be one of the 
bloodiest campaigns of the Philippine Insurrection. 
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Figure 16.   Island of Samar 
 
Pacification on Samar began in 1900. The army occupied the main ports of 
Catablogan and Calbayog in January 1900, during the Hemp Expedition. Major Henry T. 
Allan, initially commanding army forces on Samar, practiced a policy of benevolent 
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pacification. But like so many other commanders, over time he came to the conclusion, 
with the help of repeated attacks by Samarian bolomen, that conciliation was not 
working. On May 1900, MacArthur made Samar part of the Department of Southern 
Luzon, and in doing so inhibited the Department (Visayas) commander Hughes and Allan 
from instituting harsher methods.445 It would be a full year, until May 10, 1901, when 
MacArthur returned Samar back to the Department of the Visayas, that pacification 
began in earnest. In June 1901, General Hughes took personal command of operations on 
Samar against General Lukban.446 As American forces returned from China, the 9th 
Regiment, U.S. Infantry, was immediately sent to Samar for Hughes’ battle with Lukban. 
At the same time, under urging from Hughes, MacArthur reported that it was a 
paramount military necessity to close all ports on Samar.447 During the army’s struggle to 
pacify the island, the navy rendered valuable aid. 
The gunboat Arayat, patrolling the straits between Samar and Leyte reported on 
their efforts to enforce the blockade from February 6-25, 1901. Visiting Colonel Murray, 
commanding Leyte, it was learned that the war was practically over in his district, 4th 
District of the Visayas. But the following day, February 7, 1901, a short distance away, 
the Arayat overhauled three boats loaded with rice and hemp. On February 9th, across the 
straits, the gunboat visited Katbologan and Colonel Hardin, commanding the 4th district 
of department of southern Luzon, Samar, in which he (Hardin) requested assistance in 
stopping illicit trade. On February 10th and 11th, the gunboat overhauled four bancas, one 
without papers; and all were allowed to proceed. It was noted that it was not often to find 
a boat without papers, as Leyte, under Murray, granted passes upon application to almost 
anywhere, including ports in Samar which was closed. This was how the illicit trade was 
carried out. On February 11, 1901, the Arayat overhauled nine more bancas, all with 
permits. 
It was learned during these patrols that a signal fire system, between Samar and 
Leyte, had been perfected. Information of an approaching gunboat preceded the vessel by 
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about ten to twenty miles in daylight, but a few 1-pdrs. tended to discourage this practice. 
On February 18, 1901, as the Arayat proceeded down along the Samar coast near the San 
Bernardino Straits, as usual, she was preceded by fifteen miles by signal fires. But about 
the town of Uari, she caught eight bancas, all carrying hemp from Samar to Luzon. The 
practice was to take hemp to Luzon and bring back money or rice, depending on if it was 
time for the insurgent tax collectors. On the 23rd the Arayat visited Murray again who 
said all was very quiet on Leyte. But when the gunboat visited Uasey, on Samar, the next 
day, she discovered a number of bancas with regular passes issued from Tacloban, Leyte. 
The master of one of these vessels, the Anastacia, admitted that since May 1900, he had 
been bringing out from Tacloban, Leyte, money and rice for the firm Mendosona & 
Company, and taking back hemp from Samar. He had never been interfered with by the 
army authorities on Leyte. The problem was not with the natives but with the army. The 
natives were trading in good faith with ports in another military district; the problem was 
that the Inspector at Tacloban, Leyte, had no right to clear vessels for ports in another 
district, Hardin’s district on Samar.448 
On May 14, 1901, the gunboat Villalobos, cruising off the west coast of Samar 
destroyed a 14-ton banca when it made for shore and the crew took to the woods, and 
later in the day destroyed an abandoned barota (native boat) which contained 350 pounds 
of rice. On May 15, 1901, the gunboat overhauled a banca heading for Samar; and it was 
determined that the papers, issued on Leyte, were executed with culpable carelessness by 
the customs authority, which did more harm than could be remedied by a fleet of 
gunboats. The following day, six barotas making for Samar turned back towards Leyte 
upon sighting the gunboat. One was abandoned in their haste, and the boat was found to 
contain 1,000 pounds of rice which was destroyed.449 
As the situation on Samar worsened, the Princeton, senior officer present on Cebu 
Station, left Cebu for Samar, where the captain conferred with General Hughes on the 
disposition of the gunboats, Villalobos, Mariveles, Pampanga, Don Juan de Austria,  and 
Arayat, which were all patrolling around the island. The plan was for the army to advance 
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into the interior, but to do so, communications and supplies would be provided by the 
navy’s gunboats. The gunboats would also provide transportation and landing for the 
army. To aid the gunboats, so they would not have to go off station to coal at Cebu, a 
collier was requested to station off Samar, and one was sent.450 
The Villalobos, reporting on her movements on May 21, 1901, contacted Hughes 
and learned of a new phase in the pacification of Samar, the plan was for the army to 
launch expeditions up the islands rivers to take the offensive against the insurgents. The 
Gandara, Gibatan, and Katubig rivers were navigable for 15 to 20 miles, and it was the 
desire of the army to keep a gunboat on each river, and along the west coast of Samar. 
The Villalobos informed the Senior Officer Present, Princeton, and was then dispatched 
to retrieve the Don Juan de Austria. Upon returning to Samar, the Villalobos sent the 
Arayat off the north coast, the Pampanga off the northwest coast, and took station herself 
off the Gandara River. It was the desire of Hughes to destroy all native boats on Samar. 
The gunboat Mindoro also took position off the Gandara River, and on June 3, 1901, the 
Mariveles, Princeton, and Don Juan de Austria arrived.451 
On July 22, 1902, the Arayat, operating with Major Smith on Samar, took a party 
of army soldiers up the Pambuhan River. The gunboat proceeded up the river for 12 miles 
and landed the army to reconnoiter the countryside and search for a possible site for 
establishing a camp for later. After finding a suitable site, the troops embarked and the 
gunboat proceeded down the river in late afternoon. While cruising down the river, 
insurgents launched an attack from the right bank of the river, sending rifle fire about the 
ship. The Arayat quickly returned fire and landed a small detachment of men (army and 
navy), and the insurgents were quickly routed. Having secured the area, the American 
troops once again embarked on the gunboat, and she started down the river once more, 
and after traveling two miles down stream, insurgents attacked again. This time the ship 
was able to silence the insurgents with the fire of her guns. By 7 p.m. that night the 
gunboat, and the embarked army troops, returned to the mouth of the river, at which point 
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an insurgent old brass canon opened fire from an old ruined church. The Arayat’s main 
batteries quickly silenced the gun, and the vessel proceeded back to Laguan, Samar.452 
For the month of July, the gunboat Basco provided aid to the army on the rivers of 
Samar. On July 1, 1901, the ship cooperated with Troop G, 10th Cavalry in destroying 
property along the Gandara River, and while laying at anchor on the same river on the 3rd, 
insurgents opened fire on the gunboat, for which the aft 1-pdr. was used to silence the 
insurgents. From July 4th to the 6th, the vessel ran supplies and dispatches for General 
Hughes, and on July 7, 1901, returned to aiding Troop G on the Gandara in searching for 
insurgents. On July 8, 1901, insurgents attacked the gunboat, and the ship opened up with 
both, fore and aft 1-pdrs. and her Colt automatics. Next, the Basco landed a small 
detachment of soldiers which while finding no insurgents, captured two loaded bamboo 
canons, for possession of which they destroyed 20 neighboring houses and 35 caribou. 
On July 13, 1901, the vessel reentered the river again, and on the 15th, cooperated with 
the 10th cavalry in destroying property along the river, and on the 17th was fired upon by 
some 25 insurgents at a range of 200 yards from a hill overhanging the river. While the 
gunboat was hit 10 times, no casualties or damage was reported, and a landing party of 
soldiers drove the insurgents back and destroyed their barracks located on the hill. On the 
22nd she ferried the 1st infantry about Samar, and on the 24th and 25th again aided the 10th 
in destroying property about the river. From the 26th to the 30th the gunboat cooperated 
with the 9th infantry in destroying property about the swamps that lined the mouth of the 
river; in all they destroyed 70 houses, 9 tons of hemp, 100 caribou, 20 boats, and captured 
3 bolomen.453 
 The gunboat Arayat continued assisting the army in its efforts on Samar on into 
August 1901. After an army launch was fired upon in the Katubig River on August 8, 
1901, the gunboat Arayat (senior) sent the gunboat Gardoqui up the Tubig River to land 
an army detachment on the 9th, which was done successfully. Meanwhile the Arayat 
steamed around the east coast of Samar and was requested by the army commander at 
Oras to assist in sending an expedition up the Dolores River. On August 10, 1901, the 
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gunboat embarked a company of the 9th Infantry, consisting of a captain, surgeon, 40 
men, and a native guide. Sounding the entrance, it was found that at high tide, the 
gunboat would be able to enter the river. She did, and landed the army to scour the 
countryside, but found only an abandoned town which had been already fired by the 
insurgents. Next, the expedition steamed 10 miles up the river and anchored for the night. 
On the 11th, the gunboat proceeded further up the river, landing the army at different 
points to destroy houses and anything else. But as the gunboat approached, the natives 
usually fired their homes as they fled, doing the army’s work for them. After traveling 32 
miles up the river, the expedition came to the town of Jinalasan, but again, it had already 
been burned by the natives. Being unable to precede further up the river, the gunboat sent 
a small party on further, eight miles, in the ship’s boats, destroying some property. On 
August 12, 1901, the expedition began her return trip, having captured one native, two 
loaded rifles, two bolos (knives), and destroying much property. Again, as she had done 
on her way up, she landed men at different points to scour and destroy property along the 
river. Returning to Oras on August 13, 1901, the expedition found that during their 
expedition up the Dolores River, some 200 natives had been frightened out of the area 
and had come to Oras, bringing their household effects, apparently to stay. The Arayat 
arrived at the port of Laguan on August 16, 1901, and found out from several natives that 
in the attack on the Arayat back on May 31, 1901, along the Tubig River, fifteen 
insurgents had been killed by her fire, presumably her 6-pdr.454 
On September 6, 1901, the Gunboat Arayat arrived at the port of Laguan, and 
received word from the garrison commander that about 4,000 people now occupied the 
town, and that they had been receiving a steady flow of natives for over two weeks. The 
neighboring town of Palapa had grown to over 800 people. Several expeditions, launched 
up rivers as previously discussed, had resulted in the destruction of much property. The 
garrison commander hoped that more people would come in as the rice in the hills was 
exhausted. Unfortunately, signs of a famine were beginning to show among the 
population, and the soldiers at Laguan had to send daily expeditions to collect rice to feed 
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the people. The caribou, that was vital to the cultivation of rice, had all either been shot 
by the U.S. army or died of disease. Upon returning to the port of Calbayoc, the gunboat 
learned of the Balangiga massacre (which will be discussed later). Immediately, the 
gunboat received word, from the Senior Officer Present at Cebu and from General 
Hughes, to proceed to southern Samar and notify the army posts at once of the massacre. 
The gunboat ran the straits and proceeded to notify the posts at Tacloban, Guinan, and on 
Sept 20, 1901, the post at Pambuban. The garrison at Pambuban was immediately put 
into defensive positions and withdrawn from the town, and the surrounding structures 
cleared out. A fresh rifle pit was discovered in one of the buildings that commanded a 
house in which the army had been previously quartered. And when townspeople were 
asked to move from certain houses, they asked to leave the town completely; indicating 
their awareness of Balangiga and the possible attempt of a similar massacre in 
Pambuban.455 
One of the best illustrations of the early efforts and pacification problems on 
Samar, prior to the Balangiga massacre, was presented in the September 14, 1901, report 
by the Princeton, the Senior Officer Present on the Cebu Patrol Station. On the Island of 
Samar, the report tells how Hughes continued to battle the insurgents and was trying to 
pacify the island. It was reported that Lukban’s complete correspondence was captured, 
and the commercial houses of Smith, Bell & Company and Warner and Barnes & 
Company were implicated in providing aid and succor to the insurgents. For this, the two 
companies were asked to leave. It was also noted that as long as the ports on Leyte 
remained open to trade, rice and ammunition was being conveyed across the straits of 
San Juanico to Samar. The only positive note of the report was that the populace on 
Samar were returning in large numbers to the garrisoned ports. The commanding officer 
of the Princeton envisioned the solution on Samar as, “but one way of subduing these 
people: by annihilation and fire. This plan was followed with success in Panay, is now in 
progress in Samar.” In his opinion, Leyte, which was for the most part quiet, was 
prolonging the insurgency on Samar by illicit trade in rice. The vessels on patrol on Cebu 
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Station at that time were the Princeton, Isla de Cuba, Guardoqui, Mariveles, and 
Pampanga.456 With uncanny premonition, the commanding officer’s recommendations 
and suggestion would become reality after the Balingiga massacre.  
On September 28, 1901, at about 6 a.m., 400 boloman at the coastal village of 
Balangiga, Samar, attacked Company C of the 9th Regiment, U.S. Infantry. Unarmed and 
eating breakfast, of the seventy-two U.S. soldiers garrisoned at Balangiga, only 24 men 
and 11 wounded made it to the neighboring army garrison at Basey the next day. Most of 
the American soldiers died where they sat in the mess hall, hacked to death by bolos. An 
advance party sent to the town afterwards found the town empty, army buildings burned, 
and dead bodies mutilated. One dead army soldier was found still gasping a baseball bat 
in his dead hands, eight natives, with smashed heads, lay about him in a circle.457 
 The loss of arms, about sixty rifles with 28,000 rounds, was also a serious matter. 
General Hughes viewed the natives’ actions as savage, and quickly dispatched a strong 
company to chastise the perpetrators.458 The massacre sent shock waves through the 
Philippines and America. To further deal with the insurgents on Samar, the 12th Infantry 
Battalion and 300 marines were sent to strengthen the small garrisons on the island.459 
After Balingiga, insurgents on Samar became more brazen in their actions. On October 
16, 1901, 46 men of Company E were attacked by 400 bolomen, 10 U.S. soldiers were 
killed and six wounded, at a cost of 81 insurgents killed.460 American retribution, by the 
army and navy, would be swift and unrelenting; Balangiga would usher in the most 
extreme of harsh methods employed by U.S. forces during the Philippine Insurrection. 
On October 7, 1901, in response to the Balangiga Massacre, Rear Admiral Remey wrote 
the Secretary of the Navy to urge the adoption of more stringent measures against the 
insurrection, in the line of deportation which had begun in January. He (Remey) saw this 
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as the most powerful and humane deterrent against the insurrection, better than “shooting 
and hanging would have”.461 
On October 9, 1901, Brigadier General Jacob H. “howling Jake” Smith left 
Manila to command Samar. In an effort to ensure a uniform strategy and “remembering 
Balangiga”, Smith outlined “the policy” as he put it. As natives were beginning to present 
themselves at the garrisoned towns with greater frequency, Smith believed it would be 
advantages to lesson the rigors of war toward these non-combatants. In his policy, Smith 
classified Filipinos into two groups. The first group consisted of those in arms or those 
who collected arms, money, food, or information for those in arms. The second group 
consisted of all those not actively in the first group. Toward the first group, Smith 
advocated constant unremitting prosecution, active attacks, and the cutting off of 
supplies. Toward the second group, he promoted the softening of restrictions and 
prohibitions. He allowed them to provide for themselves the necessities of life, making 
sure that they did not suffer for food or clothing. To achieve this policy, Smith informed 
all army garrisons to notify the natives in their vicinity, that for their protection, they 
would be required to move within certain prescribed limits. As long as they (natives) 
remained peaceful, they would be afforded all the opportunities to obtain food and other 
necessities. Smith also informed all his garrison commanders to always assume the 
offensive and pursue the enemy vigorously, an order that will be shown was carried out 
very effectively through the cooperation of the army and navy.462 
While operating in the waters between southern Luzon and Samar, the gunboat 
Quiros received intelligence from the army that native craft were crossing the straits 
when gunboats were not in sight. On October 30, 1901, the gunboat patrolled along 
southern Luzon and discovered one large and two small praws (native fishing canoes), 
two bancas, and one large war canoe. The ship sent a landing party to further investigate 
and found some 2,000 pounds of rice and a large quantity of hemp being dried (indicating 
it was recently brought in by water). In the absence of papers, all was destroyed. It was 
the assumption of the commanding officer, Lieutenant W. B. Fletcher, that the rice was 
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being smuggled into Samar and that hemp was being brought back to be taken to a 
neighboring town where Smith, Bell and Company collected hemp. It was Fletcher’s 
suggestion that all the ports be closed to trade and that an additional gunboat, preferably 
of the Pampanga Class, be sent to patrol the area. It would only be a short period before 
his suggestions became reality.463 
On October 18, 1901, Major Edwin T. Glenn, Judge Advocate for the Department 
of the Visayas, requested from the navy a gunboat to assist him in arresting several 
known local officials on the island of Biliran and Leyte which were delivering hemp and 
aiding in the distribution of rice to Samar to help the insurgency. Glenn further stated that 
this would be in line with the navy’s efforts to blockaded Leyte from Samar, cooperate 
with the army, and conformed to the wishes of Hughes.464 The Villalobos, reporting on 
her expedition with Glenn, reported that between October 18 thru the 20th, she had visited 
two ports on Leyte that resulted in the arrested of seven insurgent supporters, and visited 
six ports on the Island of Beliran and arrested  eleven further collaborators, several arms, 
insurgent documents, and a large amount of insurgent funds, estimated at over 200,000 
pesos.465 
On October 3, 1901, the gunboat Arayat cooperated with the army in 
reconnoitering insurgent positions. On the 5th, finding insurgents in force, the gunboat 
fired the ship’s Colt automatic, 6-pdr., fore and aft 3-pdrs., and 1-pdr. into the insurgent 
positions, knocking down the insurgent flag and silencing any resistance. When a 
combined army and navy party began to land, the insurgents opened fire, but the use of 
the ship’s Colt and 6-pdr. on the swamps and breastwork quieted the insurgents, and upon 
landing, the party found the entrenchments deserted. On October 6th, the gunboat 
patrolled the area around Pambujan, clearing out insurgent fisherman and destroying fish 
corrals. From Oct 7-11, the gunboat patrolled the area and continued to bombard the 
insurgents who had returned to Omagongong. The Arayat arrived at Balangiga on Oct 14, 
1901, finding a small garrison made up of only half a company, mostly new recruits who 
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were greatly affected by the post’s previous history, and resulted in several pigs being 
shot every night as suspected boloman. Insurgents in the vicinity continued to harass the 
garrison by firing into the town at night. But with the presence of a gunboat in the harbor, 
the insurgents were not apt to attack. The moral effect of a gunboat was about equal to 
that produced by a regiment on the natives.  
Before departing, the garrison commander requested that the Arayat lob a  couple 
of shells the insurgent way, so the gunboat steamed close in to the point and shelled all 
the houses in sight, setting a number on fire. On October 16, 1901, the Arayat returned to 
Panbujan, but found that the garrison had been relieved by a whole company of the 7th 
infantry, so not being needed, the gunboat left on October 17, and arrived at the port of 
Laguan on the north coast of Samar on the 19th. The garrison commander informed the 
Arayat that the town of Laguan had grown to over 5,000 people along with the 
neighboring town of Palapa which had also grown significantly. Initially it had been hard 
to get the natives to come in after the order “to come in” was issued and had no effect, so 
the army set about burning all the outlying houses, killing a dozen or so natives, and the 
next day 300 moved into the town.  
The next port call for the Arayat was at Oras, and there also was found that the 
town had grown to 2,000 people. The gunboat next engaged in cooperating with the army 
on Samar as she landed army and navy troops at two places along the Samar coast known 
to be inhabited by insurgents; 45 houses were destroyed along with 20 boats. On October 
26, 1901, the gunboat arranged to conduct a joint operation around the Salcedo River, as 
the army had been unable to reach the countryside. On the 27th, the combined forces 
landed under the guns of the Arayat and cleared out the island of Tubabao and the 
adjacent shores of Samar, burning 80 houses, 65 boats, and shooting a good deal of live 
stock. On the 28th, on the Samar coast near the mouth of the Salcedo River, the gunboats’ 
main batteries cleared the jungle as a landing force advanced, killing an unknown number 
of boloman, destroying 25 boats, and burning 45 houses, and again killing a number of 
live stock.466 
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The Arayat reported on November 6, 1901, that she landed a detachment of army 
troops along the coast of Samar and assisted by firing her 1-pdr. at houses along the 
beach to clear them of insurgents. In all, the small expedition destroyed 17 bancas, 5 fish 
weirs, much live stock, and 34 houses near the Salcedo river. On November 14, 1901, in 
cooperation with the army, a landing party of navy bluejackets joined an army column of 
52 troops and 450 natives. For two days the expedition scoured the countryside, marching 
for over 50 miles, burning 50 houses, 2 insurgent camps, killing ten insurgents, and much 
live stock.467 Besides wrecking havoc on illicit trade on the high seas, the navy was 
obviously also engaged in cooperating with the army’s policy of creating a “howling 
wilderness” on the interior of Samar. 
On November 23, 1901, Major General Chaffee wrote Like E. Wright, the Vice-
Civil governor of the Philippines, that the civil government on Leyte was suspended and 
trade on both Leyte and Samar was prohibited. All boats would be fired upon and 
destroyed by the navy; except, fishing vessels. The reason for such harsh measures was 
the insurrection on Samar, for which Leyte was sending food, men, and arms, and money 
across the straits of San Juanico. The shipping passes issued on Leyte were being abused 
by the insurgents. One vessel plying between the two islands was found to have rice and 
lead (used for manufacturing ammunition); all such contraband would be destroyed or 
commandeered.468 
The Yorktown, senior officer present, for the Samar patrol, reported in mid-
December, that upon investigation, it was found that a number of army officers and 
enlisted personnel were providing protection to disguised insurectos by the indiscriminate 
and careless manner in which passes were being issued to vessels. General Smith was 
outraged, he viewed that the navy was getting the problem of illicit trade into shape; 
native boats and towns along the coast viewed gunboats as formidable obstacles and 
extreme danger to any illegal traffic for themselves and for all their property afloat and 
within reach on shore. General Smith immediately prohibited the use of passes. The 
passes were originally issued in the hope of easing native suffering, but protests of 
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starvation were more than the circumstances justified, and Hughes saw the suffering as an 
aid in bringing the insurrectos to term.469  
On January 8, 1902, the Yorktown, reporting from Samar, again expressed 
frustration with the army concerning the blockade. It was a trying experience as the 
passes given by the army were used as a convenient cloak to pursue contraband traffic. 
Luckily, the commanding officer of the Yorktown spent three days with Smith aboard, 
and presented his findings. One of the worst ports was Basey, and the island of Leyte. 
Army officers seemed blind to the fact that some of the most trusted natives had 
complicity in furnishing supplies to the insurrectos. A number of boats and occupants 
captured and turned in at Basay and Tacloban, were released afterwards and reengaged in 
this traffic. On the previous Saturday, 63 boats were overhauled, and 3 of every 4 had 
been captured and turned in previously by a gunboat. Smith pledged his full support.470 
On January 14, 1902, Admiral Rodgers stated that, “It may safely be said that if the 
military operations on shore were conducted by the Army with the same unflagging zeal, 
energy, and unity of purpose that characterizes the movements afloat, that the termination 
of hostilities in Samar would be a matter of weeks instead of months.”471 
On February 18, 1902, General Vicente Lukban was captured by a party of 
Philippine Scouts on Samar. Lukban reported on Feb 25, 1901, that the army and the 
navy had harassed him and kept him on the move; the naval blockade had paralyzed trade 
and was very severe, hampering communications with Leyte. He described the blockade 
as being so very close and with the constant bombardment, people could only plant a 
little rice to sustain themselves, while the army sacked towns.472 Lukban’s remaining 
forces surrendered in April, and on June 17, 1902, the island reverted to civilian 
government, paving the way for the declared end of hostilities two week later.473 The last 
of the insurgents had been defeated. 
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 Samar had been a difficult occupation for the United States. While is 
topography and reliance on the importation of foodstuffs made it very susceptible to the 
navy’s blockade, it was not until the army unified its command and strategy that 
pacification took hold. With the full blockade of the island by the navy, the vigorous 
destruction of all property outside the American occupied towns, and the relentless 
pursuit of the insurgents by the army with the navy’s aid, the insurgents were finally 
defeated. 
G. THE END OF HOSTILITIES 
On July 2, 1902, the Secretary of War informed General Chaffee that the 
President would end the insurrection on July 4, 1902, with the following proclamation:  
The insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the 
Philippine Archipelago having ended, and provincial civil governments 
having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago 
not inhabited by Moro tribes, under instructions of the President to the 
Philippine commission dated April 7, 1900, now ratified and confirmed by 
the Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, entitled ‘An act temporarily 
to provide for the administration of affairs of civil government in the 
Philippine Islands and for other purposes,’ the general commanding 
division of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the further performance 
of the duties of military governor and the office of the military governor in 
said archipelago is terminated. The general commanding division of the 
Philippines and all military officers in authority therein will continue to 
observe direction contained in the aforesaid instructions of the President, 
that the military forces in the division of the Philippines shall be at all 
times subject, under the orders of the military commander, to the call of 
the civic authorities for maintenance of law and the enforcement of their 
authority.474  
On July 4, 1902, the Philippine Insurrection ended. Months earlier, the junior 
squadron commander reported that Samar would be quiet for some time.475 On May 14, 
1901, the Concord was ordered to Alaska, the Castine and Marietta to the Atlantic, and 
the Princeton and Petrel to Mare Island for overhaul.476  Two days after the end of 
hostilities in the Philippines, the Navy department further sought to downsize its forces in 
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the Philippines, so on July 7, 1902, the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces on Asiatic 
Station recommended that the Basco, Calamianes, Luzon, Mariveles, Panay, Paragua, 
and Arayat should be decommissioned, but only after they were, “overhauled and 
prepared for immediate service in case of necessity”. At that time the admiral spoke how 
the squadron was cooperating with the army on the coast of Mindanao and in the Sulu 
Archipelago.477 A year later, the southern squadron commander wrote, on May 20, 1903, 
that the squadron consisted of the Rainbow (Flagship), Albay, Annapolis, Celtic, Don 
Juan de Austria, Frolic, Isla de Cuba, Iris, Piscataqua, Quiros, Samar, Wompatuck, and 
Zafiro. The duties of the ships were in suppressing illicit traffic, cooperating with the 
military authorities, and when necessary, collecting hydrographic information. The only 
operations of war were on the island of Mindanao with the Moros. The squadron had two 
patrol districts, that of Polloc on the east coast of Mindanao, and that of Zamboanga on 
the southern coast. The gunboats Cuba, Frolic and Quiros were being held at Cavite in 
readiness to intercept a vessel about to leave Hong Kong with a shipment of arms, but no 
further information was available.478 The Philippine Insurrection was over, but hostilities 
on Mindanao, separate from the Insurrection, would ignite in 1903 and lead to a conflict 
that could be said persists till today. 
In his annual report for 1903, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, H. C. Taylor, 
reported on the Asiatic Station that there was a general state of peace, except for the 
patrols of the southern coast of Mindanao and of the Sulu Islands where the navy was 
aiding to assist the army in checking supplies for the Moros and the suppression of illicit 
traffic. The Asiatic Squadron saw a shift as vessels were transferred to the northern 
squadron (see table 5). 479 While advocating the need for ten cruisers on the station, he 
did not provide any reasoning. But in his recommendation for two more gunboats, he 
explained that they were needed for the protection of U.S. interests on the rivers of China. 
He used the examples of other nations which had similar vessels in Chinese waters, and 
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as American interests in China were growing, it was earnestly recommended that such 
vessels be immediately provided. The beginning of the Yangtze River Patrol was born.480 
 
Table 5. Vessels on Station for 1903 
VESSEL ASSIGNMENT TYPE 
Kentucky CINC Asiatic Flagship Battleship 
Wisconsin Northern Squadron Flagship Battleship 
Rainbow Southern Squadron Flagship Auxiliary 
Oregon Northern Squadron Battleship 
Monterey Northern Squadron Monitor 
Monadnock Northern Squadron Monitor 
New Orleans Northern Squadron Cruiser 
Helena Northern Squadron Gunboat 
Wilmington Northern Squadron Gunboat 
Vicksburg Northern Squadron Gun 
Monocacy Northern Squadron Gunboat 
Elcano Northern Squadron Gunboat 
Callao Northern Squadron Gunboat 
Villalobos Northern Squadron Gunboat 
Annapolis Southern Squadron Gunboat 
Austria Southern Squadron Gunboat 
Cuba Southern Squadron Gun 
Frolic Southern Squadron Gun 
Quiros Southern Squadron Gunboat 
Albay Southern Squadron Gun 
Samara Southern Squadron Gun 
Wompatuck Southern Squadron Gunboat (armed tug) 
Piscataqua Southern Squadron Gunboat (armed tug) 
Isla de Luzon Detached Gunboat 
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VESSEL ASSIGNMENT TYPE 
New York Detached Armored Cruiser 
Yorktown Detached Gunboat 
Princeton Detached Gunboat 
Arayat Decommissioned Gunboat 
Basco Decommissioned Gunboat 
Panay Decommissioned Gunboat 
Calamianes Decommissioned Gunboat 
Mariveles Decommissioned Gunboat 
Paragua Decommissioned Gunboat 
 
According to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, “The campaign in the 
Philippines, so far as concerns the navy, has consisted almost entirely in cooperation with 
army expeditions against the insurgents, upon which, as evidenced by the reports of all 
army officers concerned, the naval vessels rendered invaluable assistance. A further 
check upon the insurgents has been the rigid system of patrol carried on by the smaller 
gunboats, which has materially hampered the inflow of arms and ammunition to the 
islands.”481 A prime example of the results of the navy’s efforts in blockading the 
importation of arms for the insurgents was when insurgent Major Jeciel, commanding 
Isabela Province, reported that it was almost impossible to obtain ammunition for his 
troops’ Mauser and Remington rifles.482 Another example of the navy’s success in the 
blockade was when the insurgent commander, of the island of Mindoro, wrote the Hong 
Kong junta that even though he had sufficient rifles, their ammunition was exhausted and 
they did not have the means for making more.483 On Samar, the insurgents were so short 
on weapons that they dig up American graves as they usually buried their dead with their 
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arms.484 For the navy’s role in blockading the importing of arms to the insurgents, the 
navy’s efforts were highly successful. 
There have been many critics to the army’s policy of “concentration” in which the 
navy was a vital factor. Such authors such as Teodoro Kalaw, Leon Wolff, and Stuart 
Miller saw Generals Bell and Smith as butchers, but some, such as John Taylor, John 
Gates, and Brian Linn have tended to defend the army’s policy.485 As benevolence and 
civic action gave way to repression, coercive measures had increased; property 
destruction to deprive guerrillas of food and shelter and also punish their supporters was 
popular. Colonel Arthur Murray on Leyte professed in 1902 that having to do it over 
again, he would to a little more killing and a little more burning.486 In the end, it was the 
practice of provocation as much as appeasement that rendered the insurrection a failure. 
In both instances, the navy’s gunboats played a major role. 
For the period from January 1, 1901 to the conclusion of hostilities on July 4, 
1902, the navy greatly aided in the suppression of the insurgency. The navy prevented the 
flow of arms to the insurgents. As the army sought to implement more stringent 
pacification policies against the insurgents and their supporters, it was the navy that 
prevented illicit trade, consisting of hemp and foodstuff, from being imported and 
exported, thus greatly affecting the populations ability to sustain itself outside of 
American controlled areas. As the army also instituted a more rigorous policy of pursuing 
the insurgents, it was the navy again who aided in covering the landings, communicating 
with garrisons, and transporting the army to the remote locations that the insurgents 
inhabited. The navy’s role for the last period of hostilities was as instrumental as the 
previous years, and directly aided in ending the insurrection. 
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V. THE AFTERMATH 
America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by . . . the embittered 
few. We must defeat these threats to our nation, allies, and friends.487 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the role of the United States Navy within 
the complexities of the Philippine Insurrection, a role that cannot be simply ascribed to 
the traditional notion of cooperating with the army and enforcing a blockade. The navy 
engaged in these tasks and with much success, but it is imperative to have a broader 
understanding of how these fit into the larger scheme of the conflict. For that reason, this 
study narrated the intricacies of how and when the navy cooperated with the army, 
effected the blockade, and conducted other operations. The result has been an in-depth 
understanding of the crucial part that the Navy played in the Philippine Insurrection. 
The Philippine Insurrection has been described as America’s most successful 
counterinsurgency campaign; making it a prime study for the use of the military, civic 
action, and pacification operations.488 As described by Secretary of War Elihu Root at the 
conclusion of the insurrection, “It is evident that the insurrection has been brought to an 
end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand, and by making peace 
attractive, through immediate and present demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose to 
give to the people just and free government, on the other.”489  
What gave the U.S. military the advantage was the navy, notably the armed 
gunboats that operated upon the seas and rivers. The navy provided the crucial element 
without which; the army could not have conducted successful operations. The navy aided 
through the prevention of importation of arms and preventing coastal traffic in an 
archipelago that lacked roads. It  prevented Aguinaldo from centralizing his authority 
throughout the archipelago, disrupted the insurgents’ ability to raise and transport funds, 
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protected and supplied army garrisons, prevented the movement of insurgent troops, and 
provided the capability of amphibious operations which the enemy lacked.490 
In evaluating the cooperation between the army and the navy, it is clear that what 
is termed today as “jointness” was well in effect one hundred years ago. During the first 
year (1899) of conventional campaigns on Luzon, as the army sought to defeat the 
Filipino army through conventional warfare, the navy assisted. The navy provided fire 
support, supplies, communications, and the ability to conduct amphibious landings, from 
Cavite in the south to San Fabian in the north. As the conflict degraded into guerilla 
warfare and the army sought to expand its presence throughout the islands (1900), the 
navy again provided support, as in the Hemp Expedition. In the final stage of the conflict 
(1901-1902), as the army attempted to consolidate its hold on the archipelago and defeat 
the insurgents, it was the navy that provided the ability for the army to strike where it 
needed to, with surprise, along the coast and on inland waterways, as was seen with the 
capture of Aguinaldo. 
In assessing the blockade, it must be approached from the perspectives of external 
and internal facets. From abroad there was the threat of the importation of arms and 
ammunition. For all of the intelligence received on possible shipments, there is no 
evidence that any large arms shipment were ever captured. While it might be assumed 
that the navy failed in this regard, further exploration provides a different conclusion. 
Insurgent documents repeatedly indicate that arms were always in extremely short 
supply, to the point of causing defeat. 491 Furthermore, insurgent documents never 
acknowledge that any shipments were received after the onset of hostilities. Therefore, it 
is apparent that arms and ammunition were not being imported into the Philippines. The 
result of this must in part be attributed to the presence of the navy’s blockade in 
presenting an obstacle that maritime merchants were not willing to risk. Also deserving 
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credit must be the efforts of the State Department upon foreign countries, and the 
insurgents themselves for entering into bad business deals and embezzling their own 
funds for personal use. 492 
The other aspect of the blockade was internal, inter-island. In this aspect, the navy 
played a fundamental role in assisting the army’s pacification policy, interdicting the 
insurgent lines of communication and lines of action. Throughout the archipelago the 
navy cruised and boarded vessels carrying contraband. This denied the insurgents the 
ability to use water as a means of communicating, supplying, and transporting men and 
material. The biggest effect was in conjunction with the army’s pacification policy of 
concentration, begun by General Hughes on Panay, Cebu, and Samar, and then seen with 
General Bell in Batangas Province and General Smith on Samar. As the army sought to 
mass the civilian population in towns under its control, and destroy all foodstuffs within 
the interior, it was the navy which prevented the importation of food and supplies for the 
guerillas and in doing starved a number of insurgents into submission. 493 
The last role that the navy filled in the Philippine Insurrection was in regard to 
other operations, or more aptly termed, independent operations. With the army 
consistently short of personnel, ranging in the Philippines from 43,833 troops manning 53 
stations in November 1899 to 69,420 troops manning 502 stations by December 1900 
 it was up to the navy to act as a force multiplier and fill the gap. 494 While the 
army was busy on Luzon during the initial year, the navy captured the ports of Cebu and 
Zamboanga. In other instances, the navy conducted operations against “targets of 
opportunity”, firing upon insurgents ashore whenever possible. As the army eventually 
expanded its presence, the navy’s independent operations diminished. But, the navy 
continued to engage in preventing piracy, conducting survey work, and showing the flag 
in unoccupied ports. 
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From the Philippine Insurrection, there are a host of lessons to be learned, but in 
regards to the navy, this study focuses on three: the value of the navy in regards to the 
principles of war, in regards to the gunboat, and the usefulness of the navy in counter-
insurgency operations.  
The army was only able to adhere to the nine principles of war through the use of 
the navy.495 With a land force that reached a peak of some 70,000 troops, occupying an 
archipelago of 7,100 islands inhabited by 14,000,000 people was a daunting if not 
impossible task for the army.496 It was the navy which provided the army with the 
flexibility to achieve mass, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, and security 
throughout the islands by landing troops, ferrying reinforcements, and using the fire 
power of its naval guns. The ability of the army to move unimpeded along the coasts 
allowed the soldiers to drive the insurgents into the interior and away from their center of 
gravity, the native population. The insurgents themselves feared an American attack on 
this center of gravity on June 2, 1900. 497 While the army battled over the three remaining 
principles of objective, unity of command, and simplicity for some time, a hindrance that 
hampered the navy’s role and resulted in the prolongation of the conflict, the final 
adoption of unified stricter policies after 1900 solidified victory.498 
The second lesson concerns that of the utility of the gunboat. When discussing the 
navy in the Philippine Insurrection, the navy unequivocally equates to the gunboat. No 
other vessels could accomplish the tasks required in the Philippines in operating in the 
littorals. The large capital ships of the Asiatic Station were relatively useless as seen 
through the reduced crews mandated, the sinking of the Charleston, and their relative 
obscurity from action. While gunboats could not match the firepower of the larger 
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cruisers or battleships, their ability to maneuver close ashore proved even more 
advantages in cooperating with the army. In effecting a blockade, multiple small vessels 
could cover the expansive area of the archipelago and pursue vessels into the littoral 
waterways.  
The third lesson concerns the utility of the navy in counter-insurgency operations. 
When the Filipino Revolutionaries resorted to conventional warfare, it had been capital 
ships and gunboats that aided the army in defeating the enemy. But, when it turned to a 
guerilla insurrection, it was the gunboat that acted alone in aiding the army, a theme 
echoed by the “hero of Manila Bay”, Rear Admiral Dewey, “Once the early fighting with 
the insurgents was over and their capital at Malolos taken, the problem was one of 
successive occupation of towns and provinces against all the exasperations of guerilla 
warfare, in which the navy could be of assistance only by protecting landing forces and 
the use of its small gunboats in shallow waters.”499 Insurgents rarely massed in large 
numbers and retained great flexibility to maneuver, so the gunboats’ speed, surprise, 
firepower, and ability to land sufficient troops, enabled the army to defeat the insurgents 
along the coasts and inland waterways of the archipelago. Insurgents derived their 
strength through the populace; it is where they received their food, money, supplies, 
recruits, and hid. It was only in combination with the navy that the army was able to 
separate this vital linkage. By controlling the food, commerce, and maritime traffic, the 
insurgency lost its support base and finally collapsed. 
The implications for today’s navy are simple.  As the secretary of the navy 
reported in 1902, “a modern navy cannot be improvised, it needs time for development 
and perfection, and neither is war or the threat of war the time.500 The capital ship, 
whether it was the cruisers and battleships of yesteryear or the Aegis destroyers and 
aircraft carriers of today, will always be needed. Conventional military threats and 
opposing navies mandate this. As Rear Admiral Remey, in an early premonition of things 
to come, wrote on Japan’s desire for the Philippines: 
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In these times of international unrest and territorial expansion, the 
defenselessness of our position in the Philippines is a standing invitation 
to attack. Against Japan, close at hand with all her resources, we would be 
almost helpless, at least until a powerful expedition could be equipped and 
sent out from the United States, during which time we would probably 
lose all we now hold in the islands, with part of our fleet.501 
While the Spanish-American War has been seen as the principle event of the navy 
from 1897-1911, in shaping naval policy, accelerated ship building, increase in officers 
and seaman, and educational facilities, the Philippine Insurrection provides a different 
perspective. Following decades of neglect after the Civil War, in which officers stagnated 
from the lack of upward mobility and lacked initiative, decision, resourcefulness, and had 
little experience except for routine subordinate tasks, the Philippine Insurrection aided in 
solving these problems.502 As America transitioned to a world power with a navy to 
match, it was not aboard the large combatants or in the classrooms that the skills required 
were obtained, but rather on the bridges of gunboats. As most eloquently put by Bradley 
A. Fiske, who rose to the rank of rear admiral: 
Yet as I looked at McFarland, I could not help a little feeling of bitterness, 
in seeing this young man so early in command (gunboat Samar) of a 
vessel, when I compared with it the crushing hopelessness of the life that 
officers of my age had led for many years. We had spent the most aspiring 
years of our lives in the dullest, the most uninteresting, and the most 
useless duties . . . .503 
It was the young officers aboard gunboats in the Philippines who as much as 
anyone  ushered in the new era of the 20th century; not on great battleships fighting an 
enemy fleet, but operating in the littorals, in support of land forces and against an enemy 
with no fleet. From the experience of the Philippine Insurrection, these same officers 
would lead the nation as captains and admirals to success in two World Wars.504  
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Over the course of United States, war has only been declared five times, and yet 
America has engaged in over two-hundred armed conflicts. The threat posed today by 
insurgents and terrorists has been described as asymmetrical, and has sent the United 
States military onto a path of “Transformation”. But as these enemies employ the same 
strategy and tactics that their predecessors used one hundred years ago, is it logical to 


















VI. APPENDIX A.  U.S. NAVAL SHIPS OF THE PHILIPPINE 
INSURRECTION 
The following is an alphabetical compilation of the combatant naval vessels that 
served aboard the Asiatic Station in the Philippines on one or more occasions between 
February 4, 1899 and July 4, 1902, excluded are auxillary vessels: colliers, refrigerators, 
and supply ships. 505 Pictures, when available, have been included.506 
 
Name: Albany 
Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: May 29, 1900   Complement: 365 
Displacement: 4,011 tons    Length: 346 feet 
Beam: 43.75 feet     Maximum Draft: 20 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 6-inch guns, (4) 4,7-inch guns. 
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Name: Albay 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: May 21, 1899   Complement: 27 
Displacement: 151 tons    Length: 100 feet 
Beam: 17.5 feet     Mean Draft: 6.75 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 6-pdr., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department 
 
Name: Annapolis 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Annapolis 
Commissioned: July 20, 1897   Complement:  
Displacement: 1,116 tons    Length: 168 feet 
Beam: 36 feet      Maximum Draft: 13.8 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 4-inch guns 








Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: August 10, 1900   Complement:  
Displacement: 201 tons    Length:  
Beam:       Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery:  




Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: January 7, 1890   Complement: 395 
Displacement: 5,436 tons    Length: 327.5 feet 
Beam: 48.6 feet     Maximum Draft: 24 feet 
Main Battery: (12) 6-inch guns, (6) 14-pdrs. 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 2, 1899    Complement:  
Displacement: 42 tons     Length:  
Beam:       Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (2) 1-pdrs., (1) Colt automatic 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. Converted tugboat. 
 
Name: Bennington 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Yorktown 
Commissioned: June 20, 1891   Complement: 197 
Displacement: 1710 tons    Length: 230 feet 
Beam: 36 feet      Maximum Draft: 16.5 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 6-inch guns 




Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: May 2, 1887    Complement: 301 
Displacement: 3195 tons    Length: 271.25 feet 
Beam: 42 feet      Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery: (2) 8-inch guns, (6) 6-inch guns 





Type: Armored Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: December 1, 1896   Complement: 517 
Displacement: 9,797 tons    Length: 400.5 feet 
Beam:  64.75 feet     Maximum Draft: 26 feet 
Main Battery: (8) 8-inch guns, (12) 5-inch guns 





Type: Auxiliary Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned:      Complement:  
Displacement: 6,888 tons    Length:  
Beam:        Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery: (4) 4-inch guns, (2) 5-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 11, 1899   Complement:  
Displacement: 151 tons    Length:  
Beam:        Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 3-pdr., (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Callao 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: July 31, 1898   Complement:  
Displacement: 208 tons    Length: 119 feet 
Beam: 17.5 feet     Maximum Draft: 6.66 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 6-pdr., (3) 3-pdrs., (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Captured during war with Spain. 
 
Name: Castine 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Machias 
Commissioned: October 22, 1894   Complement: 153 
Displacement: 1318 tons    Length: 204 feet 
Beam: 32 feet      Maximum Draft: 14.33 feet 
Main Battery: (8) 4-inch guns 




Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: December 26, 1889   Complement: 309 
Displacement: 3,730 tons    Length: 312.5 feet 
Beam: 46.1 feet     Maximum Draft: 21.66 feet 
Main Battery: (2) 8-inch guns, (6) 6-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (4) 6-pdrs., (2) 3-pdrs., (2) 1-pdrs., (2) 6mm Colt automatics, (4) 
37mm guns, (1) 3-inch field gun 
Notes: Sunk off coast of Northern Luzon after striking uncharted reef. 
 
Name: Concord 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Yorktown 
Commissioned: February 14, 1891   Complement: 194 
Displacement: 1,815 tons    Length: 230 feet 
Beam:  36 feet      Maximum Draft: 16.5 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 6-inch guns 











Name: Don Juan de Austria 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Don Juan de Austria 
Commissioned: April 11, 1900   Complement:  
Displacement: 1,130 tons    Length: 210 feet 
Beam:  32 feet      Maximum Draft: 12.5 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 5-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (4) 6-pdrs., (4) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes: Captured during war with Spain. 
 
Name: El Cano 
Type: Gunboat     Class: El Cano 
Commissioned: November 20, 1902   Complement:  
Displacement: 560 tons    Length:  
Beam:        Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (4) 4-inch guns, (4) 6-pdrs., (2) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Frolic 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: July 6, 1898    Complement: 44 
Displacement: 607 tons    Length: 165 feet 
Beam:  25 feet      Maximum Draft: 10.33 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (4) 3-pdrs., (2) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes: Converted yacht. 
 
Name: General Alava 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: March 9, 1900   Complement:  
Displacement: 1,390 tons    Length: 212 feet 
Beam: 28.25 feet     Maximum Draft: 16 feet 
Main Battery:  




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 2, 1899    Complement:  
Displacement: 42 tons     Length:  
Beam:        Maximum Draft:  
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 




Type: Gunboat     Class: Wilmington 
Commissioned: July 8, 1897    Complement: 170 
Displacement: 1,689 tons    Length: 250.75 feet 
Beam:  40 feet      Maximum Draft: 11.75 feet 
Main Battery: (8) 4-inch guns 






Name: Isla de Cuba 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Isla de Luzon 
Commissioned: April 11, 1900   Complement: 137 
Displacement: 1,125 tons    Length: 192 feet 
Beam:  30 feet      Maximum Draft: 12.33 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 4-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (4) 6-pdrs., (4) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes: Captured during war with Spain. 
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USS Isla de Cuba 
 
 
Name: Isla de Luzon 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Isla de Luzon 
Commissioned: January 30, 1900   Complement: 137 
Displacement: 1,125 feet    Length: 192 feet 
Beam:  30 feet      Maximum Draft: 12.33 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 4-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (4) 6-pdrs., (4) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes: Captured during war with Spain. 
 
Name: Kentucky 
Type: Battleship     Class: Kearsage 
Commissioned:     Complement:  
Displacement: 12,905 feet    Length: 368 feet 
Beam:  72.1 feet     Maximum Draft: 25.9 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 13-inch guns, (4) 8-inch guns, (14) 5-inch guns 









Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: March 22, 1900   Complement:  
Displacement: 151 tons    Length: 115 feet 
Beam:  17.5 feet     Maximum Draft: 7.44 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 6-pdr., (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Captured during war with Spain. 
 
Name: Manila 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: July 31, 1898   Complement: 93 
Displacement: 1,750 tons    Length: 209.25 feet 
Beam:  31.1 feet     Maximum Draft: 13.5 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 4-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (4) 6-pdrs., (4) 1-pdrs., (2) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes: Captured during War with Spain. 
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Name: Manileño 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: May 26, 1899   Complement:  
Displacement: 142 tons    Length: 97 feet 
Beam:  18 feet      Maximum Draft: 6 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 6-pdr., (1) 6mm Colt automatic, (2) 37mm guns, (2) Gatlings  
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Marietta 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Wheeling 
Commissioned: September 1, 1897   Complement: 144 
Displacement: 1,058 tons    Length: 174 feet 
Beam:  34 feet      Maximum Draft: 13 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 4-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 17, 1899   Complement: 27 
Displacement: 142 tons    Length: 99.75 feet 
Beam:  16.5 feet     Mean Draft: 6 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 3-pdr., (1) 37mm gun, (1) Gatling gun  
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Mindoro 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 11, 1899   Complement:  
Displacement: 142 tons    Length:  
Beam:        Maximum  
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 3-pdr., (1) 37mm gun, (1) Gatling gun  
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Monadnock 
Type: Monitor     Class:  
Commissioned: February 20, 1896   Complement: 213 
Displacement: 4,005 tons    Length: 259.5 feet 
Beam:  55.5 feet     Maximum Draft: 14.5 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 10-inch guns, (2) 4-inch guns 






Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned:     Complement: 158 
Displacement:  1,370 tons    Length: 255 feet 
Beam: 35 feet      Maximum Draft: 9  feet 
Main Battery:  




Type: Monitor     Class:  
Commissioned: February 13, 1893   Complement: 218 
Displacement: 4,084 tons    Length: 256 feet 
Beam: 59 feet      Maximum Draft: 15.33 feet 
Main Battery: (2) 12-inch guns, (2) 10-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class: Nashville 
Commissioned: August 19, 1897   Complement: 178 
Displacement: 1,720 tons    Length: 220 feet 
Beam:  38 feet      Maximum Draft: 13.33 tons 
Main Battery: (8) 4-inch guns 




Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: February 2, 1891   Complement: 393 
Displacement: 4,592 tons    Length: 311.5 feet 
Beam:  49.1 feet     Maximum Draft: 23.25 feet 
Main Battery: (12) 6-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (8) 6-pdrs., (4) 1-pdrs., (2) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes:  
 
Name: New Orleans 
Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: March 18, 1898   Complement: 365 
Displacement: 4,001 tons    Length: 346 feet 
Beam: 43.75 feet     Maximum Draft: 19.75 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 6-inch guns, (4) 4.7-inch guns 
Secondary Battery: (10) 6-pdrs., (8) 1-pdrs., (2) 6mm Colt automatics 
Notes:  
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Name: New York  
Type: Armored Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: August 1, 1893   Complement: 562 
Displacement: 9,021 tons    Length: 380.5 feet 
Beam: 64.9 feet     Maximum Draft: 26.75 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 8-inch guns, (12) 4-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: October 5, 1897   Complement: 135 
Displacement: 1,128  tons    Length: 168 feet 
Beam: 36 feet      Maximum Draft: 13  feet 
Main Battery: (6) 4-inch guns 




Type: Protected Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: February 5, 1895   Complement: 447 
Displacement: 6,602 tons    Length: 340 feet 
Beam: 53 feet      Maximum Draft: 24.75 feet 
Main Battery: (10) 5-inch guns, (4) 8-inch guns 




Type: Battleship     Class: Indiana 
Commissioned: July 15, 1896   Complement: 494 
Displacement: 11,719 tons    Length: 348 feet 
Beam: 69.25 feet     Maximum Draft: 27.1 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 13-inch guns, (8) 8-inch guns, (4) 6-inch guns 





Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 8, 1899    Complement:  
Displacement: 201 tons    Length:    
Beam:        Maximum Draft:    
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 6-pdr., (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
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Name: Panay 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: June 2, 1899    Complement:  
Displacement: 142 tons    Length:    
Beam:        Maximum Draft:    
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 6-pdr., (1) 3-pdr., (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic, (1) Gatling 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Paragua 
Type:       Class:  
Commissioned: May 26, 1899   Complement:  
Displacement: 201 tons    Length:   feet 
Beam:        Maximum Draft:    
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery:  
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department 
 
Name: Petrel 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Petrel 
Commissioned: December 10, 1889   Complement: 132 
Displacement: 956 tons    Length: 176.25 feet 
Beam: 31 feet      Maximum Draft: 13.5 feet 
Main Battery: (4) 6-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned:     Complement:  
Displacement: 854 tons    Length: 149 feet 
Beam: 28.5 feet     Maximum Draft: 12 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (4) 1-pdrs. 
Notes: Converted tugboat 
 
Name: Princeton 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Annapolis 
Commissioned: May 27, 1898   Complement: 147 
Displacement: 1,128  tons    Length: 168 feet 
Beam: 36 feet      Maximum Draft: 14.5 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 4-inch guns 





Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: March 14, 1900   Complement:  
Displacement: 347 tons    Length: 145 feet 
Beam: 22.5 feet     Maximum Draft:    
Main Battery: (2) 6-pdr. Nordenfelt guns 




Type: Protected Cruiser    Class: Cincinnati 
Commissioned: April 17, 1894   Complement: 313 
Displacement: 3,462 tons    Length: 300 feet 
Beam: 42 feet      Maximum Draft: 20.25 feet 
Main Battery: (11) 5-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: May 26, 1899   Complement: 30 
Displacement: 201  tons    Length: 113.75 feet 
Beam: 18 feet      Maximum Draft: 8 feet 
Main Battery: (1) 6-pdrs. 
Secondary Battery: (1) 3-pdrs., (2) 1-pdrs., (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department 
 
Name: Urdaneta 
Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: May 12, 1899   Complement: 15 
Displacement: 42 tons     Length: 71.5 feet 
Beam: 12.25 feet     Maximum Draft: 6.125 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (1) 1-pdr., (1) 37mm gun, (1) 6mm Colt automatic 
Notes: Originally purchased by War Department. 
 
Name: Vicksburg 
Type: Gunboat     Class: Annapolis 
Commissioned: October 23, 1897   Complement: 135 
Displacement: 1,128 tons    Length: 168 feet 
Beam: 36 feet      Maximum Draft: 12.75 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 4-inch guns 








Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: March 5, 1900   Complement:  
Displacement: 347 tons    Length:   feet 
Beam:   feet      Maximum Draft:   feet 
Main Battery:  







Type: Gunboat     Class: Wheeling 
Commissioned: August 10, 1897   Complement: 142 
Displacement: 1,170 tons    Length: 174 feet 
Beam: 34 feet      Maximum Draft: 13 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 4-inch guns 




Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned: May 13, 1897   Complement: 170 
Displacement: 1,689 tons    Length: 250.75 feet 
Beam: 40 feet      Maximum Draft: 11.75 feet 
Main Battery: (8) 4-inch guns 







Type: Gunboat     Class:  
Commissioned:     Complement:  
Displacement: 462 tons    Length: 117.5 feet 
Beam:  25.5 feet     Maximum Draft: 12 feet 
Main Battery:  
Secondary Battery: (3) 1-pdrs. 




Type: Gunboat     Class: Yorktown 
Commissioned: April 23, 1889   Complement: 195 
Displacement: 1,921 tons    Length: 230 feet 
Beam: 36 feet      Maximum Draft: 16.5 feet 
Main Battery: (6) 6-inch guns 




Type: Auxiliary Cruiser    Class:  
Commissioned: April 13, 1898   Complement: 285 
Displacement: 6,179 tons    Length: 389.1 feet 
Beam:48 feet      Maximum Draft: 20.1 feet 
Main Battery: (2) 5-inch guns 
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VII. APPENDIX B.  U.S. NAVAL GUNS OF THE PHILIPPINE 
INSURRECTION 
The following is a collection of illustrations of the naval guns used by ships on 




6mm Colt Automatic 
                                                 
507 Navy, Annual Reports for, 760-761. Hans Mehl, Naval Guns: 500 Years of Ship and Coastal 
Artillery (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 61-85. United Stated Navy Department, Bureau of 




45 Caliber Gatling Gun 
 
 




37mm Hotchkiss Gun 
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